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22 July 1985

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NUMEROUS HARBOR PROJECTS UNDERWAY ACROSS NORTH AFRICA

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
14 May 85 p 2

[Article by "W. An.": "Transshipment Facilities Needed for Industrial, Mining Projects"]

[Text] Frankfurt—Plans have been drawn up or construction has actually started recently on new port facilities in North African countries in particular in connection with industrial and mining projects. In Algeria, the new harbor of Djen-Djen near Jijel is being built close by the planned iron and steel complex of Bellara, operated by the state-owned Sider Corp. Recently, the Dutch firm of Ballast Nedam of Amstelveen was brought into the project which calls for an investment of some 750 million Dutch guilders. The Dutch firm has assumed responsibility for the dredging operations for which 40 million Dutch guilders have been budgeted. The main contract, worth 530 billion Italian lira, was awarded in the fall of 1984 to an Italian consortium headed by Societa Italiana per Condotte d'Acqua and including Mantelli & Co as well as Fincosit.

Over the next 4 years, the Italian consortium will build 4 kilometers of breakwaters and two kilometers of quays and excavate six and one-half million cubic meters of earth. The construction of the harbor of Djen-Djen is based on plans prepared by Tractionel S. A., Brussels, a firm of Belgian engineering consultants. The project is to be financed primarily by deliveries of Algerian oil to Italy. The Jidda, Saudi Arabia, Islamic Development Bank joined the project in August 1984 by extending a \$4 million loan.

The Spanish firm of Dragados y Construcciones and the Dutch firm of Royal Boskalis Westminster were awarded a contract to build a new commercial port at Zarzis by the Tunisian government in January 1985. The contract is said to be worth \$46 million. The construction project is connected to exploitation of potassium sulfate deposits in the vicinity of Zarzis in southern Tunisia. Financing of the Spanish share of the contract was arranged by Grindlay's Bank of London and that for the Dutch share by Hollandsche Bank-Unie of Amsterdam. Construction work will include excavation, earth moving and the construction of breakwaters and quays.

In January 1984, the FRG provided Tunisia with a DM 14.4 million loan for the expansion of the fishing harbor of Tabarka in the north of the country. This expansion calls for lengthening the breakwaters as well as the dredging and extension of the harbor basin, the construction of wharves, the establishment of the necessary infrastructure and the consultation work. Costs for the entire project are estimated at DM 33.4 million. The state-operated Commissariat General a la Pêche, Tunis, has overall responsibility for the project.

The [Tunisian] government's Office des Ports Nationaux Tunisiens awarded a \$16 million contract to the Turkish firm of Sezai-Fezai Akkaya in the summer of 1984 for the construction of piers for small freighters and tugboats in the port of Gabes. Plans for the expansion of the harbor which is used primarily for loading fertilizers and phosphoric acid were drawn up by the Societe du Port Autonome of Marseilles, France which also assumed responsibility for supervising the bidding procedure.

In late 1984, the Marine Construction Company, of which the Yugoslav firm of Projekt Ivan Milutinovic (PIM) and the Libyan General Ports and Lights Authority are partners, was awarded a \$110 million contract by the Libyan government to rebuild the 4.7-kilometer breakwater of the port of Tripolis which was damaged by severe storms in the spring of 1981. In the spring of 1984, PIM had already been awarded a contract to complete the second stage of the expansion of the port of Misurata. That particular project is worth \$280 million. At Misurata, construction is currently underway on a major iron and steel complex. The Yugoslav company has also been awarded a contract for major work on the expansion of the port of Benghazi.

In Egypt, the new port facilities at Damietta, some 10 kilometers west of the Damietta arm of the Nile along the Mediterranean coast, are scheduled to go into operation sometime this year. The contract for the construction of this harbor went to a Franco-Japanese consortium headed by the Societe Generale d'Enterprise pour les Travaux Publics et Industriels. The consortium also includes other French firms, e.g. Screg, Grands Travaux de Marseille, Spie-Batignolles and Campenon Bernard. The overall contract is said to be worth about 1.2 billion French francs, with the French share amounting to 600 million French francs. The first stage of the Damietta project calls for the construction of six berths.

In connection with a major iron and steel complex in Egypt, construction is underway for port facilities at El Dikheila. The plans were jointly drawn up by the British firm of White Young and Partners, London; the government-operated Bureau Central d'Etudes pour les Equipements d'Outre Mer (BCEOM), Paris and the Paris Port Authority. The first stage of construction is scheduled for completion by late 1986. The harbor will be

protected by 2.25-kilometer breakwater and will be provided with a roughly 640-meter-long minerals dock and a container and lumber dock 1.5 kilometers in length. The World Bank provided partial financing for the project by extending a \$132 million loan.

The first stage of construction of the port of Abukir in Egypt was officially completed in the fall of 1983. Two more stages will follow. The port is to take some of the load off the port of Alexandria. Transshipment capacity of the first stage is said to be 3 million tons annually. That first stage included construction of wharves one kilometer in length as well as 1.2 kilometers of dock facilities. Costs of the first stage of construction are estimated to have run to 42 million Egyptian pounds. A large fertilizer complex is located at Abukir.

In Morocco, a construction project for a harbor in El Aïun in the former Spanish Sahara has been drawn up. The harbor will primarily be used to ship phosphates from the deposits at Bou Craa. It is to take place of the existing piers which frequently have to undergo repair. The project calls for construction of 2-kilometer breakwater as well as docking facilities and silos. Total costs are expected to be 700 million dirhams (with one dirham being equal to DM 0.33). The consulting work is being provided by the abovementioned French firm of BCEOM.

In March 1984, the Spanish firm of Dragados y Construcciones (also mentioned above) was awarded a more than \$100 million contract for the construction of additional facilities at the port of Agadir. These include transshipment of grain, petroleum products as well as regular roll on/roll off freight. The existing facilities at Agadir will henceforth be used by the fishing industry.

On the southern Atlantic coast, the French firm of Delattre-Lévivier has begun construction of an integrated fishing harbor at Tan Tan, Maroc, the French firm's Moroccan subsidiary, was made a partner in the project. The harbor will be used to process 53,000 tons of fish annually and will have cold storage facilities and an ice factory. Overall responsibility for the project went to Omnium Marocaine de Peche. The Delattre-Lévivier contract is worth about 200 million French francs.

A project has been drawn up for the construction of a drydock accommodating ships up to 60,000 tons at the new port of Jorf Lasfar which is to be used primarily for the shipment of phosphates and phosphorus. The European Investment Bank of Luxembourg has supported the construction of the Jorf Lasfar harbor by extending two loans totaling 40 million ecu (1 ecu=DM 2.23). The contract for construction of the harbor was awarded to Spie-Batignolles and two other firms. International bidding was recently opened on the renovation of silos for the storage of grain and vegetables in the ports of Safi and Casablanca by Societe des Silos Portuaires of Casablanca.

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CSO: 4620/40

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

INTERVIEW WITH AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OFFICIAL

JN061515 Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Jun 85 p 21

[Interview with Ahmad 'Uthmani, Amnesty International official in charge of organization for the Middle East and the Arab Maghreb, by Wafa Ahmad in Amman--date not specified]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Wafa Ahmad] Do you play a certain role in defending the Palestinian prisoners?

[Ahmad 'Uthmani] Before anything else, I would like to say that my responsibilities at the General Secretariat have nothing to do with investigating human rights, whether in this region or in any country in the world. Moreover, I am not authorized to make general statements or to give interviews on human rights in the countries I visit. These things are the responsibilities of Amnesty International's secretary general and the information section at the General Secretariat in London. In this regard, I would like to explain the limits that I should not exceed in answering the questions addressed to me--not because I do not want to answer them, but out of faith to my commitments. However, to answer your question, I can remind you of Amnesty International's publications, statements, and declared stand, within the framework of the organization's specific tasks, regarding what has taken place and what is taking place in Israel, in the occupied Palestinian territories, and in Lebanon in terms of violations of human rights.

In 1980, the organization issued a book entitled "Amnesty International's Report and Recommendations to the Israeli Government From 3-7 June 1979," which includes the Israeli government's reply and Amnesty International's comments. In October 1984, Amnesty International issued another report entitled "The Orders of House Arrest in the Cities and Villages in Israel and the Occupied Territories."

The organization also has its stands and statements regarding the conditions of the Palestinian prisoners. Some Arab newspapers have written about these stands and statements. I can recall the press statements on the detainees in the Ansar camp in Lebanon, on transferring the detainees to Israel, and the recent statement on what is taking place in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. This recent statement was reported by your newspaper. Moreover, in a wider range, Amnesty International adopts the cases of the Palestinian detainees, including the PLO members, and calls for releasing them as long as they do not carry out acts of violence or call for this. [passage omitted]

[Ahmad] Is it among your responsibilities to establish branches for the organization in some Arab countries? What are the steps you have achieved in this regard?

['Uthmani] So far, there is a branch being established in Tunis. Early this year I visited Morocco, Egypt, and Kuwait on a mission similar to my visit to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. I have found a great response from the citizens in these countries. We will continue our efforts to discuss the possibility of establishing branches and forming committees for Amnesty International in these countries.

In implementation of the aforementioned program, Amnesty International has begun Arabicizing some of its publications, such as its monthly publication which has been issued in Arabic for more than a year, in addition to some reports, files, and press communiques. Amnesty International is also seeking to develop the Arabicizing. You know that there is also an important role that should be played in this regard by the organization's strugglers, branches, and groups in the Arab countries, wherever they exist. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4400/168

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

INTERVIEW WITH AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL OFFICIAL--Ahmad 'Uthmani, Amnesty International official in charge of the organization for the Middle East and Arab Maghreb, is currently visiting Jordan in order to make contacts on the possibility of establishing a branch for the organization in Jordan and to acquaint the citizens, who are concerned with human rights, with the organization's objectives, publications, and reports. AL-DUSTUR met with 'Uthmani in order to discuss the organization, its objectives, inception, and other related issues. 'Uthmani says: Amnesty International is a nongovernmental organization. It is an independent international organization whose specific role is to protect human rights at an international level. However, it is an observer member with a consultative capacity in the United Nations, UNESCO, the European Council, and a number of other organizations. It does its utmost to preserve its neutrality in substance and content, and it urges governments to respect human rights as stipulated by international law. [passage omitted] This is all 'Uthmani could discuss. When we asked him a number of questions about the conditions of prisoners in the West Bank, he declined to answer. He said that his mission is specified by an official letter from the organization, and that his responsibility does not allow him to make public statements or hold press interviews about the conditions of human rights in the countries he visits. [By Tahsin Mansur] [Excerpts] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 6 Jun 85 p 4 JN]

CSO: 4400/168

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

APS, BURUNDESE AGENCY AGREEMENT--A delegation from the Algerian News Agency (APS) led by its general director, Mr Mohammed Benzeghiba, arrived on 26 June in Bujumbura for a 3-day official visit at the invitation of Benoit Muyeb, Burundese minister of information. During its stay, it examined with the Director General of the Burundese Press Agency "AB" Patrice Nilbandetse possibilities and cooperation prospects between the two agencies. An outline agreement of cooperation was signed between the two agencies by the general directors. /Text/ /Algiers APS in English 1011 GMT 29 Jun 85/

CSO: 4500/142

EGYPT

CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN ISRAELI CONCEPTS, POLICIES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 15 May 85 p 2

[Commentary by Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad]

[Text] Today Israel is celebrating its "Independence" Day ... in Egypt, even!

Since its establishment on 15 May 1948, Israel has been characterized by a dualism that distinguishes it from all other countries in the world. On the one hand, it is a "completed undertaking," in the sense that it is a "sovereign state" and a member of the United Nations. On the other hand, it is an "unfinished undertaking" whose nature has not yet been finalized, in the sense that it is a state whose final borders have to this day not been decided upon.

As a result of this dualism, many contradictory points of view have arisen. The positions that the Israeli parties--for example--take on what the borders of Israel should be are many. There are parties that believe that these borders should not encompass all of historical Palestine, in order to preserve the Jewish nature of the state and so that non-Jewish citizens would not form a significant minority or even the majority some day. Then there are parties that believe that the borders of Israel should go beyond the borders of historical Palestine, and preserving the Jewish nature of the state would be done by expelling the Arabs, the original owners of the land, with or without the use of force.

These contradictory positions over Israel's borders result in contradictory positions towards the Palestinian question: to what extent was there a Palestinian question to begin with in the view of Israel and its parties, and consequently, to what extent is recognizing the Palestinians as a people justified, along with their right to have a representative body? Therefore the objections by Israelis to recognizing the PLO come not because it is a terrorist organization as they say, but because the Palestinian people did not exist to begin with in their view, and the idea, consequently, of any organization that claims to represent something that does not exist does not hold water.

The dualisms and conflicting points of view have gone so far that Israel has come to have a prime minister who announces that he will not look closely into the identities of the Palestinians who will be included in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, as long as they are not known to belong to the PLO,

while on the other hand is the foreign minister, who must implement cabinet policy and who announces that Israel will never deal with Palestinians who belong to the PLO.

In light of these dualisms we wonder: What is the use of American efforts to discover the fine line that distinguishes "PLO members" from members of the Palestine National Council," or the fine line that distinguishes PLO members from Palestinians who are "sympathetic to the PLO," when the "American partner" is making no effort to do away with the contradictory and differing points of view and dualisms in the Israeli positions. Is it conceivable that any progress can be made in the talks when the Israeli cabinet itself takes conflicting stands on the most prominent issue that the talks will center on?

Finally, we pose this question to officials in Egypt: Is it right that Israel should celebrate its "Independence" Day in Cairo, when its position towards the Palestinian question remains the same: absolutely no recognition of the Palestinian people nor of their legitimate representatives?

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EGYPT

AMERICAN AID, RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 22 May 85 p 2

[Commentary by Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad]

[Text] Egypt's economic problems are directly related to the hazy efforts being made to make "a lot of progress" in the Egyptian-Israeli talks this week in Mina House. The term "a lot of progress" was quoted from a comment made by David Kimche, the Israeli negotiator, on the progress of the talks.

Improving relations with Israel, the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv, and the removal of obstacles to "normalization" are among the most important American conditions to continuing to offer economic aid to Egypt, despite the fact that Egypt has been unable to make some of its payments since the beginning of last year.

What is new in these talks is that the Egyptian-Israeli dialogue has resumed, after it had been cut off in practice since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, regardless of the fact that Cairo has a "peace" treaty with Israel, and that it was anxious to avoid giving Israel a pretext to say that Egypt had violated this treaty in any way whatsoever.

The resumption of the dialogue at a high level is not something Israel will accept as being a mere "formality" just to please Washington and to make it easier for Cairo to get the aid that it wants, without tangible, well-defined results from the talks that by their nature will keep land from the Arabs and stand in the way of Cairo's return to the Arab stage.

As soon as the talks are crowned with success, Israel has its own ready-made plans to descend upon Cairo with many projects in all areas of "normalization," to guarantee that no "cold peace" will occur again.

Therefore, the demonstrations took on a greater importance, those demonstrations that took place in the heart of Cairo and in front of the Jewish synagogue in 'Adli Street on 15 May to prevent Israel from celebrating in Egypt the anniversary of its establishment 37 years ago on 15 May 1948, defeating at that time the Arab armies, which included part of the Egyptian army.

The extraordinary central security measures in the heart of the city were set up in the hope of thwarting attempts to start the demonstrations in the first place, and to keep the Israeli delegation at Mina House from seeing that the Egyptian man in the street objects to the resumption of talks.

But the Taba question, the central issue in these talks, has remained unsolved because the Israeli side insists on rejecting the principle of arbitration, and adheres to acts of mediation that will guarantee for Israel "rights" in Egyptian Taba in the name of good intentions, and to test how hard the Egyptian side will be on this score.

The events of this week have shown that it is impossible for the opposition powers and parties to support government positions in foreign policy, as President Mubarak asked in his 1 May speech, because those positions are directly related to domestic policy.

The events of this week have shown that improving relations with Israel, which is a foreign policy issue, is strongly linked to American economic aid, which has a direct connection to how the government will go about confronting an issue which is at the heart of our domestic problems, Egypt's entrenched economic crisis.

The government will not escape the dilemma posed by this linkage, that is, from the fact that the American solution to our domestic problems would symbolize Egypt's improving its relations with Israel at the expense of its role and position in the surrounding Arab world, by Egypt's developing relations with capitals that are expected to play a role of "mediator," such as Bucharest and Ankara.

Rather the radical solution would be to free the course of our difficult economic problems from dependence on the United States and subservience to it, even though that would require a strategy for confronting these economic issues that would differ radically from what is being done now.

But there is nothing that would suggest that there is any intention of doing that.

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EGYPT

REPEAL OF PRICE CONTROLS ON PRODUCE CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 22 May 85 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] During a time of crisis the government's role becomes evident, and during hard times interference by the government increases....

Inasmuch as the government begins to withdraw gradually and release its grip day by day, giving free rein to exploiters, thieves, and those who love a quick profit.

When it was decided to repeal price controls on fruits and vegetables, following other previous repeals, that was the signal for a new storm of price hikes, though the producers and those who were supposed to be encouraged got nothing.

Consumers paid more, while the big merchants were the only ones who benefitted!

The question is: On whose side is the government? On the side of the poor and the middle class? On the side of those who wish to live honorably and make an honest living, or of those who wish to amass profits?

It would be logical for it to be in fact on the side of the majority, the weaker and the poorer. It would be logical to learn a lesson from the story of bulk milk, which at the producers costs 25 piasters per kilo, while it comes to us in the city at three times that price because of the middlemen.

We say: Repeal of price controls will not encourage production, but it will enrich the merchants and consumers will be burnt by the fires of new price hikes, aggravated by the planned price increases resulting from the removal of subsidies or price adjustments on some manufactured goods.

It is still the same old joke: the government is strengthening its control over the marketplace!

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CSO: 4504/369

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

CAPTURED SOVIET-MADE ARMS--Goulmina--Gen Jeannou Lacaze, chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, who has been visiting Morocco since Tuesday, went to the town of Goulmina in the south of the kingdom on Wednesday afternoon. General Lacaze was accompanied by Gen Abdelaziz Bennani, commander of the southern zone, the Sahara. At Goulmina airport five Soviet-made tanks, which were seized by the Royal armed forces during a battle against the "Polisario" mercenaries, were shown to the chief of staff of the French Army. These tanks, of the BMP type, and in perfect working order, are outfitted with sophisticated equipment. Maneuvers carried out using one of these tanks showed the capacity of this kind of tank in hitting its objective at any angle. Along with these five tanks several intact antitank missileers were also exhibited. /passage omitted/
/Excerpt/ /Rabat MAP in French 1000 GMT 27 Jun 85/

CSO: 4500/143

22 July 1985

SUDAN

AL-MUSTAQBAL INTERVIEWS CP LEADERS

JN301044 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 29 Jun 85 pp 52-54

[Interview with Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party and Al-Tijani al-Tayyib, a leading party member, by reporter As'ad Haydar; date and place not specified]

[Text] AL-MUSTAQBAL: How do you view the return to the masses and popular activity after 13 years of clandestine activity and legal prosecution?

Nuqud: The return is part of the struggle, just as clandestine activity was part of the struggle. The return has its responsibilities, tasks and problems. I believe that we have the competence and capability to quickly absorb the profound changes that have taken place in Sudan and in the Sudanese popular movement. At the same time, we are aware of the dangers surrounding Sudan and the Sudanese people's uprising as well as in the entire region.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: How have you overcome the tribulation of 13 years of legal prosecution, of rebuilding the party, and of playing a struggle role in overthrowing Ja'far Numayri and his regime?

Al-Tijani: After the 19 June 1971 defeat (the coup attempt led by Hashim al-'Ata), the setback began. This was marked by a campaign of arrests and atrocious suppression. Unfortunately, the government authorities were aided by several party Central Committee members, who volunteered to disclose the names of secret party members, their homes and even their hideouts. As a result, some 40,000 party members were arrested during that period, and only a few party leaders remained at large. It took us a long time to adjust to the new situation and to look for one another. During the period from July to September, we succeeded in regrouping the party members and their allies and in holding the first Central Committee meeting in September 1971. During that conference, we evaluated what took place in July, examined the means of overcoming the difficult situation, and expressed confidence that the party would surmount its tribulation. During that conference also we adopted a defensive stand and stressed the need to increase our forces as well as those of the popular movement without exaggerating our strength or belittling the pro-Numayri forces. We believed that the setback was a transient development and that the evolution of international politics was bound to clash with the Numayri regime.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Numayri's regime was on the verge of collapse almost 3 years ago. In the Communist Party's opinion, why did the final collapse take so long?

Al-Tijani: Several reasons contributed to the delay. These are:

1. Some opposition parties expected foreign states (that is the United States and Egypt) to replace Numayri.
2. The existence of clear reservations among intellectual circles concerning parties in general (perhaps, it is better to say that these reservations existed among intellectual circles that cooperated with Numayri). Therefore, we are now demanding a revision of school curricula to conform with the needs of the Sudanese people.
3. The South ever since the Addis Ababa agreement, and until 1982 this region remained calm. The southerners had greater freedom in the elections and other fields. They were even free to reject presidential decisions. They became an oasis of democracy in a desert of suppression. Thus they isolated themselves and had no idea about Sudan's problems.
4. The existence of a joint defense pact with Egypt and the threat of U.S. intervention. This has weakened the popular opposition movement's willpower to resist.
5. The campaigns of suppression that continued for 16 years and that filled Sudanese prisons with detainees from different trends, forces and parties.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What has led to the recent popular upheaval and the overthrow of the Numayri regime?

Al-Tijani: The Sudanese people's uprising was the result of the struggle by all factions. The people succeeded in overthrowing Numayri when they abided by the main theme of the uprising which was: A broad democratic front and national salvation. We in the Communist Party did not set for the uprising any objective beyond overthrowing Numayri and regaining political freedom and national sovereignty for our people.

Undoubtedly, the hard living conditions due to increased suppression, the implementation of the World Bank decisions without discussion, mortgaging the economy to the United States, and Numayri's provocation of the Sudanese people when he said in one of his speeches: Why do you want an increase in the sugar ration, so you can make sweets? And why do you want to compare yourselves to my wife, who is the wife of a president? All these developments, plus the continuous struggle by our party and all national democratic forces have contributed to the final overthrow of the Numayri regime.

[JN301222] AL-MUSTAQBAL: Much has been said about the Sudanese Army's role in the 25 March upheaval, that it had claimed credit for the upheaval, and that what took place had been a coup arranged by Egypt and the United States. What do you have to say to this?

Nuqud: The military coup took place as a result of pressures from within the army. These pressures were not affected by all that Numayri has done to this establishment. National sentiments continued to prevail among army ranks, particularly among the soldiers, specifically among the sons of the South, the Nuba and Darfur. Therefore, the Sudanese Army remained part of the Sudanese people and continued to be affected by their trends. When the Sudanese people's trends became active, they reflected positively on this army.

On the claims that the coup had taken place in accordance with a U.S. desire, we believe that had the matter had anything to do with Washington, it would have chosen a Numayri-like regime without Numayri. It would also have chosen its man, 'Umar al-Tayyib. It would be wrong too to say that what took place had been a coup that was arranged by the United States and Egypt because this will mean that the outside forces have succeeded in aborting the 25 March upheaval, and this is absolutely not true.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: You signed the upheaval with the National Alliance of Trade Unions, the Al-Ummah Party and the Nationalist Unionist Party. Will you pursue cooperation with the parties and within the framework?

Nuqud: We call for continuing this coordination with all the parties, with the exception of the Muslim brothers (Al-Turabi's group). We believe that one of the most urgent tasks is to expand the bases of the national grouping to make it comprehensively represent all popular forces, and to enable this national grouping to become the political authority of the masses that would confront any danger that may threaten the upheaval.

As has been confirmed by our party's Central Committee, we believe in the need to pursue action for the liquidation of the May institutions, foremost the State Security organ, for the imposition of a campaign for the reform of the state, and for reinstating those who have been relieved of their posts for political reasons.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: Why are you excluding the Muslim brothers, and why this war between you and the Muslim brothers, led by Dr Hasan al-Turabi?

Nuqud: The Muslim brothers, under Al-Turabi, were one of the pillars of the Numayri regime. Al-Turabi has largely contributed to all that had taken place in the last years, particularly during the application of the Islamic laws. In view of their activities and their political movement, they are the enemies of freedom and democracy. They are one of the dangerous forces that the Sudanese people are confronting. We must all unite to check and contain them. The issue of combating the Muslim brothers is not an issue for the communists alone but is also an issue for the entire Sudanese people.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What is your stand on the problem of the South, and what solution do you believe would secure peace and unity for Sudan?

Nuqud: The crisis in the South has local roots. It is part of Sudan's crisis. It is a difficult, deeply-rooted, and frightening crisis which can be tackled only if we admit its gravity and if we pool efforts to settle it and secure democracy to allow every person to contribute within his capabilities.

We support the call for a dialogue. We believe that acknowledgement and respect of the unity of the South as a region enjoying historical, ethnic, cultural and religious traits will give this dialogue the necessary and required capability. The most important development which took place in the South--this development must be taken into consideration--is that for the first time there exists a southern force which does not say that there is a southern problem but works on the basis of the presence of a Sudanese problem within whose framework there is a local problem, the southern problem. From this premise, the question of the South is no longer an issue which is linked to secessionist or unionist trends as was the case in the past. Undoubtedly, regional self-rule must consist of a comprehensive political, cultural and social solution and not merely a regional structure on administration and posts with which we would satisfy the southerners. We must also admit that the state of affairs in the South has changed, and that the contacts southerners have had with the outside world have made them gain wide experience and maturity. We must take this into consideration. We must approach John Garang on the basis of a comprehensive program for a solution and not on the basis of satisfying him or the southerners by giving them several ministerial portfolios.

[JN301123] AL-MUSTAQBAL: During Numayri's reign, Sudan nearly became a U.S. protectorate. The agreements for establishing U.S. military bases in Sudan are among the most serious developments of that previous phase.

Nuqud: During Numayri's reign, Sudan's national sovereignty underwent an experience it had never before witnessed. The Sudanese people opposed the establishment of bases in their country even before the British left. As a result of a personal, unilateral decision by Numayri, they found themselves harboring four U.S. bases. These bases are located in the following areas: The first is in (Arkit); the second in the West, near Al-Fajir; the third in (Fulkit); and the fourth in the South, in the Upper Nile. Moreover, Numayri agreed to turn Sudan into a dumping ground for nuclear wastes in return for \$4 billion that would go into his pocket and the pockets of the pillars of his regime. Had this agreement been implemented, it would have been a crime against all future Sudanese generations. According to the Sudanese Communist Party's publication, radioactive elements such as strontium-90, cesium-37, and polonium-239, which would generate several hundred degrees of heat and remain radioactive for thousands of years, would have been dumped. Moreover, during Numayri's regime, Sudan was transformed into a base for the Rapid Deployment Force and into a regional center for U.S. intelligence. We, along with the Sudanese people, regard these agreements with the United States as being not binding to the Sudanese people or to Sudan.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: A great deal has been said about Egyptian-Sudanese relations. It has been said that the integration was an integration of the Egyptian and Sudanese Governments. What is your opinion?

Nuqud: Sudan is a sovereign state. Out of friendship and the eagerness to maintain unity, we say to Egypt that the integration agreement and the joint defense agreement were reached as a result of pressure exerted on Sudan. This is a grave mistake.

A bigger mistake is that Egypt annexed areas beyond the border lines, especially near the Al-Nubah Lake region. We believe that Sudan is Egypt's strategic depth in the event of an aggression against it. However, Egypt has now signed a peace agreement with Israel, and does not need this depth. Therefore, why does it continue to violate the recognized borders between our two countries. Thus, in the interest of our two countries, we demand that the joint defense agreement be abrogated. We also demand that dealing with Sudan should not be based on the assumption that Sudan is part of Upper Egypt.

AL-MUSTAQBAL: What about the case of the Falashas?

Nuqud: There are no secrets left about the case of the Falashas. The alliance brothers in the Civil Aviation Authority exposed all the secrets of the operation. However, I would like to add that all the Sudanese people must be fully informed about this. Ar'iel Sharon landed at Khartoum Airport enroute to Zaire and met with Numayri and 'Umar al-Tayyib. Moreover, former Israeli president Yitzahq Navon came here and secretly met with the officials in charge of the operation. David Kimche also spent some time here at the Falashas' assembly point in order to organize the evacuation. We believe that the investigation into the case of the Falashas should be published, and that all those who were involved in this case should be put on trial as an example for everyone who betrays his homeland and cause.

CSO: 4500/139

SUDAN

HUNGARIAN TELEVISION INTERVIEWS LEADERS

LD140350 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1853 GMT 13 Jun 85

["Panorama" program presented by Alajos Chrudinak; no video available]

[Excerpts] At this time last week, we were still in the Sudan to compile the following report.

The trade union leaders who initiated the uprising were slightly surprised and bitter about the action of the soldiers who, undoubtedly, wanted to cool the people's movement. This is what I discussed with Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, secretary general of the Sudanese Communist Party, who lived in illegality for 14 years.

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] Now that the leaders of the army unexpectedly grabbed power or, as some would say, stole the revolution, what do you intend to do?

[Nuqud in Arabic fading into superimposed Hungarian translation] The leaders of the army did not gain power unexpectedly.

[Chrudinak] Did you anticipate it?

[Nuqud] The army leaders took control as a result of the pressure exerted by the soldiers and young officers. This is very important, because this is not a traditional or classic coup. On the contrary, as the demonstrations multiplied and the people's uprising spread, the soldiers and low-ranking officers of the army exerted increasing pressure on the leaders of the army. In the end, the army intervened. As for the military leadership, no other option remained open than to take power or to let the initiative slip to the soldiers, to the young officers and lower officers.

[Chrudinak] And that would have led to radical changes, is that correct?

[Nuqud] Yes, that would have led to radical changes. But the army's leadership intervened and grabbed power. But it was not the Americans who instructed the army leaders to grab power. This coup is not, therefore, an American coup.

[Chrudinak] Are you sure about this?

[Nuqud] Absolutely. But it is possible to imagine a certain case of identical interests, because the Americans would also have liked to arrest this people's uprising and insure that the uprising did not go further than at present. Secondly, the Americans are satisfied with this solution and with the fact that events stopped at this point. But it was not they who told Siwar al-Dhahab to go and seize power.

[Chrudinak] It is rumored that Siwar-al-Dhahab informed the Egyptian Embassy about this decision of his, but he failed to inform the trade union federations.

[Nuqud] This may be true. After all, Siwar-al-Dhahab was Numayri's defense minister and is linked to Numayri, to the governments of Egypt and the United States, and to Numayri's policies. [End recording]

Siwar-al-Dhahab, the leader of the Sudanese military junta, received us in the presidential palace. He is a calm and calculating soldier, but still a soldier.

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] Yesterday I spoke to a few trade union leaders at the trade union federation. Some of them said that your action, i.e. the action of the army's leadership, arrested and disarmed the people's arising. In other words, they are convinced that if the army had not intervened then the revolution could have progressed further. They are complaining that things are going slowly. What is your opinion about this? What can you say in reply to this complaint?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab in Arabic fading into superimposed Hungarian translation] I reject such talk. It is true that the people started, initiated, this revolution. But the army completed this revolution by joining the masses and taking power in their name, pledging that after a 1-year transitional period it would be returned to the elected representatives of the people.

[Chrudinak] General, at the time of the rule of the fallen president Numayri, you were minister of defense. People around here are saying that you were a friend of president Numayri. What moved you, as minister of defense, to overthrow Numayri?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] Yes, I was minister of defense at the time of Numayri and I had very good, close relations with the one-time president. However, more recently it turned out that the entire Sudanese people decisively rejected the old government. The people engaged in nationwide demonstrations which paralyzed the entire state and political strikes unanimously demanding the overthrow of the government.

[LD140352] [Chrudinak] You had close relations with Numayri then. As you have just said, you had close, friendly links. How is it possible that you, having had these close links, did not notice that President Numayri's system was dictatorial? Did you not notice that he repressed the population, as did the vice president, who is about to be tried for this, or did you not care?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] This dictatorship was obvious from the way he treated the citizens. But it did not manifest itself in the armed forces in the same way. At any rate, the situation came to a head when the people rejected the previous government and demanded its overthrow. After that, I had no other choice but to side with the people.

[Chrudinak] As far as your foreign policy is concerned, I do not believe that either neighboring Egypt, which played an important role in Sudanese politics, or the United States would be happy about the present rapprochement between Sudan and Libya. Has Cairo reacted in any way to these new developments?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] There has been one positive reaction, coming from none other than Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, who said that the Libyan-Sudanese rapprochement served the interests of the Arab cause. This means that the Egyptians have given their full blessings to the steps we have taken toward fraternal Libya. At the same time, we have stressed that our relations with Libya will not be developed to the detriment of our ties with Egypt. We shall make sure that our ties with Egypt will be as strong as possible. This is how it has been for a long time.

[Chrudinak] Does this mean, therefore, that the new foreign policy of Sudan does not affect in the slightest the special relations with Egypt and the United States?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] That is correct. It does not affect our relations with either Egypt or the United States.

[Chrudinak] Certain Western papers have said that you acted as a result of prompting by the United States and Egypt. Is this true?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] This is not true at all. There was no prompting from the United States, or Egypt, or anywhere else. This was an entirely Sudanese revolution.

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] No one.

[Chrudinak] As far as Islamic laws are concerned, do you intend to alter these laws? I am referring to the chopping of arms and similar practices.

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] Perhaps some changes will be made in the wording of these laws, but the laws themselves, as Islamic laws, will remain in force, as these laws have been accepted by the constitutional institutions and by representatives of the people. But the people's representatives will make a decision after the elections due in a year's time whether these laws should remain in force or not.

[Chrudinak] Does this mean that Islamic courts will continue to exist during that time and will continue to pass sentences? Or am I mistaken?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] The courts are functioning and are passing sentences. But there will be some small changes made in the laws.

[Chrudinak] So there will be no more hands chopped off? Is that what you are saying?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] Perhaps, for example because of the famine in Sudan.

[Chrudinak] In other words, a hungry person might be forced to steal. Is this the reason?

[Siwar-al-Dhahab] Yes. [End recording]

The next day, Libyan leader Al-Qadhdhafi paid an unexpected visit to Khartoum. Al-Qadhdhafi made no secret about the fact that his visit had an anti-Egyptian edge. The Sudanese leaders deny this.

[Begin recording of Al-Qadhdhafi in Arabic fading into superimposed Hungarian translation] I think this revolution in Sudan started a process. I heard on the news that demonstrations broke out in Egypt yesterday and an insurrection broke out against the Egyptian presence of the Israelis. I think the Egyptian regime is threatened with the same sort of uprising which swept away Numayri's regime. The Egyptian people have learned from the Sudanese. [End recording]

Prime Minister Daf'allah and the general seemed a bit embarrassed as they were listening to Al-Qadhdhafi's statement because the most resolute enemy of Reagan and Mubarak demonstrated with his presence in the Sudanese capital that the changes in Sudan had increased Libya's room for maneuver, but had reduced that of Cairo and Washington. Al-Qadhdhafi announced that he was prepared to contribute significant sums in aid, and would even be prepared to make up the aid provided by the United States. This is what I questioned prime Minister Daf'allah about.

[LD140455] [Begin recording] [Daf'allah in Arabic fading into superimposed Hungarian translation] We are endeavoring to establish good relations with Libya.

[Chrudinak] Does it not offend the United States, as America considers Libya as public enemy number one in the region?

[Daf'allah] However, this does not mean that, I don't think that it would offend the United States. We, as an independent country, have the right to establish contacts with whomever we want to. I don't think that it would hurt anybody.

[Chrudinak] So, I can say that you are now reviewing your relations with the United States and Egypt, for a lot of things have changed.

[Daf'allah] You have said it.

[Chrudinak] But is it so?

[Daf'allah] I cannot see any contradiction in the fact that independent Sudan, which makes its own decisions, as its people has willed it, maintains friendly

relations with the United States or any other country, while it has good neighborly relations with Libya. There is no contradiction here.

[Chrudinak] But I have heard....

[Daf'allah, interrupting] Of course, there is a difference between being friends and being the agents of someone. We shall never be anyone's agents.

[Chrudinak] Why, were you earlier?

[Daf'allah] Look, earlier, perhaps. But I am not talking about the past. Numayri's regime did establish links which did not serve the interests of Sudan. But now, keeping the interests of the Sudanese people in mind, we want to establish friendly relations with everyone.

[Chrudinak] Do you not find it possible to imagine that the United States and Egypt may carry out an action in Sudan or mobilize some Sudanese officers in order to restore the agent regime of Numayri? Is there no such danger?

[Daf'allah] I cannot speak either in the name of the United States or of Egypt; you ask them. However, I would like to say that I did not use the term "agent" when I spoke about the relationship between Numayri and the United States. I only said that Numayri's external relations were not balanced.

[Chrudinak] Some trade union leaders are saying that the soldiers no longer even ask them, that they cannot participate in decision making, etc. Do you not think that something has happened in this respect since the uprising? That the Military Council has taken every power in its grip and is not willing to share it with the trade unions?

[Daf'allah] You again are saying now that the Military Council has taken every power in its grip. If it were true, I would not have accepted the post of prime minister because I have no personal interest in having this post. I accepted it in order to serve the people. If I felt that I could not serve the people, that I had no power whatsoever, then I would not stay in this office any longer. Thus the rumor, according to which the Military Council has taken every power in its grip and that the premier hasn't a say whatsoever, is not true. [End recording]

[LD140550] On the bank of the Nile, I met Philip 'Abbas Ghabbush, the well-known priest and politician of nubia. [sic] [the Nuba]

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] What is your comment in respect to the removal of Numayri? What is happening in Sudan now? Yesterday I saw you with General Siwar-al-Dhahab. Do you think he wants a change?

[Ghabbush in Arabic fading into superimposed Hungarian translation] I have hoped [word indistinct] gives over the power to the people in the near future and not in the distant future, you know....

[Chrudinak] What do you have in mind?

[Ghabbush] That the regime should be a civilian one, and that the government should not be dictated by the military from above because here in Sudan we are already afraid of a military regime. We are afraid of a military regime in whatever form. It is possible that tomorrow General Siwar-al-Dhahab and his men will be bigger dictators than Numayri was. Well, this is what we are afraid of. Therefore, we advocate wanting rapid and substantive changes. The soldiers bring up as an excuse all sorts of problems and they say that they will stay in power for another year after which a change can come. We, however, would like this change to be a little bit faster so that our people should not lose their mood; the main of the street speaks openly. He asks what is happening, have we changed [words indistinct] of Numayri and then getting another Numayri. What is the benefit in this? These are the kinds of things people are saying in Sudan.

[Chrudinak] The Islamic Court appointed by Numayri here in Sudan has accused Philip 'Abbas Ghabbush and followers of his party serving in the army of wanting to overthrow Numayri's regime by a military coup. On these live pictures the judge informs the defendant about Ghabbush's plea for pardon. If my knowledge is correct, president Numayri took you to court where you were sentenced to death; but after your plea for pardon he forgave you....

[Ghabbush] Yes it is so.

[Chrudinak] And then you swore to serve Numayri loyally. Is it really how it happened?

[Ghabbush] Yes it is so, but I have never sworn to serve him. [sentence as heard] At the Islamic Court, I entered a plea for pardon because together with me 150 young persons, soldiers in the majority, also were sentenced to death. I could not leave these young men to themselves; I could not let them be sentenced to death by firing squad.

[Chrudinak] So Numayri wanted to execute not only you....

[Ghabbush] All of us had been sentenced. Naturally, all of us were sentenced to death. I had to face the tragedy that the murder of these innocent people would be on my conscience because they belonged to my party.

[Chrudinak] And you plead for pardon?

[Ghabbush] I only asked for pardon for them but not for myself. I requested pardon for these people but fortunately thanks to God, to my luck I was pardoned, God wished it, so I too escaped. I have always opposed the Islamic laws because it is always us who fall victim to them first. There you are; this is how it happened.

[Chrudinak] Who do you have in mind?

[Ghabbush] I think of the poor, the penniless, the unemployed and the uneducated, those without support. Look, we are African 100 percent. We are Africans 100 percent and the African and Arabic customs cannot co-exist. We live far away from each other even if....

[Chrudinak interrupting] So you differ from each other.

[Ghabbush] To a full degree. I say no not only to the Muslim Brotherhood, but to everybody who wants Islamic laws. What we have already tried once in Sudan cannot be done once more to us because it is us who are in the majority and we reject these laws. The Islamic way of justice has finished in Sudan. We shall not allow it again.

[Chrudinak] But Siwar-al-Dhahab wants only a modification of the laws.

[Ghabbush] No, it is not only modification. I reject this kind of talk and he knows very well we reject it.

[Chrudinak] He merely wants the modification of the laws and not their abolition.

[Ghabbush] It must be completely abolished. There can be no question of modifications. It must be completely abolished. That is what the entire people of Sudan says with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic movement. Only these two speak differently, but even the ordinary Muslims do not share their views. They too demand the immediate abolition of the laws. Let Islamic laws be first introduced in Saudi Arabia. But even in Saudi Arabia they have not been implemented completely. Why do they want to introduce them in Sudan? It is simply a business and nothing else but commerce. But this kind of merchant attitude we don't need. First the people should be given enough food. Can you pray to God with an empty stomach, hungrily?

[Chrudinak] Can it not be done hungrily?

[LD140707] [Ghabbush] It is impossible praying hungrily. But if my stomach is full, I immediately seek out God and pray to Him. First, He must give food to the Sudanese people. Then He can do whatever he wants.

[Chrudinak] The greatest enemies for your party are the Muslim brothers?

[Ghabbush] The Muslim brothers, apart from them, we have no enemies.

[Chrudinak] Are they still that strong?

[Ghabbush] No, they are finished--because they cut off people's hands, legs, that is all they know about, nothing else. Whatever they are shouting, they are shouting [Ghabbush imitating Muslim prayer]. Nobody listens, they are not needed by the Sudanese people, or even by the Muslims. It's the end, you understand, they are finished. [End recording]

The leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood is Hasan al-Turabi, who on the film is seen taking part, together with Numayri, in the annihilation of \$5 million worth of alcoholic beverages. Actually, Numayri had introduced the hand of Islamic law in Sudan on the proposal of Hasan al-Turabi.

[Begin recording] [Chrudinak] You were not harmed, although earlier you cooperated with Numayri. For a long time, you were Numayri's foreign affairs adviser. What is more, it was on your advice that he introduced Islamic laws. What is the situation now?

[Al-Turabi in Arabic over superimposed Hungarian translation] The post I held had neither power nor influence. In the Numayri regime, my basic role was to introduce Islamic laws and to wipe out the British system of law, which was in force in the country at that time.

[Chrudinak] And you managed to achieve that.

[Al-Turabi] Yes, I managed, but Numayri monopolized the advantages of the introduction of Islamic jurisdiction. It was he who formulated the laws and their execution. Finally, it was this, the method of the execution of Islamic laws, that [words indistinct].

[Chrudinak] But when you were Numayri's foreign political adviser, it was precisely then that Sudan's foreign policy really became unbearable.

[Al-Turabi] No, I was Numayri's adviser only in the last few months before I might have been arrested, but what happened was....

[Chrudinak interrupting] But your opponent (?Ghabbush) told me that your laws are directed against the poor. And in Sudan as many as six or seven million people are starving.

[Al-Turabi] Yes, yes.

[Chrudinak] And the hungry person is not able to pray.

[Al-Turabi] The hungry person can pray. Of course he can pray. Prayer is movement and the starving man can move. Prayer does not cost money.

[Chrudinak] But you also know that a man with a full stomach sees the world in a different way than one who is starving. Actually, what we are talking about, and Ghabbush says this, too, is that one cannot apply the Islamic laws vis-a-vis these have-nots, these starving and wretched people.

[Al-Turabi] Islamic law does not only consist of the cutting off of hands. It also regulates alms. Alms are collected from the rich, but they are taken away from their capital; the money is given to the poor and not to the state. This is new.

[Chrudinak] So you believe that the hand of the thief should be cut off? That a man who drinks alcohol should be whipped? That the adulterer should be stoned?

[Al-Turabi] No, a man who drinks alcohol is not stoned, he is only whipped. [LD140947] The unfaithful, yes, they are stoned. Look, in a country like Sudan, where 2 million people do not find anything to drink, why should we import wine from France or England? Why should we waste several million working hours on people drinking and getting drunk? This poor country must mobilize all its existing energy. For this reason, a person who drinks is whipped. In the case of theft, there are mitigating circumstances. When a region is struck by famine, the cutting off of hands must be suspended there. In Khartoum, for example, where there is no famine, the situation is different. If someone steals something there we determine if he really needed the stolen money, and, if so, he is pardoned; if he did not need it, however, we chop off his hand in order to deter him.

[Chrudinak] Many rich people steal millions. Your former colleagues in the government...they came to no harm. The officers also stole. They also say that Numayri was an alcoholic.

[Al-Turabi] Numayri had not drunk lately. Earlier he did drink, but then he stopped. However [words indistinct].

[Chrudinak] How do you know that he does not drink?

[Al-Turabi] I know him personally. I have known him since childhood. We went to school together. I know him well.

[Chrudinak] I heard that he drinks a lot.

[Al-Turabi] Yes, he drank a lot up to the beginning of the seventies. Since 1975, however, he has not drunk at all. He prays regularly. In his private life, Numayri was a Muslim, but he did not want Islam to curb his power. In power he was a tyrant, but in his private life he is a Muslim.

[Chrudinak] I have heard that, when you took part in the first hand-cutting ceremony, you fainted.

[Al-Turabi] Yes.

[Chrudinak] Obviously you fainted because this is a cruel, inhuman, disgusting form of punishment.

[Al-Turabi] I faint when one of my teeth is pulled. Many people faint at the mere sight of blood; I am one of them.

[Chrudinak] But this means that....

[Al-Turabi] Look, I am so sensitive that, when I see an injection needle, I turn my head so I will not see the actual injection.

[Chrudinak] But, like you, the people whose hands are cut off or who are whipped are also very sensitive.

[Al-Turabi] Murder is cruel and still people murder each other. War is also cruel and still people prepare for war with nuclear bombs in order that they might defend certain values. We also have such values. Legally-acquired property and the legal marriage, for instance must be respected. [End recording]

[Chrudinak] The question is whether or not the democratic process will continue. The situation is fairly unstable. The political squabbling might lead to a civil war or the soldiers might revert to dictatorship. Yesterday I spoke to General Siwar-al-Dhahab. He said he will retain Islamic justice with some merely minor modifications.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified speaker in Arabic with superimposed Hungarian translation] Perhaps, we could like radical modifications, big changes. [Apparent contradiction between Chrudinak and speaker as heard] For example, we will suspend cutting off hands because there is famine. Khalifa Omar also put an end to cutting off hands at the time of famines.

[Chrudinak] Was that because people were starving?

[Unidentified speaker] According to Islam, only those people who are well fed and well off may have their hands cut off. Only those who have money but steal may have their hands cut off. If someone is starving has no work, has nothing to put in his mouth, and has children who are starving, according to Islam, his hand may not be cut off.

[Chrudinak] You started proceedings against some of Numayri's men who, people say, cooperated with the CIA. How can you prove this allegation?

[Unidentified speaker] We do not have such proof. This is politics, not the law. Politically I know that the Americans had the country in their fist. This is politics. Here at the prosecutor's office, however, we do not have any proof that demonstrates this U.S. intervention. It is absolutely clear, however, that the country was in the hands of the U.S. administration. There is no doubt about that. Numayri's system was directed by the Americans' that is where the instructions to strike down on the Muslim Brotherhood came from. The U.S. influence was felt everywhere--the American and Egyptian influence. [End recording]

[Chrudinak] The state prosecutor is now working on the trial material of Numayri's deputy. The former vice president is accused of treason and corruption.

CSO: 4500/139

SUDAN

GRAVITY OF DROUGHT, FAMINE DESCRIBED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 19 Jun 85 pp 3-6

[Text]

Between 8 and 10m of Sudan's current population of 24m are affected by drought, 4.5m severely so. Overshadowed in the public eye by last year's media coverage of **Ethiopia**, Sudan is, however, already adjudged by relief personnel who have worked in both countries to be in as serious a state as its eastern neighbour. Its prospects for the future are considered poorer still. In addition to having more than 1.5m people internally displaced by famine, Sudan plays host to 1.14m refugees of whom 887,000 (766,000 Ethiopians and 121,000 **Chadians**) live in the northern part of the country.

By February this year, there was a critical shortfall in Sudan's food requirements, with only the *United States Agency for International Development (USAID)* providing substantial relief assistance. But since March other donor governments and UN agencies have finally responded to the urgent calls for help, as have private fund-raising efforts by such as voluntary relief agencies (e.g. *Save the Children Fund* and *Oxfam*); **British** and **US** pop stars (*Band Aid* and *USA for Africa*)- and **Dutch** and **German** TV Stations, which have raised spectacular sums with phone-in pledging programmes.

Yet, of the 520,000 metric tonnes (MT) of emergency grain so far delivered to Sudan (see Table 2), 250,000MT is still in port, 70,000MT in transit, and only 200,000MT has been delivered to regional level. It is calculated that in addition to these amounts a further 800,000MT are needed before the November harvest, (of which 600,000MT is already committed by donors).

Thus the plight of the starving Sudanese is as serious as ever. Sudan's degree of infrastructural crumbling, combined with the almost inevitable co-ordination problems, of a massive emergency relief programme, have created a situation where zero

hour (the start of the rainy season) has arrived, and yet the food and medicine have not.

The first warnings of impending famine in Sudan came in 1983, when three successive seasons of minimal rainfall rounded off a 15 year period of below-average precipitation. The 1984 rains were, in many areas, the lowest on record. Drought and desertification were exacerbated by irresponsible farming techniques, the removal of trees for firewood and land clearance, and the increased migrations of nomads and livestock in search of water and pastureland.

By July 1984, the government had declared Darfur in the West, a disaster region, though it was to wait until December (one month after USAID had initiated its first relief programme) before conceding the politically sensitive point that the whole of the north of Sudan was in need of urgent assistance.

The five northern regions — Eastern, Northern, Central, Kordofan, and Darfur — are all seriously affected by famine (see Table 1) though it is the latter two western regions which are worst hit. (For an assessment of the problem in southern Sudan, see AC Vol 26 No.11.)

Eastern region's principal problem at the turn of the year was the refugee influx from Eritrea and Tigray. There were more than 250,000 new arrivals between December 1984 and April 1985, on some days over 3,000 crossed the border. The *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)* was caught badly unprepared, and 2,000 children

died from measles in a single camp, Wad Kowli, in the space of three months. There were considerable food and water shortages. However UNHCR assisted by a host of voluntary agencies, has managed to effect a remarkable recovery operation. Since then, vehicles, fuel, medicine, and two months buffer stocks of food are now in place in most of the camps as the rains are expected to begin. The recovery of lost ground was assisted by the unexpected (some would say suicidal) return of over 44,000 Tigrayans to prepare their fields for the next harvest.

Problems remain. A cholera outbreak has terminated plans for relocating several camps to more accessible and healthy areas, and many thousands will be cut off from food and medical assistance when the wadis fill and the muddy roads become impassible. The 30,000 refugees left behind at Wad Kowli face considerable problems when the sewage area situated above the camp, begins to seep downwards, though plans are afoot to excavate and relocate the offending material to a more suitable site.

Now the focus of famine has switched to the Sudanese living in Kassala province, where most of the refugee camps are situated. Until recently water shortages, disease, malnutrition, lack of jobs and the decline of social services led many local people to masquerade as refugees, in order to get food and medical assistance. The infant mortality rate for local Sudanese children is now said to be 400 per 1,000 births, and the agencies are waking to the fact that many of the drought-affected Sudanese in the area are in a poorer state than the refugees.

Table One

Regional Analysis, Mid-June 1985.

Regions	Central	Eastern	Northern	Kordofan	Darfur
Population	4,239,000	2,330,000	1,128,000	3,278,000	3,188,000
Drought affected	1,350,000	1,200,000	150,000	2,830,000	2,870,000
Severely affected (Vulnerable)	354,000	315,000	39,000	741,000	752,000
Estimate (MT) of amount delivered Since start of relief operation — Dec 84.*	10,000 (5,000WFP & 5,000 USAID)	9,500 (4,500WFP & 5,000 USAID)	1,700 (WFP)	83,000 (USAID)	40,000 (USAID)
Monthly allocation (MT) June — Nov 85	16,200	14,400	1,800	33,960	34,440

* Excludes minor amounts from other donors

About 320,000 Sudanese are officially displaced in Eastern region, while in Northern region, an estimated 130,000 nomads from the northern deserts, or from Kordofan, are now camped in small clusters along the Nile. The main concentrations are around Shendi, Atbara and the loop between Merowe and Ed Debba. Many of the nomads have been living a hand-to-mouth existence along the river for three to four years; the only differences this year are that their number is larger, their condition worse.

The distribution of 1,700MT of *World Food Programme (WFP)* wheat has encountered problems, not least the delays of up to seven weeks that have occurred on the railway line from Port Sudan to Atbara 300 miles away. Even when 400MT arrived at the distribution centre at Karima, only 46MT found its way onward to Ed Debba, owing to a shortage of trucks, and to lorry-drivers holding out for higher prices. The local farmers appear to discriminate against the nomads, viewing them as trespassers on their riverside domain. The divergence between wages paid and the cost of foodstuffs is greater than anywhere else in northern Sudan. Temporary resettlement schemes and programmes to restore the nomads, livestock and grazing grounds are under way.

Outside Omdurman there are still two camps of 30,000 displaced persons, mainly from the west. The camps have begun once more to grow in size, after the February programme of trucking migrants back west reduced the earlier 60,000 population to 13,000.

In Central region there are now 360,000 displaced persons, many of them migrant labourers who arrived for the harvesting of cereals and cotton on the Gezira and Rahad cotton schemes, and who failed

Early warning signs

Aid officials have developed a technique for alerting governments to the imminence of famine. The signs vary throughout the world, but *famine indicators*, such as the following, are now identifiable throughout northern Sudan:

1) The consumption of famine foods, such as *mukheit* (poisonous berries which have to be boiled and soaked for days to produce a low-nutrition meal). Also leaves, tubers, pods, thorns, and the kernels of mango and *hajlid frutis*, which are crushed to make flour and oil, are being consumed. Stocks of many of these famine alternatives are now running out. Meanwhile, termite-mounds are being broken open for the grain stored inside by the insects, and *umbas*, the waste from groundnut-processing, is eaten despite the fact that it causes serious stomach problems especially among children.

2) Mass-migrations of people and livestock.

3) The spiralling of grain-costs, by a factor of 4 or 5. A 90-kilogram sack of sorghum is now priced at around S£180 (UK £45) in Darfur market places. In Northern region it can cost as much as S£256 (£63).

4) The collapse of animal prices, roughly one-eighth of those of 1984. In south-east Darfur, animals have become more of a liability than an asset; cows are being sold at S£10 (£2.50) a head, goats at S£3 (75p).

5) Desperate attempts to raise money for food-purchases. Women sell jewellery and ornaments at knock-down prices; people compete for hard labouring work at menial rates of pay, sometimes as low as 25pt (6p) per day. Theft and begging are everywhere on the increase. ●

to return home afterwards. About 70,000 are from Darfur, 135,000 from Kordofan, and 155,000 from the area to the west of the White Nile in central region itself.

In Kordofan 425,000 people are displaced, more than 50,000 of them in El Obeid Forest Camp (a camp with no forest) where the regional authorities are supplying an average of $\frac{1}{4}$ pint of water per head

Table Two

Grain deliveries to Sudan during relief operation, mid-December 1984 — mid June 1985.

Type of grain shipments	All grain shipments (MT) — including commercial imports (WFP estimates)	Emergency relief shipments (MT) (UNDP estimates)	USAID emergency relief shipments (MT) (USAID estimates)
In port	240,000	250,000	115,000
In transit	540,000	70,000	27,000*
In regions		200,000	133,000†
Total deliveries	780,000	520,000	275,000

* Refers only to Port Sudan — Kosti transit.

† Includes amounts still in transit from Kosti and Omdurman.

per day. (9 pints is generally considered the minimum drinking water requirement.) El Obeid town itself is suffering a critical water-shortage, so that a 5-gallon jerrican can cost up to 60pt (15p). Nutritional levels among those remaining in the northern villages and wadi-beds are alarming; they are even worse in the Nuba Mountain of southern Kordofan, where there is evidence to suggest that the provincial governor of the previous regime maintained a policy of supplying relief food only to islamised villages.

Darfur's official displaced figure is only 315,000 (just over 10% of the population) but this is undoubtedly the most seriously affected of all the regions. Over 75% of all children at Tendelti camp in the north are defined as malnourished; at Assernei, a camp of 53,000 persons near El Geneina, ten persons a day are dying, and the figure is likely to rise sharply given the number of children in the feeding centre who are little more than half their correct weight. There has been an influx of over 120,000 Chadians, fleeing the Abeche area; new arrivals at the disease-ridden camp at Angikoti, just across the Sudanese border, now total 2,700 a day.

The aid operation has encountered a variety of problems, both internal and external:

i. The operation, like many emergency relief operations, has not been run in a sufficiently organised manner. The *Food and Agriculture Organisation* (FAO), which is supposed to provide an early warning system, failed to appreciate the seriousness of the problem before it was too late; agencies like WFP and UNHCR were not functioning properly on the ground in the crucial early months. The EEC has dithered in its bureaucratic fashion, and even USAID which has committed over 8000,000 tonnes of grain, has let things slip since its early response in the west. USAID responded too slowly to the problems of trucking and the railway link, and its hiring of SCF, a British voluntary agency with no previous experience in large-scale distribution, for monitoring and distribution in the crucial Darfur region raised eyebrows in aid circles.

ii. The transport bottleneck is exemplified by the fact that Port Sudan's warehouses and silos are crammed to bursting point, a ship containing 65,000MT of USAID sorghum waiting off-shore, while officials search for other sites to off-load its cargo. Waiting time for harbour berths averages five days and offloading 7.3 days. About 20,000MT a week are now leaving Port Sudan by truck and rail, where as only 2,100MT a week are railed from the second major bottle-neck at Kosti, on the Nile out to the West where most of the grain is needed.

iii. Central government (particularly before Nimeiri's overthrow) has displayed insufficient concern about the fate of those in the regions. Similarly, the people of The Three Towns (Khartoum,

Khartoum North and Omdurman) seem pre-occupied with their own economic difficulties, and are generally ill-informed about the crisis in the rest of the country.

iv. The operational effectiveness of Sudan Railways, which provide the vital rail link to Darfur, has all but collapsed over the last few years. Only 58 of SR's 159 diesel locomotives are currently in service, as are 3,600 of its 5,000 wagons, although 300 new wagons are currently being assembled in Port Sudan.

v. Another major constraint is the lack of trucking facilities in the country, though the UN estimates that there is sufficient haulage capacity to truck 100,000MT up country from Port Sudan each month. Yet trucks are not available in the right places at right time.

vi. This increase in freight rates is partly a result of the increased incidents of brigandary and theft. Relief trucks have been attacked and drivers killed in several places in the west, certain roads, like El Fasher-Kebkebir, Nyala-Buram and Sodiri-Umm Sunta are treated as no-go areas for weeks at a time. Five trucks were recently highjacked at Tendelti, between Kosti and El Obeid, after robbers placed soft sand in the only viable route through a section of bush.

vii. The forthcoming rains, if they materialise, will render relief distribution across swollen wadis and through black soil areas impossible for days at a stretch. They will also lead to loss of food through spoilage, further breakdowns in the rail system, and an increase in infections and respiratory diseases among the weak and under-nourished.

viii. Lastly and most crucially for the future, no seed are yet in place for the planting season, scheduled to occupy the month from mid June to mid-July. The 6,000MT of USAID seed earmarked for Darfur and Kordofan was, until 4 June, still being hand-bagged in individual 5 kg sacks. Unsuitable strains from the east have been purchased for the desert areas of northern Kordofan and Darfur and there has been considerable disagreement about the most suitable places to allocate the limited stocks. Local relief officials now talk of swapping the eastern seed for local seed from the markets, a policy that appears to stand as little chance of success as EEC's local seed purchasing programme. The failure of the seed programmes means that the prospects for an early return to normality are poor.

But the last month has seen a quickening of activity, and a number of more positive developments:

Arrival of Winston Prattley: the UN Secretary-General's special representative has taken charge of the emergency programme (and UNDP). He was already shaken a few egos, and has helped beef up the relief and rehabilitation commission as a co-ordination unit which RICSU and others will support.

Increase in trucking to the West: *Arkel Talab* have begun trucking 5,000MT a month along the northern Omdurman — El Fasher route, and hope to increase to 10,000MT soon. SCF are to operate two fifty-truck convoys, funded, together with fuel and spares, by Britain's ODA from Kosti to Nyala, and the UN may follow suit. The ODA has also moved with considerable speed to provide 60 new trucks due to arrive in six weeks time; the Italians hope to send another 60; SCF has bought 12 more with donated funds.

Improved off-loading at Port Sudan: This is now going at full throttle. In May, 167,000MT were brought into the country, largely due to USAID's recent provision of portable hoppers and bagging machines. WFP's management and logistics team is streamlining the distribution network.

US commitment: The US has finally spoken out publicly about insufficient priority being given by the governments of Sudan and Ethiopia to the distribution of relief food. Sower el Dahab continues to promise improvements in his speeches.

Kosti-Nyala rail shipments: These have picked up momentum. Now an average of 771 tonnes per day is being dispatched westwards from Kosti, an increase of over 150%, though a derailment in Kosti town closed down the line for two days. A train loaded with seed for Darfur was dispatched safely from Kosti station, only to be driven to a nearby siding, where it remained for five days. Nevertheless, many of the suggestions of the EEC's rail survey, completed in March, are now being adopted, non-stop Kosti-Nyala relief trains to be given priority, passenger coaches to be re-conditioned for freight, expatriate technicians and management advisers recruited, and new locomotives committed for the relief effort. USAID has approved \$3m for railway spare parts, many of which have now arrived.

Road transport: USAID has rented \$1m of road construction and maintenance plant for Darfur; similar machinery is already being used to raise and resurface the main murrain road to Kordofan.

A Dutch roads team, already working in Darfur, will provide experienced personnel and further plant. Meanwhile the UN is appealing for \$10m for trucks, fuel and spares.

Armed protection: The Kordofan Regional Government has begun providing armed military and police escorts for truck convoys from Kosti.

Airlifts: An EEC airlift, using one Belgian and two West German Hercules planes, has since May 30th, been bringing dried milk, oil, pulses and medicines to Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina in Darfur. By the end of June, sand-storms permitting, well over 1,000MT will have been flown. Four other EEC Countries (UK, France, Italy and Denmark) are considering providing planes to extend the programme. Two light aircraft have been given to SCF to help transport personnel and medical items.

No doubt in the next few months, the gravity of the famine will lead to an expansion of the airlift, and the congregation (both spontaneous and assisted) of people in relief camps, which encourage overcrowding and the spread of disease, but which facilitate the job of food distribution. Even despite such ultimate solutions, anything from 500,000 to 2m of Sudan's 24m population will probably be dead before the harvest in November. ●

CSO: 4500/145

SUDAN

OMDURMAN CALLS FOR UNITED STRUGGLE AGAINST DROUGHT

EA012048 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 1 Jul 85

[Excerpts] There is no doubt that there is a real famine and a problem that has evolved after large areas of our country were hit by drought. The problem, as confirmed by facts, is getting worse and bearing increasingly heavily and mercilessly on both human beings and animals. Yes, the previous regime buried its head in the desert sands, which destroyed everything while the negligent and indifferent regime was busy financing its security and turning its repressive apparatus, its sword against the sons of the people, both weak and strong. Yes, the May regime did that, but now that we have assumed the running of our country's affairs, what have we done about that problem which is truly (harming) children, old people and women? What have we done to halt the advance of that monster that is gobbling up dozens of kilometers every year?

Brothers, we must deploy all efforts and capabilities, both official and public to confront the common enemy: drought, desertification and famine. The priority of the Transitional Military Council and the Council of Ministers must be to (insure) victory over this enemy. The most pressing task of the political parties must be to overcome this disaster. The political parties must shoulder their full responsibilities toward the citizens in all parts of beloved Sudan. They must lay down clear ideas and a well-researched practical plan and get us out of the pit of this famine.

We place great hopes in the Trade Union Alliance, which embraces professors and scientists specializing in the fields of economics and development. We expect them to produce studies laying down judicious solutions to the problems of drought and desertification. We must also solicit the efforts of brothers and friends and international organizations working in the field of combating drought and desertification. There is no doubt that, if all these efforts are put together and all the capabilities are deployed, we will extricate ourselves from the complications [mudaafat] caused by the drought that has hit our country and the effects of the famine that threatens thousands of citizens throughout beloved Sudan.

CSO: 4500/141

SUDAN

BANK EMPLOYEES CALL FOR REFORM MEASURES

JN301801 Khartoum SUNA in English 1738 GMT 30 Jun 85

[Text] Khartoum, June 30 (SUNA)--The Banks' Employees Trade Union will hold its general conference next July 7 to discuss the current situation of the banking organs issues and to affirm the trade union's support and authorization to the trade union grouping of the bank's sector in the national issues it raised recently, the Banks' Employees Trade Union Secretary General Hasan Muhammad 'Ali said today. He went on saying that the trade union had presented a number of memorandums to the cabinet calling for taking urgent measures for liquidating all the traces of defunct May era and the elements that participated in the implementation of its subversive policies that led to the deterioration of the national economy. He explained that the memorandums also called for dissolving the Bank of Sudan board of directors and to relieve the acting governor of the bank because his presence in this post would be a factor for protecting the administrations which will be interrogated in the cases of corruption.

The secretary general went on to say that the trade union had called for dissolving the specialist banks' board of directors and relieving their directors and their deputies besides dissolving the board of directors of the Sudanese Savings Bank, the Islamic Cooperative Development Bank and the National Bank for Import and Export, to relieve their directors and deputies and to investigate them in the implications which led the Bank of Sudan's law to be incapable to play its original role.

On the foreign joint and Islamic banks the trade union called for investigating on the way they granted licences to practice the banking work in the country and their capitals and reveal their subversive practices, he added.

CSO: 4500/141

SUDAN

ATTORNEY GENERAL ON PROGRESS OF INVESTIGATION

JN221804 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1125 GMT 22 Jun 85

[Text] Khartoum, 22 Jun (SUNA)--Prime Minister Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah was briefed on the progress of the investigation committees' work with political and nonpolitical detainees, the defunct regime's pillars. This took place when his excellency received Attorney General 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Ati this afternoon.

In a statement to SUNA after the meeting, the attorney general said the investigation has achieved a great deal. He said the investigation will follow a normal course until the trials are held in a just manner, contrary to what used to take place during the defunct regime. He indicated that the issue of the Falashas will be the first case to be placed on trial in about 2 weeks from now.

The attorney general said that he informed the prime minister of the ban on all visits to all political and nonpolitical detainees to guarantee the integrity of the investigation and prevent information from leaking. The ban came into effect as of today.

On the revision of the draft constitution, Attorney General 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Ati affirmed that he will submit a memorandum to the cabinet in this regard next week, as well as proposals for a new draft for a concise constitution to administer affairs during the remainder of the transitional phase.

In another development, the attorney general said that, in light of the investigation committee's reports on nonpolitical detainees, three of the detainees were released today. They are: Mahumud Abu Bakr Habashi, Idris Muhammad Idris Barakiyah and Ibrahim al-Munir.

CSO: 4500/141

SUDAN

BRIEFS

SLF OFFICIAL ON SOUTHERN INITIATIVE--Khartoum, Shawal 8, June 25 (SUNA)--
Founder and President of Sudan Liberation Front "SLF" 'Uthman Ibrahim Tawail
praised Premier al-Jazuli's initiative for solving the southern question. In
view of such a gesture, he said the front promised the premier's envoy that
SLF would halt its military operations to allow for transportation of relief
supplies to famine-affected people in the southern region. The front, he
added, authorized its regional commanders in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile to
devise a plan for negotiating with local authorities the position of the
front's fighters. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1015 GMT 25 Jun 85]

RETURNEES FROM ETHIOPIA COMMITTEE--Khartoum, 25 Jun (SUNA)--The national
committee for receiving returnees from Ethiopia held its third meeting this
morning under Brigadier General 'Uthman Hammad, chairman of the committee.
In a statement to the press, the brigadier general said that the committee
has gathered detailed information on the number of the returnees, their weapons
and families. The committee has determined the locations of the camps so that
they will be close to services and be able to accommodate them until the
(?secret) study to be submitted to the prime minister is prepared. [Text]
[Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1742 GMT 25 Jun 85]

COUP INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE--Khartoum, June 26--SUNA--The committee set up
to investigate with the designers of May 1969 coup will begin its work tomorrow
where it will listen to the testimony of the national Al-Ummah Party leader
Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Democratic Unionist Party Secretary General al-Sharif
Zayn-al-'Abidin, chairman of the former constituent assembly Dr Mubarak Fadil
Shaddad and some senior officers of the People's Armed Forces who were
arrested immediately after the ominous coup. The committee's chairman 'Abd-
al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab explained that the committee will present
over its report to the attorney general within a week and the trial will begin
after two weeks. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1734 GMT 26 Jun 85]

CROPS IN 'LIBERATED AREAS'--The SPLA-SPLM Sudanese People's Liberation Army-
Sudanese People's Liberation Movement leader, Colonel Dr John Garang de Mabior
has received a special message from Lieutenant Colonel William Nyuan Bany, a
member of the SPLA high command and member of the Executive Committee of the
SPLM. The official SPLA-SPLM spokesman has disclosed to Radio SPLA that the
letter contained a routine report by Lt Col William Bany to the SPLA-SPLM leader
on the progress of the agricultural program in the various liberated areas of

war zone number one. In his report, Lt Col Nyuan remarked that SPLA soldiers were working on the program alongside the citizens with great zeal and energy, especially in Bahr al-Ghazal administrative area, where Rhino Battalion, under the command of Lt Col PSC [expansion unknown] Martin Makur Aleo and Capt (Bagana Mouz), his deputy, have gone a long way towards the implementation of the agricultural program that aims at attaining self-sufficiency in food. Concluding his report, Lt Col Bany expressed optimism about the quality and quantity of the coming harvest. [(Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 21 Jun 85]

BEJA JOINS SPLA-SPLM--The official Sudanese People's Liberation Army-Sudanese People's Liberation Movement [SPLA-SPLM] spokesman has disclosed to Radio SPLA that an official delegation representing the Beja people in eastern Sudan has conducted talks with the SPLA-SPLM leadership. According to the spokesman the discussions revealed a meeting of minds between the delegation and the movement's leadership on all the crucial issues facing the Sudan. The spokesman went on to say that the members of the delegation, who became convinced following the meeting that the SPLA-SPLM is truly national organization which is struggling for justice and equality, and the welfare of the backward areas of the Sudan, have declared their membership of the SPLA-SPLM, and their full support for it. The spokesman concluded by promising that the names of the delegation's members, which for security considerations are being kept secret at present, would be announced at an appropriate future date. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 22 Jun 85]

10 DEATHS IN TERAKEKA--Juba, 29 Jun (SUNA)--Ten people recently died of starvation in Terakeka, north of the city of Juba, which is currently witnessing an influx of large numbers of citizens from famine-stricken neighboring areas. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1433 GMT 29 Jun 85]

TU ALLIANCE SECRETARY RECEIVED--Brigadier Kamal Ab-Bashar, commissioner of the national capital, received in his office this morning Eng 'Awad al-Karim Muhammad Ahmad, secretary of the Trade Union Alliance, to whom he gave an account of the steps taken to stabilize the prices of essential commodities in the context of forming a higher committee with branch committees in the districts to supervise the markets. The secretary of the alliance expressed his support for these measures and offered to participate in the formation of popular supervisory committees. Turning to the issue of rectifying the situation affecting the (?supply) of petrol for commercial vehicles, the commissioner of the national capital gave an account of the agreement arrived at with the Taxi Trade Union, which lays down that petrol should be [word indistinct] once every 5 months for 13 pounds per (jerrycan) and that the charges should include the legal stamp duty. His excellency indicated the possibility of returning [words indistinct] charges and duties in respect of public service and private vehicles in the framework of the current atmosphere of cooperation and understanding. [Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 27 Jun 85]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA--Khartoum, 24 Jun (SUNA)--Mubarak Adam al-Hadi last week presented his credentials to Nigerian head of state Major General Muhammadu Buhari as Sudan's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1426 GMT 24 Jun 85 JN]

SUDAN, FRG GRANT AGREEMENT--Khartoum, Shawal 7, 24 June, (SUNA)--The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has consented to provide Sudan with a grant of DM 130 million (43 million dollars) to finance agricultural inputs of this season. A Sudanese delegation has recently concluded this agreement following talks with officials of the F. German Credit Bank. The delegation, led by secretary of the loans committee of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Muhammad Khayr al-Zubayr, has also informed the German side of Sudan's current requirements of drugs that cost DM 22 million, a matter which the German side promised to consider. Sudan needs the worth of 150 million dollars of agricultural inputs annually. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 0915 GMT 24 Jun 85 JN]

CSO: 4500/141

TUNISIA

BOURGUIBA ON U.S. INFLUENCE, ARAB AFFAIRS

PM201429 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 16 Jun 85 p 3

[Interview with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba by 'Irfan Nizan-al-din in Paris on 13 June]

[Excerpts] [Question] Your Excellency, what are the most important topics in the talks you have already held in Paris and the talks you intend to hold in Washington in a few days, and what are your hopes regarding the Arab cause and Palestine?

[Answer] My current tour of two friendly states with which Tunisia has friendly, strong, and long-standing ties aims primarily at strengthening these relations even further in the interest of our countries and in the interest of the just causes of mankind and world peace. I am certain that the cultural concepts and sublime values which Tunisia has in common with these two countries will help us tackle a number of issues in a positive and objective spirit. Naturally, the Arab causes and particularly the Palestinian cause will be among our main preoccupations and will figure prominently in our deliberations.

[Question] While still on Arab causes, how do you view the future of current political developments related to the Palestinian cause, especially after the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement and the possibility of U.S. support for that agreement?

[Answer] I will probably have a clearer answer to that question after my visit to the United States. However, I do believe that the U.S. decision is essential in determining the successes or failure of any political initiative in the region. In the present circumstances I cannot imagine a settlement without the United States being a responsible party to it. There is another factor which we must take into consideration when assessing these developments. That factor is the Israeli position which controls these developments to a large extent and which has so far been intransigent.

[Question] So much for the U.S. and Israeli sides, what initiatives do you think the Arab side could take at Arab and international levels to produce real and effective developments that would generate change?

[Answer] The success of any Arab initiative requires common ground among the Arabs. Regrettably that requirement is not available at present. How can we talk about a successful move at Arab or international levels so long as differences between Arab leaders and regimes are at their worst?

[Question] There is a need for an Arab summit conference. King Hassan II has recently called for an emergency Arab summit conference on the Palestinian question. There is also a prior agreement to hold the annual summit conference in Riyadh. Do you think that an Arab summit conference will be held and what is your position on this matter?

[Answer] I am all for fruitful, purposeful and direct dialogue but bad personal relations between some of the Arab leaders and the current complications in the region prevent the holding of an Arab summit conference in the near future.

[Question] May we now move to another subject, Your Excellency, namely the Arab Maghreb. Bearing in mind the current situation how do you view the future of the Arab Maghreb? Will it be a future of different blocs or of coordination and integration?

[Answer] We have always maintained that the [unity] of the Arab Maghreb is a definite necessity and is the only way to give the region prosperity and impregnability in the future. I am sure that with time the Maghreb people will realize this fact more and more and will impose it sooner or later. If there are obstacles impeding such a project at present it is reassuring to know that all the Maghreb countries' officials believe in the Arab Maghreb idea and are convinced that efforts must be made to iron out these obstacles and implement the project.

CSO: 4500/140

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

SAHARAN, SPANISH TU TALKS--SDAR (Liberated Territories), 24 Jun (APS)--At the leed /as received/ of the visit that a delegation of the General Union of Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro Workers (UGTSARIO) led by the head of international relations, Mr Lahbib Breika, paid in Madrid, a joint communique with the Worker Trade-Union (USO) was released, the Saharan Ministry of Information announced yesterday. The USO expressed in this communique, its solidarity with the struggle of the Saharan people and workers, condemned the 1975 Madrid Accords and denounced the war and the intransigent attitude of the Moroccan Government and its policy of military escalation. The document also includes an appeal to the Spanish working class to make common cause with the just struggle of Saharan workers and another one to Moroccan political and trade union /as received/ to fight for peace between SDAR and Morocco. On another turn, the United States brought its support to OAU and UN efforts for a political solution based on the direct negotiation between SDAR and Morocco. It called on the Spanish Government to recognize SDAR in order to contribute to peace in the region, the document pointed out. The two trade-union centrals expressed their satisfaction before the good relations linking them, the document concluded. /Text/ /Algiers
APS in English 1005 GMT 24 Jun 85/

CSO: 4500/144

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

OIL, TRADE STATISTICS--Bahrain's oil exports rose last year--but the island's trade deficit as a whole widened. Figures just released by the Central Statistics Bureau reveal total exports in 1984 were worth BD [Bahraini Dinars] 1,165.4 million compared with an imports figure of BD 1,308.3 [as published]. The trade deficit rose to BD 142.9 million--up from BD 60 million in 1983. The bureau's statistics put oil exports up to BD 1,019.8 million against BD 972 million in 1983 and oil imports up to BD 618.4 million against BD 536.2 million. A breakdown of Bahrain's balance sheet shows imports from Arab countries were valued at BD 26.6 million while exports to these countries totalled BD 18.6 million. The majority of Bahrain's imported goods came from Japan and were worth BD 115.5 million; second Italy about BD 80.9 million and Britain third at BD 72 million. On reciprocal trade Japan imported goods worth BD 30.4 million from Bahrain, the United States BD 11 million and India BD 10.9 million. Importation of foodstuffs and animals to Bahrain was valued at BD 74.7 million in 1984. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 16 Jun 85 p 1 GF]

EXPATRIATE WORKFORCE DROPS--Numbers of expatriate workers in Bahrain have been slashed by 15 per cent so far this year, the Labour Directorate has announced. And more expatriates are expected to leave by the end of the year in a massive exodus sparked by government austerity measures and a general regional recession. Khalifah Khalifah, Labour Director at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, said a new computerised system would soon enable the Ministry to keep even tighter control on expatriate labour contracts and accurately forecast future trends. Private companies are being asked to submit monthly labour reports to the directorate, who will authorise the renewal of expatriate contracts only after the reports are fully assessed. No precise figure was given with the percentage fall. Expatriate workers account for about 58.5 per cent of Bahrain's total workforce, and 70 per cent of the private sector. [Text] [Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 30 Jun 85 p 1 GF]

OFFICIAL DISCUSSES OIL PRODUCTION--Manama, 18 Jun (WAKH)--Bahraini Finance and National Economy Undersecretary 'Isa Burshid said the oil situation in Bahrain has been improved. In a statement published today by the Bahraini Daily AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ, Burshid said Bahrains production of crude and refined oil has increased during 1984 in comparison to 1983. Refining increased by 15 percent and the export of oil increased by 11.7 percent as well. The production of refined oil reached 73.4 million barrels in 1984 while in 1983 it was only 63.8 million barrels, an increase of almost ten million barrels in one year, he said. The rationalization of expenditure in government bodies is continuing, to halt unnecessary expense, the undersecretary added. [Text] [Manama WAKH in English 1600 GMT 18 Jun 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/168

ISRAEL

FUTURE OF NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 5 Apr 85 p 10

[Article by Hanan Qristal: "Who Needs Rotation"]

[Text] From the moment that the National Unity Government gained the confidence of the Knesset, it has lived in the shadow of the threatened violation of the agreement to rotate the prime ministership. Most recently that topic has been the subject of dramatic headlines in the wake of hints and roundabout remarks attributed to senior people in the Labor Party. There were those who declared that the rotation at the top would only occur over their dead bodies. There are at least five possible rotation scenarios that could take place during the tenure of the current Knesset.

The First--Business as Usual

The coalition agreement between Labor and Likud is observed. In November 1986 Yitzhaq Shamir and Shim'on Peres exchange jobs.

The Second--Force Majeur

The involvement of some force majeure, such as a dramatic peace initiative by President Reagan or King Husayn, forces Likud and Labor to dismantle their partnership and to decide jointly on early elections. The divorce is accomplished with no vituperation about legality or deception but rather is explained in terms of essential philosophy: the opposing ideologies of Labor and Likud prevent a continuation of their partnership and require a renewed clear mandate from the electorate.

The Third--Internal Struggles

Internal struggles within the Herut movement force Likud to initiate a dismantling of the government. At the Likud congress set for the fall of 1985 it turns out that the Sharon camp is the strongest, and that his prospects are good for winning the Likud candidacy over Shamir and Levy. The Minister of Industry and Commerce prefers to bring about the collapse of the government and force early elections.

The Fourth--An Exercise

Shamir, as agreed, takes over the prime ministership in November 1986, but about 3 months down the line Peres, who continues to enjoy high popularity in the polls, initiates a government crisis. That way he can maintain popular support at the voting box without being accused of violating the agreements.

This scenario could come about in two different ways:

1. The ministers from the Labor block resign from the government. The Shamir government becomes a caretaker government following its defeat by a Knesset motion of no confidence. The prospects for this option are extremely weak because the Labor Party will not be seduced into allowing Likud again to conduct, by itself, conduct a policy of election bribery.

2. The Labor faction in the Knesset joins the opposition in a no-confidence motion and brings down the national unity government. The entire government becomes a caretaker government. Likud and Labor exploit the ministries that they control for electioneering.

The Fifth--Excuse, Risk, Tactics

Shim'on Peres does not fulfill his role in the agreement and overturns the coalitional partnership with Likud. This scenario is the most popular among political analysts. Labor Party leaders avoid discussing this scenario like fire and, in all discussions for the record, deny any hint of their intention not to fulfill their obligation to Likud.

In off-the-record talks with ministers and senior MK's, the rotation is the main topic of conversation. The conclusion from these talks is clear: Yitzhaq Shamir's prospects for returning to the prime ministership are poor. According to this scenario, which focuses on non-fulfillment of the rotation agreement, it is Prime Minister Shim'on Peres who now enjoys public popularity.

For himself, his party, his place in history, Peres needs a crushing victory at the polls to allow him to set up a Labor government under his leadership that will not be dependent on an equal partner. Such a victory is particularly necessary after having led Labor to three consecutive electoral defeats. The most devastating of these was, surprisingly, the last, in which Labor dropped from 47 percent of the votes to 44 percent. Peres entered the election campaign with 10 percent of the public seeing in him a suitable candidate for the prime ministership. The last survey before the elections, which was not published, gave him only 7 percent public support.

Dismantling of the partnership with Likud and pushing forward the elections allows Peres to kill two birds with one stone. The first--to avoid a renewed exhausting internal struggle in 1988 against the popular Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. The second--to oppose the Likud candidate with the title and position of prime minister.

Peres, a polished and clever politician, understands that 2 years in the position of foreign minister may tarnish his image, damage his popularity and result in insurmountable obstacles in 1988. He cannot permit himself a fourth electoral defeat at the polls.

The leadership of the Labor Party, excepting, of course, Yitzhaq Rabin and the heads of his camp, support the idea of overturning the rotation agreement and pushing the elections forward. The defense minister, who, according to the coalitional agreement, is to remain in office 4 full years, is the most ardent supporter of implementing the exchange of prime ministers between Peres and Shamir. Rabin, who is now totally absorbed in completing the withdrawal from Lebanon and who maintains fair, loyal and correct relations with Peres, has not given up his intention of returning to the prime ministership. He is carefully preparing for his comeback in 1988 and the expected struggle with the foreign minister. Rabin understands that pushing forward the 12th Knesset elections will mean, as in 1984, accepting the leadership of Shim'on Peres and thus giving up, perhaps forever, his dream of returning to the prime ministership.

The timing that Prime Minister Shim'on Peres will choose for abrogating the partnership with Likud stretches from July of this year, 2 months after the Histadrut elections and after completion of the withdrawal from Lebanon to international borders, up to September 1986, 2 months before the end of his term of office. The date bandied about recently over and over again among the Labor leadership is October 1985. This is a convenient date, a year before rotation comes due, which will allow Peres and his party to present the public with their accomplishments in ameliorating the economy and in implementing the decision to end the Lebanon fiasco.

The most appealing date for Labor leadership is actually the beginning of 1986, on the assumption that the Herut congress, which will convene after a 6-year interruption, will again choose Yitzhaq Shamir as its candidate for prime minister. Shim'on Peres would prefer to run in early elections for the 12th Knesset against the colorless and unimpressive Shamir rather than against Ari'el Sharon or David Levy who are more charismatic personalities. Peres would thus prefer to wait for the Herut congress to again recognize Shamir before bringing down the government.

A successful Labor campaign in the Histadrut elections, in which Peres would shine as superstar alongside the popular Isra'el Qeysar, might accelerate Labor's efforts to push the elections forward. On the other hand, a failure in the Histadrut arena, measured in the striking loss of a number of development town labor council seats, could cool their enthusiasm.

The excuse that the Labor leadership would use to violate the partnership with Likud is not yet known and may not yet have been decided. The best party minds are taking part in the competition to find a logical reason or excuse that will not boomerang and which will lay the burden of guilt on the Likud camp. Possible excuses come from the areas of the economy, relations with Egypt, the West Bank settlements and Lebanon, or a possible government resolution to set up a commission to investigate the involvement of the Begin-Sharon-Shamir government in the Lebanon war.

The risk in adopting this scenario lies in the fear that the public will not forgive at the polls any party felt to be responsible for the dismantling of the national unity government. The very act of dismantling the government could damage Peres' credibility, again stick him with the image of the tireless political saboteur and serve as a catalyst for Menahem Begin's return to political life. The former prime minister, who still owes something to the public and his place in history, which is the reason behind his surprising withdrawal from public life and his strange isolation, could exploit the dismantling of the coalitional agreement to make an impressive political comeback.

Even If Rotation Takes Place on the Agreed Date, Labor Could Bring Down the Government 3 Months Later

Labor's preferred tactic would be to trap Likud and make its ministers withdraw from the government in anger. According to this scenario it would be possible to persuade the National Religious Party and perhaps also Shas and Agudat Isra'el not to automatically walk out with Likud, but to remain for a limited period in a narrow Labor government which, in such a circumstance, could determine a convenient time for early elections and adopt a strategy of election blackmail.

But if it should become clear to Peres that even a bulldozer will not dislodge Likud from the government and every insult is simply ignored, the prime minister would be forced to tender his resignation to the president and turn the national unity government into a transitional government under his leadership, which would function in an exchange of accusations, mutual stalemate and anarchy until after the elections.

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CSO: 4423/47

ISRAEL

ISRAEL, SYRIA SEEN HEADING FOR WAR ON GOLAN

TAL01548 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Jun 85 p 7

[Commentary by Tali Zelinger: "Al-Asad Broke the Bank"]

[Text] The defense establishment's period of illusions has ended. The awakening up from the Lebanese dream, and the cynicism which has grown as a result of this development have sharpened our sight regarding other sectors, which are also connected with the shattered Lebanese dream. The caution which always characterized the IDF intelligence's assessments has doubled, and the military-political ramifications of the Lebanese disaster have influenced these assessments. Syria has gained in this war much more than Israel has lost. The Syrian president has broken the bank and is just about to buy the casino. Israel is observing from the sidelines and part of what it sees will be described here.

The assessment today is that sooner or later there will be a war between Syria and Israel. The loss of a considerable part of Israel's deterrent power and Syria's achievements in the war in Lebanon only strengthened Syria's self-confidence, and sooner or later it will decide to attack Israel. As always its main aim will be to reconquer the Golan Heights. The road to this is paved by strengthening the Syrian army, by offsetting Israel's increasing strength, by creating problems in Lebanon and by continuously undermining Israel's self-confidence.

The impetus behind Syria's desire to strengthen its aggressive capability vis-a-vis Israel is a combination of a sense of confidence stemming from its achievements in Lebanon, and a sense of political isolation: Syria felt it is in the process of being politically isolated in the Arab world due to the feelers sent out by Jordan and the PLO regarding contacts with Israel, the peace between Israel and Egypt, and signs of moderation in other confrontation countries such as Iraq. It is believed that in view of this process Syria will take almost any measure to save its central role in the struggle against Israel, even if this means getting entangled in a war with Israel or hostile actions against its southern neighbor Jordan, which threatens its position.

Israeli experts say Syria does not believe it can utterly defeat Israel. The strength of the Syrian Army, however, is such as to allow its leadership to launch a war that, even if it ends with many casualties and short of victory,

will bring about a movement which would be worth the price. With this in view, the Syrian Army is busy increasing its size and quality. All the military preparations are done with one central aim in mind--returning the Golan Heights to Syrian hands, even if this means that a political arrangement is imposed following a military operation which has not ended in victory. The Syrians want to attain the strategic power to achieve their aims by means of procurement: frog and scud missiles, SS-21 missiles, SA-5 missiles, long range land-to-sea missiles and advances Sukhoi-22 planes for attacking targets deep inside Israel; and by means of training: intensive training which combines large, heavily equipped, and mobile commando forces with assault helicopters.

The Syrian Army currently has approximately 500,000 regular soldiers and the aim is to exhaust manpower in order to further enlarge it. There is absolutely no doubt that Syria is headed for war. The only question is when and under what circumstances. The circumstances and timing of such a war will influence the performance of the IDF in face of the Syrian Army, even though at this stage there is no doubt Israel can beat Syria in a one-front war. The question is what will be the price in terms of human lives, and what will be the price politically.

There is another central question here--what stand will the Soviet Union take regarding a Syrian military option and to what an extent will Syria take the Soviet position into consideration. Israeli experts believe the Soviets have a great influence over the Syrian president, but not absolute influence, and ultimately Al-Asad will act according to his own considerations. According to this assessment the Soviets will support any Syrian decision in order to stand by their basic commitment to preserve Syria from defeat.

The Soviet's commitment and their willingness to support Syria after-the-act might be tested in relation to Syria's behaviour toward Jordan, in case the latter and the PLO continue to moderate their positions in the direction of a compromise. Israel believes Syria will make every effort to foil such a process, including by encouraging subversiveness in Jordan, as it has done in the past, and by military steps such as concentrating large forces along their joint borders as a muscle-flexing demonstration. Al-Asad might launch a limited military action against Jordan, if he believes this would be his salvation. The Soviets might be against such a move, more so than they would oppose or halt aggression against Israel. However, it is believed that if Al-Asad decides to undertake such a move, they would back him.

In any case, the tension between Israel and Syria will not decrease in the near future. Perhaps we lost the great opportunity to ease the friction in the framework of a preliminary political process. The army is making assessments and preparations. The political echelon should also make assessments and preparations so as not to miss any opportunity or initiative, and save us from another military confrontation.

CSO: 4400/171

ISRAEL

HA'ARETZ ON THREATS FACED BY ISRAELI NAVY

TA131648 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Jun 85 p 7

[Article by military correspondent Re'uven Pedatzur: "Threats in the Naval Arena"]

[Excerpts] Ironically, the Israeli Navy's successful operations have a detrimental effect. The Navy's outstanding performance during the Yom Kippur War and its ability to protect the coast from terrorist attacks, have caused the "lethargy effect." According to senior Navy personnel, "We have a problem in trying to convince others that a real and significant danger exists from the sea. This is because Israel has never been seriously attacked from the sea, and this creates the impression that the naval front is not dangerous." A review of the decision-making processes connected with equipping the Navy shows that Navy personnel have difficulty in consolidating an effective lobby--like that of the Air Force--that would work to obtain the funds for its vital needs.

Thus, the discussions on producing the next generation of missile boats--the SAAR-5--have been going on for more than 3 years already, and a decision is yet to be made. It has also still not been decided when the construction of the next generation of submarines will start. "It should be clear to all the decisionmakers that a decision on the production of the SAAR-5 must be made by the end of the current year," senior Navy personnel say. "Otherwise we will not manage to put them into service until 1991-92. The same is true for submarines. A decision on the issue of submarines must be made by the end of 1985."

The naval order-of-battle statistics, as appear in the "Military Balance in the Middle East" report by the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, show a situation that is cause for considerable concern.

	<u>Egypt</u>	<u>Syria</u>	<u>Libya</u>	<u>Saudi</u>	<u>Algeria</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Israel</u>
Submarines	12	2-3	6		2	22-23	3
Missile boats	24 plus 6	20	25	9	12	90 plus 12	23
Guided missile Destroyers/ Frigates/ Corvettes	2 plus 2 on order	4	8	4 plus 4 on order	3	21 plus 6 on order	

Minesweepers	12	4		4	2	22	
Artillery							
Destroyers/ Frigates/ Corvettes	7		1			8	
Antisubmarine Battleships	3	2		8	8	13	
Gunboats/ Torpedo Boats	30	8		3	4	45	
Patrol Boats	27	6	9	38	19	101	47
Landing Craft	30	3 on order	9	12	3	54 plus 3 on order	13
Hovercrafts	14 on order			10		10 plus 14 on order	2

The chart, however, does not reflect the full picture. The missile boats and submarines the Israel Navy has in its possession have reached the end of their operational life. The SAAR-2, SAAR-3, and SAAR-4 missile boats were built in the 1960's and 1970's, and do not provide an appropriate answer to the threats of the naval battlefield in the 1990's. The three submarines--of the "Vickers 206" type--which the Navy has are quite outdated.

A real revolution has begun in the naval arena over the past decade. A technological breakthrough was made in the field of arms, which brought about an increase in the tactical space that the Navy controls. Recently, the Israeli Navy, for the first time in its history, was forced to respond simultaneously to the challenges of the most advanced Western and Eastern technology. The Arab navies are armed with the most sophisticated weapons systems to be found in the naval arena. Whereas during the Yom Kippur War the Navy was forced to respond to the threats of one type of sea-to-sea missile--the Soviet "Styx," now it also has to supply operational answers to modern sea-to-sea missiles incorporating Western technology such as the U.S. "Harpoon" and the French "Otomat." This is in addition to the threat of the U.S. "Vulcan Phalanx" anti-missile artillery piece fielded by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Now, by means of computerized weapons systems, the Arab navies can compensate appropriately for the relatively low level of systems operators.

Naval warfare has become three-dimensional in recent years: in the air, at sea, and underwater. The lack of means forces the Israeli Navy to plan its order of battle such that all its naval vessels can respond to the threats of all three dimensions. The size of the vessels currently in service (400-500 tons) does not permit the mounting of weapons systems necessary to deal with the challenges of the battlefield of the '90's. Consequently, their service capability will decrease the next decade. This is the reason for the urgency connected with building the SAAR-5, which is bigger (approximately 1,000

tons), and which would be equipped with the best and most sophisticated weapons systems.

The Israeli Navy considers the Syria-Libya naval coalition the most significant potential threat. The Libyans have built a large navy, equipped with the most modern weapons from the East and from the West. For example, the Libyans have F-type Soviet submarines--which are the most sophisticated of their kind--and French "Combattante" missile boats which include advanced electronic systems. The Libyan vessels can remain at sea for a long time, which makes it possible for them to reach a point opposite the Israeli coast and choose the most suitable moment to launch an attack. The Libyan navy is trained by instructors from the United States, Italy, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Britain, and France. One can learn about the Libyan navy's ability and intentions from the fact that during the evacuation of the U.S. Marines from Beirut, a Libyan submarine sailed along the Lebanese coast to "keep an eye" on the evacuation process.

If we add the Syrian navy--which is also equipped with the best naval weapons, and which for the first time is also absorbing submarines (also of the most modern type,) "Nanuchka" missile corvettes, and missiles capable of hitting targets off the Tel Aviv shore with great precision--it can be seen that the naval threat from that direction is cause for much concern on the part of those in charge of protecting the Israeli coast.

Israeli naval warfare experts believe that Israel would only be able to tolerate a certain number of missile attacks from the sea without suffering disruptions of civilian life.

In addition to the need to prepare for war against the Arab navies, the Israeli Navy is continually busy foiling terrorist attacks from the sea. The sinking of a terrorist boat far from the Israeli coast not so long ago illustrates the enormous responsibility the Navy has even during quiet, routine times.

Experts have assessed that the Navy's budget is much smaller than that of the Air Force. The limited resources allocated for equipping the Navy, together with the inability to decide on the immediate manufacture of new vessels, are obstacles which may some day prove fatal.

CSO: 440/171

ISRAEL

NABULUS PNC MEMBER INTERVIEWED

TA141245 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 14 Jun 85 pp 7, 10

[Interview with Sa'id Kan'an, PNC member from Nabulus, by Pinhas 'Inbari:
"The PLO Has no Military Option"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Sa'id Kan'an from Nabulus, a member of the PNC, belongs to the camp of "PLO supporters" in the territories. Some say he has excellent links with the PLO, Jordan, and Israel, and is naturally among those public figures who will make up the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to peace talks, and Sa'id Kan'an has indeed been closely involved in the latest political moves.

['Inbari] There are doubts in Israel about the seriousness of the new political initiative. Are they justified?

[Kan'an] For the first time in the history of the Palestinian problem this is a real and serious initiative. Jordan feels jeopardized by the extremist slogans being voiced in Israel by Sharon, Tehiya, and others, to the effect that Jordan should be the Palestinian homeland and moves should be made to make the Palestinians emigrate there, overthrow the existing regime and establish the Palestinian state on its ruins. Jordan fears talk of this sort. Therefore it is taking advantage of the political conditions and aiming at peace, because, by so doing, it is defending itself.

As for the Palestinians, they are also serious in their peace efforts, because after Beirut, they have no military option. The only one preaching a continuation of the military struggle in Syria, but in view of what is happening in the refugee camps in Beirut, it is clear that the Palestinians cannot go along with Syria. Jordan, in contrast to this, is offering them a political solution in a national homeland.

However, if these efforts do not bear fruit, there could be a catastrophe. The right now controls the Arab countries, and this is because the left has lost power because it failed to achieve a solution to the Palestinian problem. In the meantime, three events have occurred which sounded a warning for the rightist regimes: the attack against the sacred site in Mecca, where the attackers called out "Jerusalem"--in other words, the liberation of Palestine; Al-Sadat's murder for having followed the path of peace with Israel--at the murderers' trial they again waved the banner "Jerusalem," claiming that peace

with Israel was a surrender, the third even was the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Whoever imagined that such a thing could happen after SAVAK's clear rule over the country?! And along comes Khomeyni and his first slogan is: "Jerusalem," and the liberation of Palestine.

Israel, then, should take into account that if it does not agree to a settlement involving both sides, there will be a catastrophe in which both nations--the Israeli and the Palestinian--will suffer. Israel must respond seriously to the Palestinians' willingness for peace with a Palestinian homeland and the 1967 borders. This is the first time the PLO has been prepared to recognize UN Security Council Resolution 242, while introducing certain changes connected with the right to self-determination.

And even more important is that to date there have been three obstacles on the political path: the matter of the Palestinian state, recognition of 242, and the absence of the desire to include the PLO in negotiations. Now Israel has no reason not to respond to the political initiative. There is no question of an independent state, but one within the framework of a confederation and there is recognition of Israel within the framework of Resolution 242, with the addition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. This is the minimum to which the Palestinians can agree. And, as for the third matter, the PLO is ready for a joint delegation. These were the three obstacles the PLO has overcome. Now Israel has no pretext to evade the peace process.

[Inbari] Are the Palestinians aware of the difficulties in Israel because of the national unity government, in which the Likud has a considerable influence?

[Kan'an] This is a problem we did indeed foresee. The national unity government is incapable of making decisions. The government's existence has become agoal in itself for the Labor Party. There are no statesmen to make courageous decisions, decisions which are first and foremost for the benefit of the people of Israel.

The Likud does not understand the genuine interests of its people. They think the Arab nation will always remain backward. The Arab nation, and particularly the Palestinians, is a civilized nation with a rich past behind it, and it has overcome situations more difficult than the current one and has expelled invaders. I do not want us to come to such a pass. On the contrary, I call for coexistence. I believe with absolute certainty that any substitute would be a catastrophe. The Likud is causing the Israeli nation to bang its head against a brick wall, and it has taken advantage of certain conditions to incite the oriental communities to extremism. The wise among you are exposed to slanders and their lives are poisoned. 'Ezer Weizman, for instance, told me: "They call me 'Muhammad Weizman,'" because he is demanding that basic rights be given to the Palestinians. He made peace with Egypt and he also wants to make peace with the Palestinians. He wants to sit down with 'Arafat, with the PLO, but he is being threatened with murder!

[Inbari] You have met with many Labor Party leaders. What was your impression of their willingness for peace?

[Kan'an] Everyone I met supports the Jordanian option and, in their view, this fits in with the political process now occurring in the form of the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative. They all want peace, but they are afraid the national unity government will collapse; the Likud will take to the streets and tell the nation: "The alignment is selling the homeland to the Palestinians." I told them: You must be statesmen!

['Inbari] Just as there is a unity government in Israel, there is also national unity with many difficulties on the Arab side....

[Kan'an] When Murphy visited, we asked him: What are the results of your tour of the Arab world? He answered: President al-Asad of Syria told me: My first goal is to eliminate the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement; then I will eliminate 'Arafat the man. Syria is interested in bringing about the collapse of the current process, but it is isolated in the Arab world.

The Beirut incidents have proved that Amal, which is supported by Syria, attacked the refugee camps on Syria's orders, and so the Palestinians must do some soul-searching and join the right path, which is peace between the two peoples, Israeli and Palestinian.

['Inbari] Just as there are difficulties in the national unity government in Israel, are there difficulties in the national unity between Jordan and the PLO?

[Kan'an] The third clause in the Husayn-'Arafat agreement states unity in the form of a confederation is to be established. When Abu 'Ammar (Yasir 'Arafat) went to Tunis to get approval for the agreement, two members got up: Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] and Faruq Qadummi, who demanded including an amendment to state that the confederation would only be established after [last word in boldface] the establishment of an independent state. In my opinion, that is funny. Five minutes after the declaration of independence, will they also declare a confederation?! If the PLO steering committee decided on a confederation, let it be a confederation from the beginning.

When Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri announced that the confederation did not mean an independent state, I think 'Arafat believes this, too, and we support it. We want a confederation. We do not want a separate Palestinian state, because it would be in constant danger of an Israeli invasion.

['Inbari] You have been involved in various stages of the political process. What can you tell us about the current process?

[Kan'an] After Beirut in 1982, the PLO decided on the political path, because there is no military option. It was clear that Syria had run away from the campaign, and that when it achieved a strategic balance with Israel the Palestinian nation would be dispersed and driven to the four corners of the earth and the settlements [Jewish settlements] would fill the area. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are 15 percent of Palestine. The settlements have already taken 50 percent of that 15 percent. The peace process today means rescuing

the country from the talons of the settlements and saving the inhabitants from expulsion. The PLO leadership is aware of the danger; it was prepared to begin peace talks in order to save the people and the land, particularly after it became clear that there was no military option and Syria's position was exposed. The PLO made tactical concessions and agreements for the establishment of the Palestinian homeland within the framework of a confederation, and, at the same time, Saudi King Fahd and President Mubarak went to Washington and prepared the ground for the beginning of the peace process. They asked the United States to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which would then meet with Israel. There was talk at the that time of "talks," not "negotiations," between the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the United States. The intention is to explain our situation to the Americans in order to bring about U.S. recognition of the PLO and its right to self-determination. As a result of that meeting, another delegation will be established to negotiate with Israel.

We have now begun the first stage. Several names of Palestinians from the territories have been put forward: Hikmat al-Masri, Ilyas Frayj, Rashad al-Shawwa, and myself. This has been published in the press and by Radio Monte Carlo. But, to be frank: To date we have not received any official answer.

[Kan'an] Israel has rejected its members. The king promised that the PLO alone would choose the delegation members and Jordan would not intervene in the PLO's decisions, but Israel is imposing a veto on anyone who is a PLO member. Afterward Israel said there must not be any link with the PLO. That is funny, because the entire Palestinian nation is linked to the PLO. In this regard, I received a phone call from abroad and I was told by PLO officials that Usamah al-Baz had visited Shultz and they had discussed this matter. Shultz told Al-Baz that the United States would accept "avowed members," [last word in bold face], but not "avowed leaders." [last word in bold face] In concrete terms, they spoke about the candidacy of Nabil Sha'tar, whom the United States was prepared to regard as an "avowed member," not an "avowed leader." Shultz said: "If he is acceptable to you, he is also acceptable to us." Therefore Israel has no right to object. I can understand a refusal to sit down with such famous people as George Habash or Abu Jihad. But members of the PNC do not carry arms. They are not members of organizations, but independent. They have not committed any act of aggression against Israel, why should you not sit down with them?! That is the root of the argument today.

When I was in Amman I learned that Jordan and the PLO had decided it would be better if there were no figures from the territories in the joint delegation, but the United States and Israel stuck to the demand that people from the territories be included. I do not know what has developed since then, whether they have introduced people from the West Bank or not.

['Inbari] One of the reasons for the lack of belief in the Jordanian initiative is Jordan's policy in the West Bank. I mean its policy regarding the appointment of Arab mayors.

[Kan'an] That is not true. Under the previous government--that of Ahmad 'Ubaydat, Shmu'el Goren, the coordinator of activities in the territories, called me and asked under what conditions it would be possible to bring back the Arab mayors? I enumerated 10 conditions and was surprised when he agreed to all of them immediately. The conditions were: Not to link Nabulus with the Israeli electricity grid, permission to bring in money from abroad, the municipality's independence, for the town to elect its own council members, freedom of statements to the press, including political statements, etc.

In the meantime, the government in Amman was replaced and the palace said: If there are five municipalities, let there be five municipalities. The new minister for occupied territories, Tahir Kan'an [name and title as published], told me: We have a set of priorities: to bring back the old municipalities. If that is impossible, to hold an election. If that is also impossible, to establish new councils through your institutions. We emerged with the feeling that the crisis was going to be solved. Bassam Kan'an met with Goren, but then Israel retreated, and Goren was only prepared to speak about Nabulus!

We in the West Bank suffered very much under the Likud government. We felt that it followed a calculated policy aimed at making the inhabitants emigrate, by creating insufferable living conditions in the territories. We thought conditions would improve when a new government came along. To my regret, conditions have not changed. There have only been small relaxations on the matter of bringing in money from abroad. Journalists are still under the military censorship's stringent supervision, I have just now been prevented from going to Jordan: I am accused of having met with Abu-'Ali Shahin. Abu-'Ali Shahin is a respected man with a personality. He is not a terrorist and he does not carry arms. He was banned in Israel because he was with 'Arafat during the first days of the conquest, but he paid the price with 15 long years in jail. After serving his sentence he was released from jail and remained in Israel. And afterwards he was deported. It is true that when I was sitting in the hotel in Amman he passed by me and I asked him how he was. Because of that I have been banned from going to Amman. Under the Likud I was banned from leaving. In addition, I have been asking for permission to publish a paper in Nabulus for a long time, and I have not been given any answer, but I have learned that approval has been given for another rejectionist front mouthpiece, AL-DARB to be published.

Israel is making trouble for the moderate peace lovers who want to find a settlement, and it is encouraging the extremists. We hope that wise men will come to power in Israel so that we will be able to establish links with the Israelis. We want to strengthen Israeli moderation in order to convince the Israeli man-in-the-street of the rightness of our positions and achieve peace and coexistence.

CSO: 4400/171

ISRAEL

ELECTRONIC SPY PLANE DEVELOPED, EXPORTED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 17 Apr 85 p 6

[Article by Arye Egozi: "Israel Developed an 'Israeli-Made Spy Plane' "]

[Text] Israel developed and is now producing and exporting an electronic spy plane capable of locating air and ground targets up to 450 km away. She has also developed the world's first radar, capable of detecting sea-to-sea missiles that skim over the water's surface in attacking their targets. These two developments were first revealed yesterday during a tour for aviation reporters of the Alta plant, a daughter company of the Ashdod aircraft industry.

Moshe Urtes, general manager of the electronics division of the aircraft industry, said that Israel had developed tactical systems that are the world's best. As an example he cited the miniature pilotless drone and the fire control system that enables heavy guns to hit their targets with a precision that was previously impossible.

In response to a question, Urtes said that the electronics division could make a contribution if Israel were to be included in the American "Star Wars" program. "We have several ideas on the subject." The United States did, of course, invite Israel to participate in the development of a defense against intercontinental missiles.

Sea Skimmers

Dr Nino Levy, the general manager of Alta, revealed that the plant had solved a problem that many countries have been trying to solve without success for a long time. Alta developed a system capable of detecting sea skimmer sea-to-sea missiles in real time. The system permits the detection of the missile immediately after launch and prevents false alarms. "Had the British possessed such a system, their destroyer might not have been sunk in the Falklands War," the general manager of Alta said.

Among the developments revealed yesterday: a system for Israeli coastal defense that can detect even rubber rafts and small boats of the type used by terrorists in the past for assault landings from the sea.

During the tour a video tape was played describing an Israeli-made spy plane, all of the systems of which were developed by Alta. It is a normal Boeing 707 in which were installed sophisticated detection systems that collect the radar and radio broadcasts from planes, armor and enemy vehicles. When the plane flies at an altitude of about 10 km, it can detect targets up to 450 km away and determine their precise location and level of threat in real time. Dr Levy revealed that the plane's instrumentation makes it possible to determine as well the serviceability of the enemy's weapon systems and even the morale of the soldiers by comparing "the stream of broadcasts at different times."

A Stealth Plane

During the tour yesterday it was also reported that Alta is doing research in the area of developing artificial intelligence. What this means is computers that can imitate human thought in making decisions by making the best choice. This is a very advanced field of research which today involves many people at central research facilities around the world with the aim of integrating artificial intelligence into advanced weapons systems of the future.

At Alta they are developing a large portion of the electronic weapons systems of the Lavi airplane. Dr Levy revealed yesterday that devices will be installed in the Lavi that will make it the world's most reliable plane. The Americans, of course, are now developing, under a veil of heavy secrecy, a plane that has earned the nickname "the invisible plane" or the "stealth" aircraft. What this means is to develop a plane that will be very hard to detect by existing detection systems such as radar.

Exporters are Being Punished

Alta exported various systems in 1984 valued at \$50 million, and expects \$73 million of exports this year. In summarizing the tour, the general manager of the aviation industry, Shalom Ari'av, said that the government is waging an anti-export policy. "Whoever tries to export gets punishment instead of encouragement."

In this fiscal year the aviation industry exported various products valued at \$430 million.

9793

CSO: 4423/47

ISRAEL

GROWING JEWISH UNEMPLOYMENT EXPECTED THROUGHOUT 1985

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 11 Apr 85 p 15

[Text] Approximately 100,000 Arab workers from the territories, according to the Central Statistics Bureau, cross the Green Line every day and find employment here in industrial plants and agriculture, construction sites, municipal services, hospitals and hotels and several sectors of the economy such as harvesting, constituting the majority of those so employed. At construction sites they are more than 40 percent of the work force. In textile plants production stops in most divisions during Islamic holidays.

The dependency of the economy on this "Arab labor" grows from year to year. As long as this phenomenon promises normal life in the territories, it can be seen as a positive development. However increasing fears of a worsening unemployment situation during 1985 require a thorough investigation of the matter. There is no need to stop the flow of workers from the West Bank to jobs in Israel's large cities. But it may be that the economic situation requires visas and supervision.

The general manager of the employment service, Baruch Haqla'i has asserted on several occasions in recent years that the increase in layoffs and the shrinkage of employment opportunities in the economy during times of economic crisis will leave the Jewish unemployed with no choice but to turn to jobs that have become the "stronghold" of workers from the territories. Meanwhile, of course, almost none of his forecasts have proven true. In industrial plants in sectors that are not sufficiently high tech, Jewish employment seekers prefer, instead, to collect unemployment compensation.

Even sophisticated industries are hard put to get sufficient manpower in certain professions. There is a striking shortfall of engineers, perhaps as high as 10,000. The aviation industry--Tadiran, El Op, Scitex and other companies-- is today investing resources in trying to locate engineers among emigrants to the United States and Canada and among Jewish students studying abroad.

This reality of a need for workers on the one hand and inincreasing unemployment on the other, known among professionals as "employment polarization", will worsen this year, according to projections. It is believed that the federal budget cut will make itself felt by summer. Those

who joined in the package deal will assert their right, anchored in the agreement for stabilizing the economy, to assess the possibility of dismantling the package, which would open the way for worsening the unemployment situation.

The rate of unemployment is now 6 percent of the work force as compared to 5 percent a year ago and 4 percent 2 years ago. Even today the rate of unemployment in Israel is relatively lower than in other western countries, which have seen 10-12 percent of the work force unemployed in recent years. The scope of unemployment in Israel is still considered tolerable, but in large sectors and plants, the red warning lights are already on.

--The defense establishment intends to lay off the largest number of workers--about 11,000. The workers' committees are trying to act to soften the blow by persuading security plant management to transfer workers from divisions in which employment will decline to other divisions.

--A heavy blow is also expected in industries connected to the defense establishment. The Soltam plant in Yoqne'am, which belongs to Koor, will be left with almost no new orders starting this July and will be forced to fire several hundreds of its 1,900 employees.

--Government offices and companies will fire about 10,000 workers in the next few months. At the Ministry of Labor alone about 400 will be fired.

--"Ha'argaz" and "Merkavim", plants that produce, among other things, autobus chassis, are getting ready to fire hundreds of workers. These plants are facing the danger of a closing down of production lines. In recent months 80 employees have been fired from "Ha'argaz" while 75 were let go from "Merkavim".

--The Israel Chemical concern, which "quietly" let go a thousand of its workers last year, especially in the phosphates and fertilizer plants, is planning to continue with "efficiency and cost-cutting measures" throughout 1985, despite an increase in sales and the comfortable profit margin achieved last year.

--The firm of "Solel-Boneh" last year alone reduced its work force by 800 workers.

--220 workers from the broadcasting authority will be fired in the next fiscal year at the rate of 20 employees a month.

--The Tel Aviv municipality has decided upon a cut of 700 positions.

--Hard bargaining is expected over layoffs at Zim. Management is demanding the firing of 450 employees.

--The Ata plant, with its 2,000 employees, was given an extension until the end of this month to find a buyer, otherwise it will close its gates.

--3,000 people appear in the lists of firings that were prepared in the banks, among them 1,000 Bank Le'umi workers.

There are no firm estimates of the worsening employment situation from any government authority whatever. The Labor Ministry has insufficient resources and seems to have lost the will to meet the challenge. On the other hand, it will also have to confront a shortage of thousands of workers in various professions in industry and the hotel sector. These conflicting tendencies testify to the fragility of the foundations of Israel's employment structure.

9794

CSO: 4423/47

ISRAEL

NEGEV DEVELOPMENT TOWNS EXPERIENCE NEGATIVE MIGRATION

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Apr 85 p 7

[Article by Haim Be'ur: 'The Negev is Left Behind']

[Text]In 1981, a short time after the elections, the ministerial committee on development town matters lapsed. The deceased Yig'al Yadin was the last minister to chair the committee, and, as a member of the government, was the last to show any direct and continuous involvement in this, the country's weakest social sector.

Today there is no ministerial body tasked with handling the country's 25 development towns. There is, to be sure, a ministerial committee for social welfare matters headed by David Levy, but, according to Zohar Gindel, the director of the development towns' steering committee, almost every government ministry has a separate interest in the development town issue. Ministers who worry about strengthening their own power bases in internal party campaigns occasionally go to the trouble of visiting some distant development town, accompanied by photographers and reporters, spout promises, many of which are never intended to be kept, and reap applause.

From the data of the Central Statistics Bureau, worked up in the development towns' steering committee, it seems that 17 of the 25 development towns have registered a negative migration balance in recent years. That is, the number who leave exceeds the number who come to settle. Loss of residents occurs even in those development towns that are not considered the most problematic from the point of view of employment, such as Arad and Afula.

A series of surveys on employment possibilities in the development towns, conducted recently by the Labor and Manufacturing Productivity Institute, indicates that the dimensions of unemployment in the development towns in the south and the Negev are more serious than in the north. Therefore the degree of emigration from the southern development towns is several times higher. For example, the number of job seekers in Yeruham today constitutes 16.9 percent of the towns's potential work force; in Netivot job seekers constitute 16.2 percent. On the other hand in Yoqne'am the rate is 8.9 percent and in 'Akko, 9.4 percent.

The balance of migration in the development towns shows that in the years 1979-1983 their population grew by 68 inhabitants. But what a difference between north and south! In 1983 (the last year for which there are data) the number of new settlers in northern development towns exceeded the number of emigrants from them and 1,867 people were added to their population (it should be noted that almost a third of the increase was in Karmi'el; Qiryat Shemoneh, Safed, Tiberias, 'Akko, Upper Nazareth and Afula experienced a negative migration balance). The southern towns, on the other hand, suffered from a surplus of emigrants over immigrants, and the migration balance points to a 1,656-man reduction in population.

A survey on employment possibilities in Dimona, prepared recently by the Labor and Manufacturing Productivity Institute, reveals, among other things, the following:

--From July 1984 to February 1985 the rate of those unemployed for 6 days or more grew by 60 percent;

--The source of the negative migration balance in Dimona is to be found in the lack of varied employment and in the desire of many inhabitants to raise their standard of living;

--Employment in the town depends primarily on one sector--textiles;

--There is no second generation in Dimona to man the textile industry. That could have a decisive influence on the town and the future of its plants;

--A large proportion of discharged soldiers--about 450 people a year--have no appropriate employment. Many of them do not return to Dimona and others leave. In the absence of suitable employment, the city is threatened with "aging," degeneration due to the non-renewal of the population.

--A second survey, of Qiryat Gat, reveals that that city, too, like Dimona, is largely dependent on a single industrial sector--textiles. The rate of those on unemployment compensation in Qiryat Gat rose since September of 1984 by 150 percent.

--Last year three plants were closed in the city--Mabat furniture, Hidco and a cut flower packaging plant, leaving 180 employees out of work. Other plants in Qiryat Gat--Iskor, Polgat, Hamagder, Ligat, Uman and Bagir--fired 150 workers last year.

The director of the development town steering committee avers that in recent years there has been clear discrimination against the southern areas and the Negev in terms of investments in industrial plants as compared with other areas of the country and especially the territories on the other side of the Green line. The territories of Judaea and Samaria benefit from their relative proximity to Gush Dan and Jerusalem and therefore attract heavy investors.

Employment in the northern development towns and especially in the western Galilee is also less severely affected than in the Negev because of the relative proximity of these towns to the large industrial area around Haifa.

Zohar Gindel claims that a whole series of settlements in the north should immediately be removed from the category of "development town," because they have recently acquired an economic base and achieved social stability; specifically., Ramat Yishai, Yesod Hama'aleh, Kfar Tabor, Kinneret and Rosh Pina. That is also the case with Ma'aleh Adumim, which Gindel terms a "suburb of Jerusalem." These settlements, he says, are stealing resources needed to assure the existence of the development towns in the Negev.

In October of last year, when he visited Dimona, the prime minister declared that a ministerial committee for the development towns would be set up. Thus far the declaration has not been implemented, apparently because of the debate being carried on behind the curtain as to who would head the committee--a minister from Labor (Ya'aqobi) or a minister from Likud (Levy, Sharon or Qatzav). Meanwhile the big loser is the development towns of the south, subject to a process of decline and degeneration.

9794

CSO: 4423/47

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

COPTIC CHURCH PLAN APPROVED--The Defense Ministry and the IDF Central Command have succumbed to the pressures of the Foreign Ministry, the Religious Affairs Ministry, and the Jerusalem Municipality and have withdrawn their opposition to the site for a Coptic college and church in Jerusalem. The site which the Coptics want is adjacent to the Kfir military base and to another IDF security installation in the area. The Jerusalem District Planning and Construction Committee and a special subcommittee have approved the plan, which was rejected in the past due to what was termed "serious security risk." In the negotiations which took place recently between Egypt and Israel on renewing the normalization process, the Egyptians demanded that the original building plan, which had been rejected previously, be approved. The change in the Defense Ministry's position came following constant pressure applied by the Foreign Ministry and element in the Religious Affairs Ministry and Jerusalem Municipality who wanted to appease Archbishop Basilios, the head of the Coptic Church in Israel. However, more than him they wanted to appease the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the Egyptian Government, which made many appeals concerning this issue. A top officer in the IDF Central Command told the HA'ARETZ correspondent that the approval of the plan is a "scandal." The officer said that "I am very doubtful that if all the officials dealing with this issue had visited the area and seen the situation as it is they would have so easily withdrawn their objection to the plan." [Report by correspondent in Jerusalem Nadav Shragay] [Excerpts] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jun 85 p 1]

SETTLERS COMPLAIN ABOUT SECURITY--The head of the Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights are complaining about the fact that the authorities are ignoring recent exacerbation of attacks against civilian and other targets in the Golan Heights by hostile elements in the Druze community in the northern Golan Heights. The leaders of the settlers claim that on several occasions there was real danger to the lives of Jewish settlers in the Golan Heights following attacks apparently perpetrated by hostile elements in the Druze community. According to the settlers there has been not only a long series of attempts to sabotage civilian property such as water reservoirs and irrigation systems, but in the last few months there has been an increase in the number of terrorist attacks. The settlers cite the case of the land mine discovered last week near Birkat Ram, not far from the village of Buq'ata. A civilian struck the mine and lost his foot. They also cite the recent attempts of Druze youths to cross the border in the vicinity of Majdal Shams. In most of the cases the youths return to Israel from the Syrian territory after several days. The

heads of the Golan Heights settlements on several occasions have asked governmental and security offices to declare areas near the northern Golan Heights border a closed military zone, this in order to prevent further attacks. The settlers believe this is the only way to halt the exacerbation of the situation and to calm it down in order to prevent an increase in the attacks. [Report by Yehuda Tzur] [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 23 Jun 85 p 4]

DELEGATION RETURNS FROM HUNGARY--The Agricultural Center delegation to the international congress of the Agricultural Cooperation held in Budapest, the capital of Hungary, was received as a welcome guest and aroused great interest as the representative of advanced cooperative agriculture in Israel. This was reported by delegation members Refa'el Agmon, Ya'akov Nahtomi, and Nahum Gentz, who returned from Hungary and reported yesterday to the secretariat of the Agricultural Center. In a talk without correspondent, they reported that the structure of the kibbutz and the moshav was the focal point of interest for all those attending the congress, as expressed in remarks made by most of the representatives during the deliberations. These representatives showed up-to-date knowledge of data about the agricultural cooperatives in Israel. The heads of the Institute for Cooperative Research in Hungary expressed to the Agricultural Center delegation the wish to hold the next congress--on the issue of agricultural cooperation--in Israel. Yeruham Meshel, who had been given a personal invitation to the congress, lectured it on the Histadrut cooperative establishment. [Report by Yosef Galili] [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 24 Jun 85 p 2]

DIPLOMAT VISITS LENINGRAD--An Israeli diplomat who is a member of the Paris Embassy staff participated last week in an official visit to Leningrad following an invitation by the Soviet Government. This was learned by our Paris correspondent, Yo'av Tocker. The diplomat, Yosef 'Amihud, is in charge of information, and he traveled together with a group of other foreign diplomats who are members of the association of international diplomats, based in Paris. As far as is known, 'Amihud held no political meetings during his visit to the Soviet Union. [Text] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 25 Jun 85]

CSO: 4400/183

JORDAN

GRADUAL APPROACH TO U.S. ON PEACE SUGGESTED

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 11 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by Rami G. Khouri]

[Text] THE NEXT several months should show if the current effort by Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) to revitalise the Arab-Israeli peace-making process will make any significant progress. In general, I think the gradualist approach to achieving a substantive breakthrough is correct, for only by making such an attempt can we ever find out if the United States is serious about putting into practice its often stated verbal positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I share the scepticism of those who say the United States is unlikely to make any unilateral concessions or gestures towards the Palestinian demand for self-determination. But the attempt must be made, for only by attempting to meet the United States halfway can we finally determine the extent of the American willingness to support a diplomatic process that envisages peace being achieved by an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for Palestinian self-determination and a final peace among Arabs and Israelis.

The step-by-step process that Jordan and the PLO have proposed will seem too slow for many. There are many others who do not like the concept of the PLO naming non-PLO Executive Committee mem-

bers or non-PNC members to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would hold preliminary talks with the United States.

I would suggest that this is not the time for purists or maximalists to insist that all our demands be met a priori by the United States. By insisting on an all-or-nothing negotiating position, we have historically come out with nothing. The gradualist approach is not certain to work, but it is worth a try.

If it works, and gets us closer to a negotiation that might achieve an Israeli withdrawal and a process of Palestinian self-determination, so much the better. If it fails, we have lost nothing, and have gained the political and psychological certitude that comes with having attempted an honourable and honest peace-making effort.

I would also suggest, however, that our effort to engage the Americans in a dialogue should be more firm. The Americans insist that the PLO should accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 as the price for American recognition of and negotiations with the PLO.

In return, Jordan and the PLO should ask the United States for similarly substantive concessions. Specifically, if the United States wants the PLO to signal its acceptance of Is-

rael's existence, or Israel's "right to exist", so should we expect the United States to simultaneously signal its acceptance of the Palestinians' right to self-determination.

Let us use the same tactic on the Americans that they use on us — an affirmation of the political applicability of existing United Nations resolutions as a signal of our willingness to coexist on equal terms with the state of Israel.

The Americans want us to go back to 1967 and accept Resolution 242. I would suggest that we ask the Americans to go back even further, and reaffirm the political dynamics of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947.

That resolution called for the creation of two states in Palestine, an Israeli state and a Palestinian Arab state. The United States accepted that resolution when it was tabled in 1947, and pressured several small Central American countries to support it as well, thereby providing the majority required to make it operative.

The United States now says that it opposes Palestinian self-determination because that phrase is seen to mean the creation of an independent Palestinian state. But the United States has always prided itself on its "consistency" in the

Middle East. If so, why did it support the creation of a Palestinian state in 1947 but oppose one today?

Certainly, the United States is justified in insisting on a peace agreement that guarantees the security of Israel. But it does not have the right to dictate to the Arabs or the Palestinians what happens in Arab land that is vacated by Israel. The future political arrangement in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, Gaza and Arab East Jerusalem is a matter of Arab concern. If such arrangements satisfy the security and political requirements of Israelis, Palestinians and the existing Arab states, the United States should have no quarrels with the ultimate form of Palestinian national arrangements.

There is some logic to the American demand that the Arabs must come to terms with the reality of Israel as a prerequisite for Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. But the satisfaction of Israeli national demands is only one half of the problem in Palestine. The other half is the satisfaction of Palestinian national demands, and in 1947 the United States went on record as supporting the creation of both Israeli and Palestinian states in Palestine.

In the 1982 Fez summit resolutions, the Arabs signalled

their willingness in principle to coexist with an Israeli state — but on the condition that the Palestinians have a state of their own in one-quarter of Palestine.

We now need to have a reciprocal pledge from the Americans and the Israelis that they, in turn, are willing to coexist in peace with a Palestinian state. This should be easier for them to do in the wake of the Palestinians' decision to enter into a confederal relationship with Jordan.

Not only have the Palestinians signalled their willingness to accept a state that is smaller than the state they were originally promised in the 1947 partition resolution, but they have also agreed to dilute the demand for a permanently independent state in favour of a state that confederates with Jordan.

These are substantive concessions that have been made after great soul-searching by the Palestinian people. They have not been adequately reciprocated by parallel gestures from the United States or Israel. This is perhaps the time for the Arabs to insist for such concessions.

What we are offering in return should be rather appealing to the leaders of Israel and the United States — a commitment to negotiate peace, to coexist

next to an Israeli state, and to end the state of belligerence between Palestinians and Israelis.

It is unfair, and politically unrealistic, to expect the PLO and Jordan to make a series of concessions while all we hear from the United States and Israel is a series of no's — no to a full Israeli withdrawal, no to a Palestinian state, no to negotiations with the PLO, and no to Palestinian self-determination.

If the American/Israeli procedural demand for Palestinian recognition of previous United Nations resolutions as a condition for movement towards a negotiated peace is seen in Israel and the United States as being philosophically and politically correct, we should take that position and turn it around to our advantage. We should not hesitate to remind our adversaries that since the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict, United Nations resolutions have attempted to satisfy the twin national demands of Israelis and Palestinians.

For those in the West who preach and value consistency, there is much to be gained by going back over all United Nations resolutions, and reaffirming them en bloc. The Arab-Israeli conflict did not start in 1967, and it is not enshrined only in Resolution 242.

22 July 1985

JORDAN

WATER NEEDS STUDIED

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 6-12 Jun 85 p 4

[Text]

Three studies conducted state that Jordan's need for water by the close of the century is approximately 813 million cubic metres as against its present need of 417 million cubic metres.

These figures are the average of numbers provided by studies conducted separately by the Jordan Water Authority, the World Bank and the Howard Humphrey Consulting Company.

The studies note that there are in Jordan seven areas which are ideal for the cultivation of wheat and fodder as a start if the waters of these areas are put properly into use. These are the Lower Mujib Basin which has a potential usage of 10 million cubic metres of ground water per year, the Wadi Abyed area with 8-10 million cubic metres of water per year and the Jeffer area with 6-10 million cubic metres of water per year. The rest are the Disi area, with between 35-45 million cubic metres of water per year and the Khirbet al Samra' area east of Irbid. Its 17 million cubic metre of waste water can be quite useful if it is treated.

On the other hand, the Jordan Water Authority has recently set its comprehensive water plans

for the country, under which communities with a population of 500 will be provided with daily water pumping by the end of this year. The authority has already switched the intermittent pumpings in Jordan's cities to that of continuous daily pumpings.

Ground water wells will soon be used to the maximum potential as the authority plans to dig further wells.

CSO: 4400/169

JORDAN

U.S. AID MAY BE SOUGHT FOR WATER, HEALTH PROJECTS

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 25 Jun 85 p 4

[Text]

THE announcement of a \$250 million US aid package for Jordan has been warmly welcomed. Most of the money has been earmarked for development projects.

No specific projects have been identified so far, but the water authority of Jordan has just issued a tender for design on the first half of a very ambitious project to establish a national water pipe network.

A rough estimate puts the cost at \$300-400 million which means that the water authority will be on the lookout for finance—and US aid agencies seem to have a particular fondness for water supply projects.

The project will consist of a pipeline extending from Al Mukheibeh in the north to Qaa Disi in the south and connecting all underground water and water outlets.

Water Authority President Muhammad Kilani says the aim of the project is to ensure the security and flexibility of the national water supply and particularly to avoid any need to bring domestic water from

outside the country. Once the network is established, first priority will be potable water, with industrial and agricultural uses taking second place.

A study for the northern Jordan to Amman sector of the system was completed in 1983, and extensive development of the national water supply system has taken place since with the water authority working towards its goal of providing piped water to all Jordanian settlements with a population of over 500 people.

A number of other Jordanian institutions will also be interested in funding for their respective projects.

The Ministry of Health for one is going ahead with its JD90 million project to establish 25 new primary health care centres, remodel nine existing ones and establish 17 comprehensive health care centres. The project will be carried out in two phases and should be completed by 1990, by which time virtually all Jordanians, wherever they live, should have reasonable access to professional healthcare.

One project the ministry isn't going to have to raise funds for is proposed JD8 million National

Cancer Centre. The centre is to be built at the University of Jordan and the General Union of Voluntary Societies (Guvs) has taken on the job of raising funds.

This week it collected 300 students from various schools and colleges in Amman and sent them out into the streets with their collection tins. At the end of the first day, they brought home a healthy JD10,000.

During the next stage of the fund-raising campaign, the students will visit all government and private offices and companies and the third stage will take them out of Amman and into towns throughout the country.

The National Cancer Centre will be built in three stages as funds become available and ultimately will offer facilities for the treatment of all types of cancer. As the students go round collecting money, Guvs is hoping that most people will respond generously. They suggest that people keep in mind the fact that one in six Jordanians is likely to develop some form of cancer and, that in contrast to the normal world pattern, the majority of patients in Jordan are children.

CSO: 4400/178

JORDAN

MEASURES STANDARDIZATION WITH IRAQ

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 27 May 85 p 3

[Text]

AMMAN (Petra) — A joint meeting of specialised committees in charge of specifications and measurements in Jordan and Iraq ended in Amman Sunday. The eight-day meeting discussed differences in Jordanian and Iraqi specifications and the prospect of adopting Jordanian specifications in goods exported to Iraqi markets and Iraqi specifications for goods exported to Jordan, according to Mr. Salaheddin Taha, director of the Standardisation and Metrology Department at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. He said that the meeting also reviewed ways of testing specifications and examined ways to unify standards.

Issues of imports and exports and problems both countries face

in this matter, as well as the role of measures and specifications, were discussed at the meeting, Mr. Taha said. Also discussed, he said, were ways to facilitate the flow of national products between Jordan and Iraq.

Agreement has been reached to set up a committee to try to unify Iraqi and Jordanian specifications and measures and a unified system for conducting tests on specifications and legislation governing specifications and measures, Mr. Taha said.

He said that points agreed on during the meeting will be referred to the proper authorities in both countries for approval before they are put into force in the coming few days.

CSO: 4400/169

JORDAN

ELECTRICITY DEMAND CONTINUES TO INCREASE

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 29 May 85 p 3

[Article by P. V. Vivekanand]

[Text]

AMMAN — Jordan's annual demand for energy registered an increase of 5.5 per cent in the year 1984, compared with 6.7 per cent in 1983, and fuel used for generating electricity accounted for 23.8 per cent of the total fuel consumed in the country in 1984, the recently published annual report of the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA) showed.

The report pointed out that the growth rate in energy demand was relatively small when compared to the average 14 per cent during the 1973-1983 period, but still is in excess of the overall economic growth of the country which registered 2.8 per cent in 1984.

Jordan imported oil worth a total of JD 238 million in the year, representing about 11 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) and this figure is also considered high by international standards, in terms of the acceptable proportion between GNP and fuel import bills, the report said. The total energy demand in 1984 was about 2,730,000 tons of oil equivalent, the report said.

Focusing on electricity generation, distribution and consumption in the Kingdom, the report said the demand for electricity registered an increase of 19.8 per cent in 1984, as against 27.4 per cent in 1983, and pointed out that the growth rate in demand for electricity is still higher in proportion to the growth rate in overall demand for energy. The average

annual growth in demand for electricity in the last five years was 21.8 per cent, which is also considered high by international standards, the report said, and attributed the unproportional growth to the rapid expansion of industries and the completion of a number of rural electrification projects, in addition to increasing economic growth.

Consumption

Electricity consumption in 1984 amounted to 1944 gwh (gigawatt-hour-one billion watt hour) in 1984, the report said. A break up in the figure showed that the industrial sector consumed 43.8 per cent (44 per cent in 1983), the domestic sector accounted for 31.1 per cent (34.5 per cent in 1983), the commercial sector consumed 12 per cent (11 per cent in 1983) while 7.8 per cent (6.5 per cent in 1983) was used for water pumping and 5.3 per cent (3.5 per cent in 1983) for miscellaneous purposes including consumption by hospitals, charities, broadcasting, etc.

The report said that a combination of several factors, including a "saturation in the consumption of some of the main large industries," a national energy conservation policy and the relatively warm winter in 1984, contributed to bringing down the overall growth in electricity demand to 19.8 per cent. It expressed

optimism that decline in demand for electricity will continue in the coming years as a result of the national conservation campaign, and higher tariffs introduced in 1984 "to reflect more realistically the true costs of energy."

A total of 2,265 gwh of electricity was produced in Jordan in 1984, representing an increase of 18.1 per cent from the corresponding figure for 1983, the report said. The figure includes electricity generated by non-JEA producers. Various JEA generating units, with a production of 1908 gwh, accounted for 84.2 per cent of the total production while the remainder, 357 gwh, was produced by various private corporations for their own consumption.

Power stations

The major contributor to the JEA production was Al Hussein Thermal Power Station in Zarqa with 74.4 per cent, followed by the Marka Power Station (5.3 per cent), the Amman South Gas Turbine Station (0.3 per cent) the Karak and Tafieleh power stations (0.8 per cent) and the Aqaba diesel power station (3.3 per cent). The rest (0.1 per cent) was accounted for by power stations in Ma'an and remote villages.

Among the non-JEA producers, various industrial companies, including the Jordan Cement Factories in Fuheis, the Jordan

Refinery Company in Zarqa, the Arab Potash Company in Ghor Safi and the Jordan Fertilizer Company in Aqaba accounted for 14.8 per cent of the total production, while the Irbid District Electricity Company (IDECO) produced 0.7 per cent and municipalities and other accounted for 0.3 per cent.

According to the JEA annual report, steam power accounted for generating 87.3 per cent of the total electricity produced in Jordan in 1984 while diesel power was used to generate 11.9 per cent and gas turbine power accounted for 0.8 per cent.

New generating units

JEA boosted the total installed production capacity of the Kingdom to 700 megawatts by the end of 1984 by introducing into operation new generating units with a total capacity of 126 megawatts, the report said. Of the total 700 megawatt capacity, JEA accounts for 601.5 megawatts while non-JEA producers, including the various industries, the IDECO and municipalities and others, have the remainder (98.1 megawatt) of the total installed capacity.

In addition, work is under way in Aqaba for a new thermal power station which will have an installed capacity of 260 megawatts. The project, which will use steam to run its generators, is expected to start production in 1986.

The JEA also has plans to expand the project by adding two coal-fired steam units each of 130 megawatts, with provisions for dual (coal and oil) firing. A decision is expected to be taken in this regard by end of this year.

The peak load in 1984 was 410 megawatts as against 363 megawatts in 1983, reflecting an increase of 12.9 per cent, the report said. The interconnected peak load recorded in October 1984 was 372.1 megawatts as against 309.6 megawatts in 1983, registering an increase of 20.2 per cent.

In 1984, the national grid for electricity transmission was expanded considerably when the JEA completed the interconnection of the north of the Kingdom with the south by a 132 kv line linking Ma'an and Aqaba which provided

the port city with power from the national network. Work is continuing on another 400 kv transmission line between Amman and Aqaba and the project is expected to be completed by 1986.

Also, the report said, new substations with a total capacity of 609 mva have been put into operation in Sahab, Ashrafiyeh, Subeih and Qweira and expansion work has been carried out in substations in Irbid, Zarqa, Bayader, Amman South and Ma'an.

Turning to the electricity distribution system in the country, the report said the total length of 132 kva transmission lines stood at 1284 circuit kilometres at the end of 1984.

At the end of 1984, the distribution networks in Jordan stood at 2,374 kilometres (including 278 kilometres underground) of 33 kv networks, 613 kilometres of 11 kv networks and 7,181 kilometres of 0.4 kv networks with a total of 1,475 MVA substation capacity.

Consumers

The total number of consumers at the end of 1984 stood at 362,000, representing 87 per cent of the population, as against 323,000 in 1983, according to the report.

The report highlighted the JEA's efforts to implement the theme contained in the government's announcement earlier in 1984 that it was the year of electricity and water and said the authority and the distribution companies electrified 139 villages, inhabited by about 125,000 people, boosting the total number of electrified villages to 479, with total number of inhabitants estimated at 887,000 people, representing 85 per cent of the total rural population. Under present plans, a total of 87 new villages will be electrified in 1985 bringing the total number of electrified villages to 566 with an estimated population of 949,000 people or 91 per cent of the total rural population of the Kingdom, according to the report.

JEA and the Jordan Electric Power Company (JEPSCO) and IDECO, the two companies responsible for power supply to direct consumers, in Amman and Irbid regions, respectively, continued to implement new dis-

tribution projects in their respective areas and improve the power supply system, the report said. It said the JEA completed the erection of 353 kilometres of overhead distribution networks and 12 kilometres of underground cables, and while JEPSCO built 599 kilometres of overhead networks and 119 kilometres of underground cables, IDECO completed 954 kilometres of overhead lines and 37 kilometres of underground network.

Employees, productivity

The average number of JEA employees in the past year was 1,531 as against 1,467 in 1983 and the level of productivity increased from 1,097 mwh per employee in 1983 to 1,246 mwh in 1984, the report said.

For the electricity sector as a whole in Jordan, the total number of employees was 4,162 in 1984, with an average productivity of 544 mwh per employee, as against 4,005 employees with and 479 mwh in 1983.

The JEA's supply areas include the Jordan Valley, Karak, Tafileh, Ma'an, Shobak and Aqaba, and while JEPSCO is responsible for power supply in Amman and its suburbs, IDECO supplies the Irbid region and northeast of the Kingdom. The total number of JEA consumers stood at 45,200 at the end of 1984, while JEPSCO figures showed 230,700 and the IDECO figure stood at 85,100.

The tariff for electricity varies from sector to sector but on a uniform pattern in Jordan. Domestic consumers are charged 38 fils per kwh for the first 160 kwh and 52 fils per kwh above a total monthly consumption of 160 kilowatts, in addition to a minimum monthly charge of JD 1. The commercial sector is charged 46 fils per kwh.

For small industries using under 2,500 kwh per month are charged 40 fils per kwh and those using above 2,500 kwh have to pay only 28 fils per kwh.

For large industries the rates are JD 3.05 per kilowatt per month for peak load, 24 fils per kwh of day energy and 16 fils per kwh for night energy.

Consumers of power for water pumping are charged 29 fils per kwh while the street lighting tax is set at 13 fils per kwh.

JORDAN

RAILWAY IMPROVEMENTS PLANNED

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 30 May-5 Jun 85 p 13

[Article by Pam Dougherty]

[Text]

WORK IS progressing on the Aqaba Railway Corporation (ARC) Multi-Mode Transport Project with decisions pending on two elements and tenders are due to be issued for others probably by the second half of June.

Tenders for the supply of approximately JD 6 million worth of materials for the renewal of 101.4 kilometres of track in three stretches between El-Hassa Junction and Aqaba were opened on 1 April and are now under evaluation with a decision due within the next two months.

ARC Director General Sahel Hamzeh told The Star that the decision was taking longer than expected because the tender had attracted so many bids. Altogether 30 offers were received where such a job might normally be expected to attract 15 or so. Mr Hamzeh said the offer is for supply only to be financed by the World Bank and the corporation will undertake the installation work.

The ARC is also evaluating pre-qualifiers for consultancy services. Services are required for training ARC personnel, conducting of technical studies in the field of personnel management and the preparation of manuals and codes of practice for different railway disciplines.

The list of pre-qualified consultants should be finalised by the end of July and those qualified will then be invited to submit offers.

Tenders due to be floated by the second half of June include those for the supply of ninety hopper wagons, the construction of an approximately JD 21/2 million workshop for locomotive maintenance in Aqaba and the supply of a multi-purpose 120-tonne plus crane.

The ARC originally held negotiations with Fauvet-Girel of France for the supply of the hopper wagons, but later decided to obtain them through open tender. The purchase is being financed by the Islamic Bank of Jeddah.

Mr Hamzeh anticipates that the workshop and crane will be financed by supplier credits.

Once the Multi-Mode Transport Project is completed, the ARC's next major project is likely to be connected with the development of the phosphate deposits at Shidiya but Mr Hamzeh says, it is too early to think of details of that or any other project although the government has shown an interest in the overall development of Jordan's railway network.

CSO: 4400/169

BRIEFS

PLO OFFICIAL DENIES REPORT ON LOAN--Amman--PLO representative Amman Brigadier General 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya has stated the following: The Qatari paper AL-RAYAH published a report yesterday that the PLO Executive Committee has decided to grant Jordan a long-term loan of 1 billion dinars. He added that this report is baseless. It comes at a time when the PLO is experiencing difficult financial conditions in view of its militant commitments to the kinfolk and the homeland, and because some Arab countries have suspended the settlement of their obligations to the PLO and the fund for bolstering steadfastness. Brig Gen 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya said that this report is part of the campaign of distortion suspect parties are orchestrating against the PLO to complete the conspiracy which started with the siege on our camps in Lebanon and the killing and destruction being perpetrated against their inhabitants. He added: To complete this conspiracy, an attempt is being made to impose a financial siege on the PLO and to seek justifications for not fulfilling the Arab countries' commitments that were decided at the Baghdad summit. He concluded by saying that the PLO warns against the dissemination of such false and misleading reports. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 11 Jun 85 pp 1, 22 JN]

SHIPPING COMPANY PROFIT--Amman--In spite of the global economic recession and its direct negative impact on shipping in general, the Jordan National Shipping Lines (JNL) registered a 13 percent increase in net profits in 1984, thanks mostly to government support for the only Jordanian-owned shipping line. The JNL chalked up a net profit of JD 500,000 in 1984 as against JD 442,000 in 1983, and hopes to maintain its growth and expand in the coming years, says Ahmad Ismail', financial manager of the line, which owns four vessels. Apart from operating the South Europe-Aqaba route, JNL also manages the Al-Mabrukhi ferry boat between Aqaba and Nuwabi' in Egypt on behalf of the Jordanian government. Commenting on reports that the ferry boat operations, which includes one trip to and from Nuwabi', were resulting in losses, Mr Ismail said: "It's only natural that we have to expect less-than-full capacity business in the beginning. However, the situation is improving fast, and we expect much better results by the end of this year." [Excerpts] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 9 Jun 85 p 3 JN]

JOURNALIST UNDER 'HOUSE ARREST'--Kuwait, 11 Jun (SANA)--The Kuwaiti newspaper "AL-WATAN" has learned that Jordanian authorities have placed Rakan al-Majali, former dean of Jordanian journalists and vice president of the Arab Journalists Federation, under house arrest. Informed sources have told the paper that al-Majali was removed to the town of Al-Karak, where he was placed under house

arrest for 1 year. "AL-WATAN" pointed out that al-Majali has recently written a number of articles opposing the U.S. settlement plan in the region. [Text] [Damascus SANA in Arabic 0820 GMT 11 Jun 85 JN]

OIL IMPORTS--Amman--The Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company (JPRC) issued last week a report on the amount of oil imported into Jordan. Almost 2.5 million tonnes of crude oil was imported last year through the tapline. About 200,000 tonnes of crude were also imported from Iraq, putting the total of crude oil imports to approximately 2.7 million tonnes. The quantity of refined oil in Jordan last year was 2,592,701 tonnes, out of which 2,510,891 tonnes were refined at JPRC. JPRC last year had a 0.5 percent production increase as against 1983 and its marketing showed an approximate seven percent increase. 31,896 tonnes of liquid gas was sold in 1984, 249 tonnes of kerosene, 99,520 tonnes of gasoline and 1,345 tonnes of naphtha. [Text] [Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 6-12 Jun 85 p 4 JN]

POSSIBLE RESTORATION OF TIES WITH LIBYA--Amman, 14 Jun (QNA)--Reporting from Amman, the UAE newspaper, "AL-BAYAN," said today that Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i will make an Arab tour after 'Id al-Fitr. During this tour, he will visit the GCC countries to explain the outcome of King Husayn's recent visit to Washington. The newspaper said that 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, Libyan secretary for foreign liaison, proposed to Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i and Jordanian officials during his meetings with them in Amman yesterday a unity project between Jordan and Libya. He will also make a similar proposal to Iraqi officials during his visit to Baghdad later today. The paper added that during these meetings, the Libyan official also discussed the restoration of the diplomatic relations between Jordan and Libya which were severed more than 1 year after the burning of the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli. [Text] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0815 GMT 14 Jun 85 GF]

AMNESTY FOR CONVICTS GRANTED--In implementation of His Majesty King Husayn's orders, the Council of Ministers decided at a special session this morning under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i to issue a special amnesty for all convicts. According to this amnesty, sentences shall be commuted by half. Those convicted of premeditated murder and crimes of honor and espionage shall be exempted from this amnesty. This amnesty applies to 1,885 convicts. Those who have already served half of their sentences will be released immediately. The prime minister has instructed immediate implementation of this decision. [Text] [Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 17 Jun 85 JN]

ARMY WORKSHOPS MODIFY M-60 TANKS--"AL-AQSA" magazine, published by the Moral Guidance Department, has said that the central military vehicle workshops have succeeded in developing and modifying M-60/A3 tanks and equipping them with infrared vision systems. The workshops have also succeeded in modifying the M-110/A1 Howitzer [Hamilat madafi'] to M-110/A2, as well as programming various groups of engines to support field units. "AL-AQSA" indicated that these workshops have started work on modifying M-9 [as published] Howitzers to M-9/A3ob and renewing and modifying M-110 Howitzers to M-110/A2. The workshops plan to carry out additional projects in the future. It is to be noted that these workshops represent the nucleus of the engineering college project and industrial integration for armored vehicles. The workshops achieve annual savings of 20 million Jordanian dinars. [Text] [Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Jun 85 p 2 JN]

22 July 1985

OMAN

INCREASE IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 13 Jun 84 p 2

[Text]

MUSCAT--The Sultanate of Oman is poised to shortly raise the production of crude from 450,000 to 500,000 barrels per day. An indication to this effect was available from a recent Press interview given by the Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Security, Sayyid Fahr bin Taimour.

Sayyid Fahr told the North Yemeni newspaper '26 September' that the increased in crude production would be accomplished "in the near future."

Oman has been raising its crude output in recent months--from 400,000 bpd last year, to 420,000 in March and later to 450,000. The way the infrastructure has been developed to take the crude from the interior and southern destinations to the export terminal at Mina Al Fahal in the north is suggestive of a further substantive boost during

the next five-year plan, scheduled to commence in 1986.

According to official figures, the country produced 152.4 million barrels of crude last year, of which 135 million barrels were exported.

In the first quarter of the current year, according to the country's Development Council, 42.1 million barrels were tapped and 37.9 million barrels shipped.

Twenty-six international combines are currently operating in Oman. The country has so far allotted 13 concessions on a production-sharing basis, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) being the largest.

PDO, in which the majority shareholding belongs to the government, recently announced that there was a likelihood of the country's crude reserves being doubled to 3.5 billion barrels if a pilot project for Enhanced Oil Recovery proves successful.

CSO: 4400/174

OMAN

DUBAYY FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Jun 85 p 15

[Text]

DESPITE the decline in oil prices and a drop in domestic oil production, there have been positive developments on UAE's foreign trade front, the Dubai Chamber of Commerce said yesterday.

In a study on five years of UAE's foreign trade from 1980 to 1984, the chamber cited growing import substitution and export of local products among factors favouring trade.

The chamber said Dubai accounted for 93 per cent of UAE's total export of manufactured goods and pointed out that such exports had more than doubled between 1980 and 1984.

Imports, however, account for the bulk of this country's non-oil trade. Between 1980 and 1984, the share of imports in the country's non-oil trade was between 80 to 87 per cent.

Although imports rose by a marginal 2.1 per cent during the first two years of the period under review, the following three years saw a decline in the inflow of goods.

A decline in imports to the tune of Dh800 million in 1982 was the first fall in imports in 10 years. The study said

there were several reasons for the decline.

Import substitution as a result of increasing industrial production within the country, specially in the petrochemical sector, was a major factor contributing to this trend.

Simultaneously, import of machinery and transport equipment declined with the reduction in construction activity even as the high level of indigenous cement output pushed down the import of this commodity.

The link between dirham and the dollar which lent stability to the local currency and the depreciation of currencies of major sources of import also contributed to this trend.

The study said the UAE imported goods from over 170 countries. "The UAE is largely dependent on imports from international market to meet the local requirements of consumer, intermediary and capital goods".

On re-exports, the study said an increase during the period had been achieved despite unfavourable trading conditions in the region.

An increase of one billion dirhams in re-exports between 1980-84 was achieved at an average annual growth of 5.5 per cent.

"Re-export is considered significant to business community mainly in Dubai emirate which is known for its position as an international centre for imports and re-export activities."

Apart from Dubai, re-exports and transit trade have been on the increase from Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Fujairah in recent years.

The proportionate growth in non-oil exports from the UAE during the period has been worked out at 20.4 per cent a year resulting in a 102% increase between 1980 and 1984.

"Available data shows an increasing trend in domestic industrial exports mainly from the hydrocarbon complexes in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah. Aluminium exports from Dubai have also added a new element to UAE's export potential".

Japan, by taking 31 per cent of UAE's exports, was the biggest importer of goods manufactured in this country, followed by Saudi Arabia (21%) and US (16.6%).

U.A.E. MAIN SUPPLIERS AND VALUE OF IMPORTS DURING THE YEARS 1980 - 1984															
Value in thousand dirhams															
Country of Origin	1984			1983			1982			1981			1980		
	Abu Dhabi	Sharjah	Dubai	Abu Dhabi	Sharjah	Dubai	Abu Dhabi	Sharjah	Dubai	Abu Dhabi	Sharjah	Dubai	Abu Dhabi	Sharjah	Dubai
Japan	1024787	283027	3505250	1425600	323651	4200585	2406500	378403	3656405	2223700	250366	3892145	1612600	200441	3683522
U.S.A.	939755	214996	2045623	1359000	306019	2174034	1937400	338312	2407061	1992200	1275	2484055	1647600	514863	2610046
U.K.	975375	95099	1686975	1129000	179079	1862640	1847800	239254	1962624	1778400	182436	2076910	1698200	251185	2174779
W. Germany	789437	81165	1016034	933700	95264	1187918	1604700	91506	1268385	1086400	160935	1052684	884200	103327	860332
Italy	505526	538107	773886	46900	224152	905022	465200	181935	979804	541900	130595	807433	540300	393396	581475
Bahrain	95934	432822	899798	87700	180674	808966	128300	528539	697232	480300	728151	1447865	84200	334202	1508368
France	520324	115411	571866	846200	139651	679275	1149000	218730	912859	1120000	133271	630739	884800	216033	812128
India	48297	155717	604920	70900	129964	629927	92800	222782	621881	101200	93618	695831	122700	64480	567570
Netherland	183700	33176	520597	279600	478457	288400	78152	497459	250200	65024	416491	314900	74774	423961	
Taiwan	42006	59032	541186	28000	31202	545709	207900	11726	485096	43800	6877	525363	47588	211	528152
Total	5125351	1988354	12185935	8618600	1609558	13472543	10127800	2289339	13488886	9618100	2012548	14029516	7827000	2153003	12750335

CSO: 4400/174

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PROFILE OF EX-GAZA MAYOR RASHAD SHAWWA

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 May 85 pp 2-3, 10

[Article by David Richardson]

[Text]

IN 1922, Sir Herbert Samuel, the first British high commissioner for Palestine, received a delegation of local Arab leaders who had come to protest against the sale of Arab-owned land to Jews. He dismissed them, commenting, "All the land the Jews have acquired so far does not amount to that owned by just one of your people - Haj Said Shawwa."

A large daguerreotype of Haj Said hangs on the wall of the family home in Gaza's Rimal quarter. The photo shows a tall, bearded man wearing the traditional Turkish tarboush, his chest decorated with medals awarded by the Ottoman Empire and the Germans in recognition for the services and support of their major purveyor in southern Palestine. There is the prominent and elongated nose, the deep-set and intense eyes and, most of all, the bearing one has come to associate with the name Shawwa.

"We were the largest landowners in Palestine," recalls Haj Said's youngest and only surviving son Rashad, seated below his father's portrait. "Our lands stretched from Gaza to al-Masmiya in the north. We had vast tracts between here and Beersheba and up to the Hebron foothills. All in all, some 100,000 dunams. All that was lost to Israel in 1948. Kiryat Gat is built on land we used to farm."

RASHAD SHAWWA, also a *haj*, having undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca, is one of the "grand old men" of Palestinian politics. Hardly a day goes by without an invitation to meet an ambassador, a visiting foreign minister or under-secretary. Requests for meetings by members of parliament and journalists have become a nuisance, and are sometimes turned down.

As the United States' attempt to revive the peace process gathered momentum, Shawwa's name was among the first to have been mentioned as a possible member of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation which is to hold talks with the Americans as a prelude to eventual negotiations with Israel.

One of the most prominent surviving members of the Palestinian aristocracy, he still enjoys tremendous influence and standing among the people of the Gaza Strip despite the profound demographic, social and economic changes wrought by the creation of the Jewish state and 18 years of Israeli occupation.

Shawwa marks the end of a period in Palestinian history. The great landed families, through their wealth, education, standing and connections with the various colonial administrations were, until the early part of this century, the undisputed leaders of the Arabs in Palestine.

Unable to farm and control their lands except by feudal methods, weakened by internecine feuding and eventually discredited by their hasty departure and failure of leadership in the *nakba* (the catastrophe) of 1948, the great *hamulot* have been crumbling and disappearing for the past 50 years.

The most recent example, perhaps is that of the Ja'abaris in Hebron. The electoral defeat of Sheikh Ali al-Ja'abari as mayor in 1977 and his death a few years later saw the clan almost disappear from the local political map.

Now, Palestinian nationalism, in the territories and abroad, is being led by the professional classes and political activists of the petty bourgeoisie. But at 75, Rashad Shawwa, leader of the most famous family in the strip, is still eager anxious, to be a bridge to a better future for his people.

THE NAME Shawwa is probably derived from the Arabic word *shawwi*, a sheep or camel merchant. At least 600 years ago, according to Shawwa, his forefathers, who originally came from Saudi Arabia and traded regularly between the ancient port of Gaza and the desert hinterland, began to acquire land in the area and settle.

The clan now numbers almost 4,000 people stretched out between Abu Dhabi and California. The name still opens doors all over the Middle East.

Haj Abu Mansour, as he is known in Gaza, is one of the acknowledged leaders of the clan, though not the wealthiest. His cousin Hashem a-Shawwa, managing director of the Palestine Bank, owns hundreds of dunams in the Strip itself; Ahmad Hassan a-Shawwa, another cousin, is considered a multi-millionaire. But it is Rashad who holds the family's political capital.

"My earliest memory is meeting in one of the family's orange groves at night at the outbreak of World War I, when we loaded everything on to camels and moved to Hebron, where the family lived until 1920."

The youngest of five sons, Rashad was sent to the American Colony School in Jerusalem "where I forgot my Arabic." His father removed him from there and sent him first to an

Arab school in Jerusalem and later to the elementary school of the American University in Beirut.

The British Mandatory authorities, objecting to Haj Said's pro-Turkish sympathies, exiled him to Jaffa, where Rashad used to visit the family during holidays. "I remember in 1921, during one of these visits, there were riots and demonstrations in Jaffa. I was told that these were against the Zionists who had started to establish a national home for the Jews in this country. And from that date on I was inclined towards politics."

BUT THE YOUNG Rashad was also something of a tearaway – more interested in soccer and the popularity that went with his success on the playing-field than in his studies or Arab politics. He was expelled from the American University in Beirut after failing for two consecutive terms, but eventually gained a B.A. in economics and political science from its sister institution in Cairo.

In Cairo, Shawwa met Abdel Khader Hussein, who later became a hero and martyr of the Palestinian national movement.

This was not the first connection between the Shawwas and the famous Hussein family of Jerusalem. Haj Said Shawwa was, almost from the start of the Arab national movement in Palestine, a supporter of Haj Amin el-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem who concluded the infamous pact with Hitler in 1941.

In 1925, the mufti had sent Said to Sharif al-Hussein in Mecca to ask for funds to refurbish the Aksa mosque in Jerusalem. Said was able to bring back 25,000 golden pounds – a substantial amount in those days, and was awarded another medal for his success.

On his graduation in 1934, Rashad returned to Gaza, and established the Gaza Sports Club, of which he still remains honorary president. He began to dabble in politics, joining the pro-Husseini *a-Difa'a* party; but as the Hussein-Nashashibi rivalry began to dominate Arab politics the Shawwa's felt slighted, and Rashad resigned.

GOADED BY the disparagement of some of his family and eager for

some involvement in the political events of the time, Shawwa applied for a position with the British administration. He apparently impressed the high commissioner with his careful English, neat dress, knowledge of agriculture and large Cadillac. Shawwa was appointed a district officer, not in an Arab area as he had requested, but in Haifa.

"I remember I worked with a Mr. Pina, whose son was sent here to Gaza as a deputy military governor in 1967. In 1935, Pina invited me to a dance party at the Technion. He insisted that I dance and he introduced me to a very pretty lady.

"We began to dance and she spoke to me in Hebrew, which I did not know. She then tried French, which I also cannot speak. In broken English she asked me where I was from. I said, 'From here, from Palestine.' 'Where in Palestine?' she asked. 'From Gaza,' I replied. 'You mean' she said, 'you are not Jewish?' 'No, I am an Arab.'

"The minute I said that, she let her arms drop and left me alone on the dance floor. That made a very strong impression on me. It made me think that Jews did not think highly of Arabs and basically did not want us here."

During the two years he served in Haifa, Shawwa became involved in the Arab revolt. His older brother Az-Zadin was a district officer in Jenin, where Fawzi al-Kaukji, the leader of the revolt in the north, was based. The two brothers regularly met the close-cropped rebel leader, and Rashad used his official status and his car to smuggle arms to him and his men.

Dismissed by the British because of his connection with Kaukji, Rashad fled to Lebanon in 1937. A year later he returned clandestinely via Jordan, on the instructions of the mufti, to try to heal the rift in the movement in the Hebron area but failed to do so.

"In World War II," said Shawwa, "we saw Palestinian interests as being with the Axis, because they were the only ones who would help us counter the British support for a Jewish national home. Like today the Arabs are inclined towards the Russians, not because they like the Russians, but because they see the U.S. is supporting Israel."

WHEN THE WAR broke out in 1939, Shawwa, like the other Palestinian Arab nationalists, had been forced to leave Lebanon. He stayed with the Emir Abdullah in Transjordan while his family negotiated his return home with the British authorities. After his brothers posted bond for him and he undertook to refrain from all political activity Rashad was allowed to return to Gaza, where he immersed himself in the family business.

His first major project was the building of the town's first cinema, *a-Samer*, which he hoped would serve the Allied troops stationed in the area. But the cinema was put off-limits. "The local people did not know what a cinema was for," he recalls. "They used to come and try and barter some bread and eggs in order to get in. It was hopeless."

By this time, however, Shawwa's activities made him an object of surveillance. Not only was the Mandatory C.I.D. interested in the scion of Gaza's most prominent family, but the Hagana's fledgling intelligence arm – the Shai, forerunner of today's General Security Service – kept tabs on him as well.

Two so far unpublished reports from this period provide a fascinating insight into how the Jews and the Palestinians were preparing for the conflict both sides knew would be renewed as soon as the war was over.

On November 23, 1940, Shawwa was reported to have undertaken "a suspicious trip to al-Hamma [in the Golan]. It is surmised that he wants to make contact with Syrian agents."

An earlier report, based on information received in May 1938, indicated that his name appeared on the list of the mufti's men in receipt of a salary from the Palestine Defence Council in Damascus. Shawwa confirms that he was associated with Haj Amin, but denies ever having received a salary from anyone.

A SHAI profile of Shawwa and his family prepared in 1947 described him as "a gentle and sensitive man, always neat, fastidious in dress and polite. His financial situation is not outstanding. As a young man was known as a womanizer."

The same profile speaks of his alleged involvement in the theft from the Public Works Department

in Gaza in 1941 of some cement that was subsequently discovered in the cinema. Shawwa says that when the case was brought to court, he and the other accused were acquitted.

In 1943 the Shai received information that he was active in pro-mufti propaganda in the area and that the C.I.D. was checking his mail. The following year he and Sa'adi Shawwa were reported to be purchasing and collecting arms in the Gaza area. In 1946, the Shai learned that the British were still censoring his mail and, in December of that year, that he was in Egypt buying and smuggling arms.

Shawwa was surprised to learn that his mail was being read but confirms that he was buying arms in Egypt.

"There were arms lying all over the Western Desert. I used to buy them and I was collecting them in a warehouse in Cairo with the knowledge of King Farouk.

"In 1947, before I was able to send them to Gaza, al-Nakarashi, the Egyptian prime minister, was assassinated. The Egyptians suspected that the Moslem Brotherhood was responsible and in the massive search that followed they found the arms collected by the mufti. That led them to the arms I had collected, and they seized the whole lot. So no arms came here to fight the Jews."

While in Egypt, Shawwa was also involved in making films and was trained as a pilot. Subsequently, Israeli intelligence officers alleged that he was being trained to fly bombing missions over Tel Aviv. Shawwa, however, insists that he was on a civilian course.

EVEN THOUGH Shawwa went home to Gaza almost every weekend, he was not involved in the traumatic events of 1948. "By the time I returned in 1949, everything was more or less settled."

Gaza was by then a totally different place. The British had gone and the city was the heart of a narrow strip of territory stretching from Rafah in the south to Beit Lahiya in the north under an Egyptian military administration. A stable and largely rural population of some 120,000 dominated by the established families, was suddenly swamped by an estimated 160,000 dispossessed re-

fugees, many of them from the Palestinian lower classes.

The Shawwas, too, were profoundly affected by the change. Not only had they lost their vast tracts of land, but their political status was eroded by the Egyptian administration, which viewed most Palestinian attempts at political organization with deep distrust. Today, Rashad Shawwa says, he owns less than 200 dunams in the Strip.

"The one good thing the Egyptians did was to encourage the planting of orange groves on the sand dunes of the Strip. There were orange groves to the east, some of them many years old, but it was the Egyptians who organized the new plantings."

Rashad, his brother Az-Azdin and one of the Khalidi family from Jerusalem submitted a petition to the Egyptians asking for a local government to be established in Gaza. "From that time our relations with them were very bad. The officers sent to Gaza were interested in taking advantage of the area and in making their fortunes here. They did not want us. Also, ever since my father's visit to Sharif al-Husseini in 1925 we had been close to Amman."

With the loss of their land, the Shawwas turned to commerce. Rashad obtained the General Motors agency for the Strip, which is now run by his eldest surviving son, Mansour.

IN 1955, the Egyptians deposed Rushdie Shawwa, Rashad's brother who had been mayor of Gaza since 1946, and then arrested him and his son. In order to negotiate their release, Rashad says he had to contact an Egyptian intelligence officer then active in the Strip—Mustafa Hafez.

Hafez was the man behind the *fedayun* terrorist raids on the Israeli agricultural settlements in the vicinity. He was eventually killed by a parcel bomb, allegedly sent by Israeli agents.

The price Hafez demanded for the release of Rushdie Shawwa was that Rashad and some of his associates join the *fedaye*. Rashad insists that he never participated in the activities of the *fedaye* and that his name was on their lists merely in order to encourage other Palestinians in the Strip to join.

Israeli intelligence agents thought, and still think, otherwise. When Israel invaded Gaza in 1956, the Egyptian intelligence files were captured and within a few days Rashad's imposing mansion was surrounded by troops and searched.

He was arrested and held for six weeks in the central prison only a hundred metres from his home. He was continually questioned about his involvement in the *fedaye* by the army intelligence and the Shin Bet. In jail he was befriended by two Israeli army officers being held for stealing carpets from a wealthy Arab landowner in Dir al-Balah.

The two officers, "Omri" and "Yehiel," were able to obtain better conditions for Shawwa, who was eventually allowed to have his own bed and meals from home. Shawwa says the two men persuaded him that the intelligence people were building up a serious case against him and they began to plan his escape.

"They obtained an Israeli army uniform for me, and arranged for me to be transferred to a cell from where I was to escape and join them in an army jeep. They planned to drive me and my son Zuheir to the Hebron area, where we would have crossed into Jordanian territory."

The day before this was to happen the two officers heard they were to go on trial the next day. They made their own escape but were recaptured.

"One of them came to see me and asked me to intervene with the man in Dir Balah," says Shawwa. "I wrote a note and the man dropped his charges against them."

"A few days after the Six Day War there was a knock at my front gate. When I opened it I saw Omri and Yehiel, who had come in a blue truck. After exchanging greetings they said that the truck was full of gold bars, which they could sell to me at a very worthwhile price. I told them I did not want to see them and chased them away. I saw one of them years later as I drove down Dizengoff Street, but have never heard from them again."

SOON AFTER the Israeli withdrawal in 1957, Rashad's brother Sa'adi was arrested by the Egyptians and sentenced to death for plotting a pro-Jordanian coup in the Strip.

Rashad was also arrested and spent six months in the Abbasiya military prison in Cairo. Conditions there were terrible, he says, and Sa'adi was tortured.

Eventually, on the intervention of King Faisal of Iraq and President Shukri al-Kuwatli of Syria with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sa'adi's sentence was commuted and the two brothers were released.

A FEW WEEKS after the Six Day War, Shawwa was summoned to the military government headquarters near his home by Moshe Dayan—"a man who left a deep impression on me." Shawwa asked for permission to establish a political party, but the Israeli government refused. "It was from then, in the absence of representation, that the PLO gained strength", he says.

In 1971, Shawwa was asked to become mayor of Gaza to replace the Israeli civilian appointed to run the city after its occupation. With obvious pride he produces a seven-metre-long petition of some 10,000 signatories calling for his appointment. On Shawwa's insistence, there were three copies of the document: "One intended for the military governor, one for me and one for the PLO."

"I approached Dayan," he recalls "and told him I had to take a copy of the petition to the PLO and obtain their permission to become mayor. Dayan put his fingers in his ears, said he didn't want to know, and asked how long I would need for consultation."

Shawwa travelled to the PLO's headquarters in Beirut (where he still owns an apartment) and eventually persuaded Yasser Arafat that the best interests of the people in the Strip would be served by an Arab mayor who was an acknowledged nationalist.

"George Habash refused to see me, but he sent a message indicating that he opposed any dealings with the occupation." Shawwa returned and extracted the Israelis' permission to set up the Red Crescent Society in Gaza in return for taking on the running of the city.

The Red Crescent was soon hijacked by left-wing factions in the Strip and Shawwa established another organization—the Gaza Be-

nevolent Society, which today remains his real power-base.

It is from the society's beachside offices that Shawwa issues, during the summer peak, up to 700 permits a day for local Palestinians who, being stateless, have no passport enabling them to travel to Jordan. The same office issues recommendations for a Jordanian passport – a coveted document which Shawwa himself possesses – and the all-important "certificates of origin" indicating that citrus and other produce packed in Gaza and transported over the bridges to Jordan is not grown in Israel.

SHAWWA'S RELATIONS with the Israelis and the PLO were stormy during the early Seventies, a period marked by the ruthless eradication of the PLO cells which then effectively controlled the refugee camps.

In 1972 he was informed that he was on the Fatah assassination list.

"I asked for a meeting to be arranged with the Fatah commander in the Strip, Ziad Hussein. I met him one night in my orange grove and he took out a notebook and showed me a list of meetings I had had with Israeli officers soon after the occupation. I explained that all these meetings were part of an eventually successful effort to allow local people to draw funds from their bank accounts, which had been frozen following the occupation."

Shawwa and Hussein met several times after that, the Fatah commander apparently satisfied that the mayor, a representative of the Palestinian gentry, was not collaborating with the Israelis. Shawwa claims that he was able to persuade Hussein to give up the indiscriminate attacks on schools, labourers and market-places which were part of the PLO's attempt to bring about a popular uprising, irrespective of the casualties among their own people.

Hussein was being hounded by the Shin Bet and O.C. Southern Command and Ariel Sharon's red-bellied paratroopers who had been brought into the Strip to eradicate the PLO there.

"One night, at about nine p.m., there was a knock at my front door," Shawwa says. "Hussein stood there with his Kalachnikov and a small satchel and said simply, '*Ana tanib*' (a traditional request for shelter which in Islamic tradition imposes a duty on a householder). He asked if he could stay for two or three days until he could find a way to escape."

Shawwa put the fugitive Fatah leader in his basement. The two or three days dragged into weeks. "No one, apart from my son Mansour, knew he was here – not even my wife. Every day things became darker for him, for me. He was trying to find a way to escape but there was none. Nor was there any way he could give himself up without the disgrace of surrender, trial and imprisonment."

"On the 42nd day he shot himself. Mansour found him when he took him his lunch. I called the military governor, Yitzhak Pundak, and told him I had to see him urgently. I took Mansour with me and told Pundak that Hussein, one of the most wanted men, was dead in my basement."

"Pundak looked at me and then said: 'Shawwa, you are a lucky man. Sharon has been wanting to search your house for the past two months, and Dayan opposed this until yesterday. Sharon was given permission to search your home this evening.'"

When the story became known, Moshe Khayum, a member of a well-known Jerusalem family, wrote to Dayan recalling that Shawwa's father, Haj Said, had saved the 30 Jewish families in Gaza during the 1929 riots. Sharon was insistent that Shawwa be tried and his house destroyed, but Dayan was able to persuade Golda Meir's cabinet otherwise.

SHAWWA REMAINED in office for about a year and then resigned when the military government insisted that he provide services to the nearby Shati or Beach refugee camp. Shawwa, one eye always on how his actions might appear to the PLO, refused because it was thought at the time that absorbing the refugees into

the city would be the beginning of an Israeli solution to the Palestinian problem.

George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was responsible for at least two attempts on Shawwa's life during 1973. His escapes were so remarkable that they produced hardly disguised scepticism among military officers, who suspected that he had staged the attacks in order to cover up his involvement with the P.L.O. But Shawwa's version was borne out on at least one occasion, when the three terrorists who attacked him were killed in a secret bunker near his home. Among their belongings, secreted in the double wall of a garage, was a letter to their commander in Lebanon describing their unsuccessful attempt on the mayor.

Since then there have been two grenade attacks on his home, which is now protected by a high wall and an electronically-controlled gate. Shawwa says he is sometimes threatened by telephone, "but I pick up their impudence immediately and curse them and put down the phone. I don't give them a chance."

In 1975 Shimon Peres, then defence minister, re-appointed Shawwa as mayor. But he was dismissed again in 1981, at the height of the opposition to the Camp David autonomy proposals.

DURING HIS last tenure of the office, Shawwa was allowed to travel to the Gulf States, where he obtained \$12 million for development projects in the Strip.

Two million dollars went to start his pet project: a cultural centre for the city. To date, the elaborate building, designed by his Syrian-born son-in-law, has cost some \$7m. and it requires another million for completion. Not only are there offices, large halls and a stage, libraries, kitchen and cafeterias, but the centre has its own well-equipped printing press.

Shawwa's detractors in the city and in the military government say that a cultural centre is not the most

important thing Gaza needs. Roads are unpaved, lighting is poor and sewage disposal is primitive.

The centre is an unconscious symbol. It is Shawwa's tribute to the disappearing status of the Palestinian aristocracy that once was, a status reflected in land ownership, power and influence. Shawwa's legacy will be little of that: it will be education, worldliness and culture – all the things he feels the Palestinians lacked in their confrontation with the Jews. Israel, he notes, does not even allow any Arab history beyond that of the pharaohs to be taught in schools in the Strip.

Rashad's son Mansour is openly despondent. "He was wise, he knew it was hopeless from the beginning," he says of his grandfather, who faded from the political scene as the British mandate established itself.

Rashad's daughter Laila, an artist, now lives in London. "Living abroad makes things seem starker, and one becomes more extreme," she says while on holiday in Gaza. "But one also becomes more irritated with one's own people, their mistakes and rifts. But, in the end, this is where I feel most at home."

RASHAD SHAWWA, once a mufti man who argued that the 1947 Partition Plan was his people's minimum, is now anxious to persuade Yasser Arafat to give the go-ahead for negotiations with Israel. He is unabashedly pro-Jordanian, although the P.L.O. is acknowledged as the legitimate spokesman for the Palestinian cause. But he opposes any "false consensus" which plays into the hands of the extremists.

Musing on his memories this week, he did not know whether to be pessimistic or optimistic.

"There are four million Palestinians and, unless there is a settlement, they will make life hell for the Jews. It is difficult to look ahead, life here is so unpredictable. But I cannot afford to think of leaving this country." □

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

CUTS IN FOREIGN WORKFORCE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Jun 85 p 2

[Text]

MANAMA — Declining oil revenues, combined with a growing feeling that expatriates are affecting the development of an indigenous labour force, have moved the Gulf states to cut back on foreign workers.

Many jobs are simply disappearing, while highly paid Western expatriates are often being replaced with well-qualified, but cheaper Asian professionals.

Bahrain's Minister of Development and Industry, Yousif Shirawi, said at a recent conference that Gulf countries would cut their manpower by one million over the next five years, with Saudi Arabia alone deciding to axe 600,000 jobs.

Around 700,000 expatriates were sent home from the Gulf last year, according to a study by Bahrain economist Henry Azzam.

The number of foreign workers peaked at 7.5 million in 1981, Mr Azzam found. In 1984 there were four million expatriates in Saudi Arabia, and another 1.8 million in the other Gulf states. By the end of 1985, he expected economic recession to see foreign workers down to five million.

By all accounts, the fastest growing sector of the 1970s—construction—is seeing the greatest retrenchment, as the basic infrastructure reaches completion while new projects are being shelved due to slashed budgets.

But studies show that a Gulf society totally free of foreign workers is a long way off. The latest Kuwait census showed that foreigners, who make up 60 per cent of the 1.7 million population, meet 77 per cent of the country's manpower needs.

At present, 98 per cent of all workers in Kuwait's construction sector, 92 per cent in transport, communications and storage and 93 per cent in the commercial, restaurant and hotel sectors are foreigners, mostly Asian, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.

Although Kuwait would like to reduce the number of Asian workers, this will be difficult until Kuwaitis are more willing to do manual work, and to opt for technical training rather than for university Degrees.

An Under-Secretary in Kuwait's Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Abdel Rahman Al Mazroui, said recently: "Fathers tend to steer their children away from what they consider

menial work, and young people refuse to enter technical jobs because society looks down on those who attend technical institutes instead of universities".

Kuwait has one of the world's highest per capita incomes (around \$14,000) but this disdain for manual work is also found in the less wealthy Gulf states.

In Bahrain, with a population of 351,000, 58 per cent of the workers in 1981 were non-Bahrainis, with more than 70 per cent of employees in the private sector non-Bahrainis.

Where the Gulf states cannot do without foreign expertise, they are rationalising expenditures, meaning in many cases that expensive European and American professionals are being replaced by lower paid Asians.

While scores of Asian construction workers are being sent home, the Press shows that the Gulf still has jobs for Asians at middle management and clerical level.

Other economy measures include offering new contracts at lower salaries, reducing benefits such as overtime and accommodation allowances and replacing married men with bachelors. Bahrain's Ministry of Works, Power and Water announced such cuts earlier this year. —AFP

CSO: 4400/174

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

OFFICER REPORTEDLY EXECUTED--New Delhi, 2 Jul, IRNA--A ranking Afghan Air Force officer was executed last week. He was charged with planting bombs in important installations of Begram Air Force Base. Reports reaching here from inside Afghanistan indicated that discord is increasing between the two factions of the ruling People's Democratic Parties of Afghanistan /PDPA/; (Parcham and Khalq), following the dismissal of three ranking members of Khalq faction. The dismissed officials are ministers of mines and industries, Mihammad Esmail Danesh, president of the Central Bank of Afghanistan, Mehrabudin Patkiawal, and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA and head of the Badr-E-Vatan national front, Mohammad Ziray. It is expected that Karmal would install members of the Parcham Faction in the vacant posts. Meanwhile, Afghan sources announced here that a military column comprising 500 persons were sent to Panjsher last week and on their way, they were attacked by Afghan mujahidin in Parwan State. Fifty Karmal forces were killed and heavy damages were inflicted as a result. The dead bodies of those killed were sent to Kabul and there is no report available on the fate of the rest of the forces. /Text/ /Tehran IRNA in English 0810 GMT 2 Jul 85/

CSO: 4600/506

BANGLADESH

UN DELEGATE WELCOMES GENEVA ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH TIMES in English 10 May 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh has expressed its happiness at the recent resumption of arms reduction talks between the two super powers in Geneva, reports BSS.

Participating in a debate in the UN Disarmament Commission in New York yesterday Lt Gen (Retd) Khwaja Wasiuddin, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN General Assembly, expressed also grave concern at the unprecedented arms race, both nuclear and conventional.

He said that Bangladesh was happy to note that the two super powers had recently resumed their negotiations and hoped that any progress achieved at the negotiations should make a positive contribution towards the reduction of international tensions.

Ambassador Wasiuddin said that Bangladesh was firmly convinced that there could be no durable peace without the elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons. Bangladesh, he said, in pursuance of her firm and irrevocable commitment to the General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), had acceded to the nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The limitation of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction was an essential prerequisite for the creation of atmosphere of trust and confidence and the relaxation of international tensions, he observed.

He said Bangladesh was equally alarmed to note that attempts were being made by the nuclear powers to use the outer space for military purposes.

All such attempts, he said, should be halted and the outer space declared as a common heritage of mankind.

Turning to the reduction of military budgets, he said that Bangladesh had emphasized the need to divert the colossal financial and other resources currently being consumed by the armaments race towards the elimination of the poverty the world over.

Expressing concern on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, Ambassador Wasiuddin said that determined efforts must be made during the current session to adopt concrete recommendations with a view to preventing South Africa from becoming a nuclear power.

Ambassador Wasiuddin said the question of disarmament which had global dimensions and implications could only be addressed in a multilateral context.

CSO: 5250/0009

22 July 1985

BANGLADESH

DISCUSSIONS OF EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL REPORTED

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 30 May 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Export Promotion Council (EPC) in its 11th meeting on Wednesday discussed threadbare the prospects for raising the country's overall export earnings from an expected level of Taka 2450 crore (950 million U.S. dollars) in 1984-85 to Taka 2765 crore (1005 million dollars) in 1985-86.

The export earnings in dollar terms as proposed by Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) for 1985-86 have been calculated at the exchange rate of Taka 27.50 for one U.S. dollar. In the current year (1984-85) the exchange rate for conversion of export earnings in Taka terms to U.S. dollar terms has been based on Taka 25.81 for one U.S. dollar.

Inaugurating the EPC meeting at a city hotel, Air Vice Marshal Sultan Mahmud, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator and Minister for Industries and Commerce, stated that the country's economic progress on stable lines depended on higher export earnings. He noted that export proposals for the coming fiscal year had been targeted for the first time at over one billion U.S. dollar mark. He called for a national drive to boost export earnings through improved capacity utilisation, larger volume of physical exports, quality control and market promotion.

Reviewing the export performance in the first ten months of the current fiscal year, the DCMLA said that the earnings during July-April period 1984-85 totalled Taka 2040 crore (796.02 million dollars) representing an increase of 30.32 percent in Taka terms (14.82 percent in dollar terms) compared to the related level during the corresponding period last year.

He said that the performance over the first ten months of the current fiscal year offered no ground for self-complacency. There was a greater need to boost export earnings in view of the increasing import-export gap in the country, he added.

The DCMLA observed that the country's export trade sector during 1984-85 had been marked by a fall in physical volume but a rise in price in case of traditional items and a substantial volume-wise increase, but a marked decline in price of non-traditional items. The decrease in physical volume

of exports in case of traditional items was about 25.72 percent and the increase for non-traditional items was 22.52 percent during July-April period of the current fiscal year, he added.

The Air Vice-Marshal noted that the traditional items had been projected to contribute 62 percent and the non-traditional items, 38 percent of the overall export target of Taka 2765 crores in 1985-86.

The EPC meeting was attended by the high officials of the Commerce, Jute industries Agriculture Ministries and other concerned agencies of the Government. The representatives of various chambers of commerce and industries and different trade and industry associations took part in the deliberations of the meeting.

Call to Lower Interest Rate

Mr M.A. Sattar, President Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) suggested at the meeting for lowering the rate of interest for export credit finance from 12 percent to 10 percent, in case of traditional items and from 9 percent to 7 percent in case of non-traditional items. The other suggestions made by FBCCI chief included granting of cash subsidy in place of existing XPL (Export Performance Licence) activating the One-Stop Service Cell at the Export Promotion Bureau and more extended facilities for shipping and handling arrangements at ports.

Power Failure Deplored

Mr Mahbubur Rahman, President Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DCCI) noted that power failures and delays in obtaining import licences for raw materials including packing materials for export oriented industries were impeding the performance in the export sector. He pleaded for extended rebate facilities in the form of export duties rationalisation of existing duty draw back facilities and conversion of XPL sanctions from the existing FOB to CIF basis. He called for Government support and facilities for setting up export houses.

Syed Manzur Elahi, Acting President Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry pleaded for an urgent review of the fiscal and monetary incentives and revising them to stimulate export competitiveness. He pointed out that strong dollars had become a major problem for export competitiveness of Bangladeshi goods. "In view of artificial stability of Taka-US dollar exchange rate, the exporters are facing increasing difficulties in sustaining price competitiveness in major markets," he noted.

The President of Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Khulna Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Rajshahi Chamber of Commerce and Industries and the representatives of Bangladesh Tea Association and Bangladesh Ready made Garments Association also took part in the discussions on the export proposals for 1985-86.

In all, 280 specific proposals were placed before the EPC meeting for consideration. The proposals covered various sectoral issues, fiscal and monetary incentives, cash subsidy, export credit guarantee scheme etc.

Four items including jute, readymade garments, tea and potato dominated the proceedings of the EPC meeting.

Better Deal for Jute

Jute Secretary K.M. Rabbani told the EPC meeting that the Government had decided to offer a three-year credit programme for the jute industry to overcome the crisis of 1984-85 originating from a steady rise in raw jute prices and series of wage hikes and increase in other associated cost. He was, however, optimistic about better jute crop prospects for the coming season and felt that raw jute prices at the level of Taka 300 per bale would be remunerative one for both jute cultivators and the jute industry.

Growing Alarm in Garment Units

The Readymade Garments Association maintained that the unplanned growth of readymade garment units had become a cause for growing alarm. The representative of the association apprehended that over one hundred units in the sector would face closure in the next six months time, leading to severe problems in recovery of bank credits which were extended to the related units.

Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) came under heavy fire from the representatives of the private sector for failure to arrange credit finance for export of potato. One private sector representative told the meeting that the bank had failed to provide credit funds for export of only 500 tons of potato on a revolving basis although he had procured after desperate efforts an export order for ten thousand tons of potato from Singapore. The procurement of the order involved a total expenditure of Taka 70 000 on account of business trips and other ancillary purposes, he said.

In the tea sector the emphasis was placed at the meeting on quality improvement. Strong pleas were made for withdrawing the export duty on tea in view of the slump in tea prices in the international market.

CSO: 4600/1668

IRAN

TEHRAN RADIO DISCUSSES IRAQI ATTACKS ON CITIES

GF181306 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 18 Jun 85

/Commentary by the Research Group of the Central News Unit/

/Text/ The widespread demonstrations of our country's people on Jerusalem Day and in favor of the continuation of the imposed war until final victory had critical repercussions inside the country and across the region. It was able to foil many of the enemy's intentions and aims with regard to military warfare against civilian areas and psychological war against the people.

Until now there have been many explanations for the renewal of bombardment of towns and residential areas. The inability of the Saddam regime in facing the warriors of Islam on the battlefronts in the west and the south and resorting to attacks against civilian targets in order to put pressure on the people living in those areas turned out to be an inverted pressure on the /Iranian/ Government.

These are among the elements which are easily understood. Despite this, paying attention to other aspects can help in clarifying the situation. But before looking into these elements one must keep in mind that in a psychological war against our people, two methods have been used to push them in a planned direction which will be discussed.

The first was bombardment of civilian areas in our country, causing fear in the people, and the second was a psychological bombardment by foreign radios during the time that the Saddam regime continued its crimes and destruction of nonmilitary targets.

While witnessing the surprising silence of international bodies such as the United Nations and the Security Council, we see alongside this silence the foreign radios creating a turbulent and chaotic atmosphere around this situation. Of course there was one element helping them along in this midst: that was the announcement of figures and information from responsible government circles. Only the location of the bomb or rocket explosions were not mentioned, but the number of martyrs and the extent of damages to people's property were announced.

But the Saddam regime was totally silent on the extent of damage caused to Baghdad and more than 20 other Iraqi towns, including Basra. In this way the

foreign radios were able to broadcast pointed analyses alongside the figures published by the internal news sources and the Iraqi regime's silence. In this way they hoped to weaken the people's resolve and morale side by side with the military bombardments to instill fear and defeat in the nation.

The silence of all the international bodies concerning the types of Soviet weapons used by Saddam's army and the U.S. backing for the regime in Baghdad clarifies one point. That is: the West and East have reached a unified conclusion that now is the right time to put pressure on the Muslim people of Iran to force them into a surrender and compromise with the Iraqi regime.

In addition to this, presently, one subject is being propagated. That is that the war has reached a deadlock and that Iran is unable to carry out final decisive operations.

Now we consider the severe propaganda and the lies of the internal and external counterrevolutionaries on the subject of the people being weary of the continuation of the war and the staging of some demonstrations against it. Not only the Saddam regime, but also his backers believed that it was possible to pressure Iran's leaders with a new military and psychological push, to force them to give up their steadfast position.

The radio of an imperialistic country broadcasts from start to finish slogans from a communist organization newspaper and asks for an end to the Iranian's resistance in the face of the Zionist enemy. Every night the most sophisticated methods of psychological warfare are used alongside military bombardment and it becomes clear to all that there is a definite coordination which in itself comprises a plot.

Therefore it can be summarized that one of the aims in the renewal of the war against cities and civilian areas in this country by Saddam's regime, and the insane propaganda attacks of the foreign radios, is to push the people's thinking toward the view within the framework of surrendering to the Iraqi regime.

Despite this, despite the efforts made by Saddam's regime, despite the continued efforts of foreign radios and mass media monopolies, and despite the rumor-mongerings of the counterrevolution, on Jerusalem Day our people poured into the streets. They amazed all witnesses throughout the world.

The military and psychological warfare not only did not weaken the resolve of the people, they poured into the streets wearing shrouds and demonstrated while there was a real possibility that they would not return home alive. The demonstrations on Jerusalem Day showed the reaction of a people in the face of plots by world aggressors.

In some border towns in our country these demonstrations turned bloody. In some others the people were under clear threats of air raids. Despite this, no one left the demonstrations. In that huge procession, the people with their presence and their slogans showed their support for the continuation of their resistance. They rejected any thoughts or plans for a compromise.

In any case by holding these demonstrations it became clear to Saddam, his backers and the counterrevolutionaries that they had been wrong in their calculations and that the enemy's attacks against civilian are as in reality caused the strengthening of the people's ranks.

Of course the foreign radios all remained silent toward these demonstrations and they followed their usual methods of propaganda. Meanwhile, it is possible that the Iraqi regime will continue its past crimes, but the people who carried out their demonstrations under bombardment painted the most perfect picture for them.

CSO: 4640/623

IRAN

IRAN-LIBYA JOINT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED BY IRNA

LD240821 Tehran IRNA in English 0716 GMT 24 Jun 85

/"Iran-Libya Joint Communique" /IRNA headline/

/Text/ Libya is staunchly standing beside Iran in its confrontation with a war imposed on her by the Iraqi regime on the orders of the U.S. imperialism, Arab reactionaries and Zionism, said a joint communique of Iran and Libya Sunday.

The communique, issued at the end of a 4-day official visit of Majlis speaker Akbar Hasemi-Rafsanjani to Libya, announced the formation of a joint political-military committee headed by the foreign ministers of the two countries.

The two sides stressed on resistance against Zionism, U.S. imperialism and lackey reactionaries, reiterating their determination to expand confrontation with all plots hatched against the Islamic world.

Iran and Libya also emphasized on their support for all popular, especially Islamic, revolutions and cooperation with all the oppressed people of the world until the determination of their fate by themselves and their freedom from any type of aggression.

The two sides took note of provocative measures of the U.S. imperialism and reactionary regimes against Libya and its security and stability. The Islamic Republic of Iran announced its support for Libya in her fight for the maintenance of its rights in defending Sirt Island as an inseparable part of Libyan waters.

Referring to the issue of Palestine and the present situation in Lebanon, Iran and Libya condemned plots against Palestine entity and revolution, specially the present condition in Lebanon in which Palestinian refugee camps are being hit.

Moreover, the communique added, such a situation was a plot against the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the September First Revolution of Libya, as well as a conspiracy against the armed struggles of Palestinians and revolutionary Muslim forces there.

The two sides stressed that Shi'ite Muslims were away from such conspiracies, calling on Shi'ite Muslims to deprive the enemy of the opportunity, thwart the plot and give a lesson to the plotters.

Further on the issue of Palestine, the joint communique announced the full commitment of both sides to the liberation of all Palestinian lands and for the annihilation of the Zionist entity.

The two sides, emphasizing their serious confrontation with any compromising and treacherous solution aimed at damaging Palestine aspiration, reiterated their full-fledged support for the Palestine Salvation Front and all combatant Palestinians to provide the front with the opportunity to play its role for the liberation of Palestine and resistance against any direct or indirect negotiations and against any surrender to plots designed by traitor regimes of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the submissive Palestinians front. /as received/

The communique also referred to the alliance between Iraq and Egypt which is being supported by imperialism.

Referring to other international issues, the two sides announced their decision to form the Gods Army to liberate Palestine and to establish revolutionary and Islamic relations in the world.

Iran and Libya rejected the lowering of oil prices even if it resulted in the reduction in production quotas and called on the oil-producing countries to stabilize their oil prices as a balancing power to safeguard the interests of the Third World countries.

The two sides confirmed the legitimate sovereignty of the Chad national unity and the struggles of the Chadian people in the materialization of national reconciliation.

Both sides condemned measures of the racist Pretoria regime and announced their support for the SWAPO which is fighting for the independence of Namibia.

CSO: 4600/505

IRAN

KHAMENE'I COMMENTS ON IRP 'SACRIFICES'

GF290830 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 29 Jun 85

/Text/ According to the Central News Unit, President Seyyed 'ali Khamene'i travelled to Qom to attend ceremonies to honor the martyrs of the 7th Tir /Iranian month 21 Jun-21 Jul/ tragedy on the fourth anniversary. He met His Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri yesterday.

President Seyyed 'ali Khamene'i attended a memorial service for the 7th Tir martyrs held at the Feyziyeh Madresseh-ye /theological school/. Also attending the service were the various sections of the Hezbollahi martyr-nurturing people of Qom and Mr Sanehi, the chief of prosecutor; Hashemi, the SAIRI chief; some members of the Qom theological seminary; a group of local and military officials; and scholars as well as clergymen.

The president paid homage to the self-sacrificing people of Qom and the noble martyrs including personages such as Dr Behesti and Mohammad Montazeri. He said: the 7th Tir tragedy is the greatest catastrophe of our revolution, not merely as an historical issue or a bitter experience but also as an important crucible of our revolution. Hence we should study closely the roots of this disaster and if we wish to learn from the historical crises, we should examine the short-term as well as long-range effects of these phenomena.

Referring to the positive effects of these incidents on the Islamic revolution, the president said: These incidents were a considerable blow to the Islamic revolution. But what is significant is that this blow did not stem or slow down the trend of our revolution. The wheels of the revolution did not grind to a halt, it proved beneficial to the revolution in the long run.

Continuing his speech on the advantages of this incident to the revolution, Mr Khamene'i said: This occurrence proved instrumental in establishing the sway of the Imam's line during the grand course of the revolution and it also made the people aware that the revolution had enemies who could possibly harm them. This was a warning to the people that they should not forget the enemy.

He went on: The 7th Tir incident also served to make the people recognize the worth and the role of the valuable figures of the revolution and to make them realize that faces such as that of Dw Beheshti have immense value. This incident accentuated the value of the other martyrs who have been taken away from us.

In other words, this event was the means of proving the sincerity of officials in seeking martyrdom to all. The people have learned much from this incident and have realized how to safeguard their unity, how to eliminate the elements of discord and to promote unity.

Alluding to the factors which prevented this bitter incident from interfering in the course of the revolution and in fact served to galvanize it, President Khamene'i added: Among the factors which were responsible for not allowing any harm to the Islamic revolution despite many setbacks, especially the 7th Tir tragedy, was the presence of a leadership. The presence of a leadership and the nature of the principles of leadership in the Islamic revolution was the guarantee. This is the fundamental difference between our revolution and other revolutions of the world. The Islamic revolution of Iran has a reliable axis and that is the leader, the Vali-ye Faqih.

Another feature is the awareness of the people of current affairs. The people displayed a miraculous acumen during the time the liberals and the Hypocrites were involved in propaganda against the revolutionary elements and they tackled everything with perception. If the people had not been alert, this incident would not have become an advantage to the revolution.

The other aspect was the presence of the forces of the Imam's line on the scene. Individuals who comprehended the designs of the liberals and the Hypocrites for the Islamic revolution played a positive role in the rapid and remarkable continuation of the revolution. The last point is the solidarity and optimism of the people in resolving difficulties despite the counterrevolution's efforts to depict the revolution as having reached an impasse because the people's unity foiled all these plots. This incident became an incident which strengthened the revolution.

In conclusion, President Khamene'i said: The whole world's eyes are riveted on the revolution and the Iranian nation. Today the greatest occurrence which the world has witnessed in the past decade and which has drawn the attention of the nations and political experts of the world is the Islamic revolution of Iran. The people's vigilance must increase daily and the people should find time to ponder over political issues from various perspectives. The political and cultural growth of the people which safeguards this revolution and the media, including the radio and television, play a sensitive role in this regard. The enemy wishes to create disunity which we must counteract and it is the responsibility of officials to keep the flame of hope alight in the hearts of the people. The people have the greatest affection for the revolution, Islam, the Imam, and have certain expectations from us which is quite natural. Hence officials must invest in their policies and their subsequent implementation. The fact that people are hopeful is an indication of their own efficiency.

President Khamene'i also visited the holy shrine of Hazrat Ma'sumeh (peace be upon her) and attended the resting places of the martyrs of the Mehrab /an arch in the mosque/ and the martyrs of the 7th Tir tragedy and the martyrs of the Islamic revolution. He offered prayers to their memory.

CSO: 4640/626

IRAN

MAJLIS SPEAKER MEETS WITH JAPANESE MUSLIMS

LD031619 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 3 Jul 85

/Text/ Continuing his visit to Japan, Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani today met with ministers of foreign trade, industries and economic planning of that country, as well as with industrialists and members of the Economic Federation of Japan, and had discussions with them about various fields of economic cooperation and commercial relations between the two countries.

According to a report from the Central News Unit in Tokyo, the directors of Islamic societies and organizations also met Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani this morning and talked about the situation of the Japanese Muslims and their needs and activities. In this meeting, which was also attended by the directors of Islamic centers of Japan, the Islamic Friendship Society of Japan, Islamic centers of Hokkaido, the Islamic Academy in Toga-Shima, the Mesbah Islamic Society and some of the members of other Islamic societies of Japan, a report was submitted to Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani about the situation of the Muslims in that country. The participants in these meetings announced that, according to official figures of the Japanese Government, 50,000 Muslims live in that country and there are about 35 Islamic centers. In response to questions from Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani about the problems and difficulties of Japanese Muslims, the participants said: The insufficient number of mosques and the lack of Islamic schools in Japan are among the most important difficulties of Japanese Muslims. According to this report, there is one mosque in Tokyo and there are other mosques in Kobe in the southern part of Japan. However, the mosque in Tokyo has not been used for the past 2 years due to the dilapidated nature of the building.

In this meeting, the directors of Islamic centers and societies asked the Japanese Government to put land at their disposal for the construction of mosques and Islamic schools; and they also asked for help from Islamic countries for the cost of the construction of those buildings. In this meeting Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that he will discuss the problems of the Japanese Muslims with the Japanese prime minister. He also made recommendations about the need for unity among Japanese Muslims.

CSO: 4640/625

IRAN

GOVERNMENT OFFICES DESIGNATED AS AIR RAID SHELTERS

LD271720 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 27 Jun 85

/Text/ The air raid shelters mobilization and support staff headquarters has announced in a statement: In order to prevent the possible dangers arising from enemy air raids the buildings of government organs, which are superior from the safety standpoint and considered suitable as shelters, are ready for use by the public and are indicated with the necessary signposts. The statement further states that these buildings may be used by the people in the streets during the day when enemy air raids take place. During the night the inhabitants of the quarters surrounding these buildings could make use of them during air raids.

The statement also requests that people, in order to facilitate traffic and to help our responsible official brothers in these buildings and also in order to frustrate possible enemy plots, refrain most definitely from carrying all sorts of parcels, bags and other additional paraphernalia, and that if they observe anything suspicious they should speedily report the matter to the responsible officials in these buildings. When the air raid ends they should vacate the said buildings. It is obvious that because of their limited capacity such buildings can house only the inhabitants of a small part of the city and the inhabitants of the surrounding area. For the rest of our compatriots measures are already being undertaken by the air raid shelters mobilization and support staff headquarters and when progress is achieved with regard to these measures this will gradually be brought to the attention of the public.

In another statement the air raid shelters mobilization and support staff headquarters also called on those people who own the following suitable residential buildings with car parks and basements that could be used as shelters to install signposts and thus accommodate therein their own neighbors during enemy air raids: buildings with concrete roofs at least four storeys high, buildings with prefabricated block ceilings at least five storeys high, buildings with metal girders and brick arched roofs at least six storeys high, and buildings at least seven or more storeys high.

We would like to point out that apart from the basements the first to the third floors of such buildings could also be used as shelters.

The statement also called on those of our compatriots who possess such buildings and who are prepared to help their own neighbors to discuss the situation with the air raids shelters mobilization and support staff headquarters in Tehran on telephone Nos 6162567, 6602300, while those in provincial cities, should report the same to the governors' offices.

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS U.S. ARMS, AID TO INDIA

GF251634 Karachi MASHRIG in Urdu 16 Jun 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The Reverberations of U.S. Aid to India"]

[Excerpts] New inventions are appearing at a fast pace in today's world.

In the war industry new arms appear, in fact new arms systems appear, and the obsolete arms are discarded. However in this industry the obsolete arms are seldom junked. This is because there are so many developing countries who never possessed the junked arms of the developed countries.

Today the Soviet Union and especially the United States have achieved the near ultimate in destructive nuclear and chemical weapons and are now busy developing weapon systems to be used in space. Their conventional weapons have in many instances become obsolete too fast. To recover some of the costs, they would like to sell these obsolete arms for money as well as political gains. This policy also helps keep alive their arms industries. This kind of trading is at present going on between the United States and India.

India, because of its vast potential markets and great population, can provide a good market for such trading. India has also been a big purchaser of arms. After acquiring all kinds of weapons from the Soviet Union, India now wants to acquire the latest U.S. technology and weapons although it has been given by the Soviets certain types of arms that even other communists were not being given by the Soviet Union.

For this purpose the Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, is visiting the United States. U.S. officials also appear to have become very kind toward India. The United States, despite the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. arms commitments to Pakistan, seems ready to trade in various kinds of spying and surveillance equipment, various offensive and defensive weapons, antisubmarine devices and electronics equipment together with the necessary technology to India.

When the United States was supplying arms to Pakistan, it asked for guarantees that the arms would not be used against India. It has not asked India for a similar assurance benefiting Pakistan.

The United States wants to engage in such business to wean India from the Soviet Union and to provide a market for its arms industry.

However reports received on Rajiv Gandhi's meetings with President Reagan and other U.S. leaders reveal that India, using its nonalignment cover, does not want to render obsolete its 20-year-old friendship agreement with the Soviet Union. India in fact speaks for the Soviet Union in matters affecting Afghanistan and in the case of South Asia, it would like to replace British imperialism.

The U.S. leaders are only asking Rajiv to assure that the technology supplied by the United States to India will not be passed on to either the Soviet Union or any other communist country.

We believe that the Indian premier will not hesitate to provide such an assurance because the Indian rulers have always been past masters in putting different interpretations to their words and assurances whenever the need has arisen. They are quite capable of passing on everything to the Soviet Union and yet maintain that they have passed on no such information.

While nobody can ask the United States to act against the interests of its trade and industry, one must think what results this policy of backing an expansionist power in Asia will bring. By transferring advanced military technology to India is the United States helping the Soviet plan for Asian security?

CSO: 4656/144

PAKISTAN

SOVIET THREAT TO MUSLIMS VIEWED, SECTARIANISM DENOUNCED

GF251526 Lahore NAWA-E WAGT in Urdu 20 Jun 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The Real Danger From the Red Flag"]

[Excerpts] The federal minister for justice and parliamentary affairs, Mr Iqbal Ahmad Khan, has stressed the need for sectarian unity and the need to ignore differences that may cause discord among Muslims or harm their cause. He was speaking at an Iftar [fast breaking reception] at the Shi'ites religious association. He assured his Shi'ite brothers that their demands are being reviewed and that a committee has been set up to solve their problems. But he also said that if the red flag came from the North, there will be no questioning whether it is a Sunni mosque or a Shi'ite one. Only the fact that a person is a Muslim will be enough to subject him to misery and torture.

The minister's warning is very timely and realistic. The tyranny and cruelty unleashed by the red flag bearers on the nonaligned and traditionally free Muslim country of Afghanistan and the destruction and genocide there is reminiscent of the Hitler and Mongol era. It is continuing in this enlightened era when the United Nations is striving for a united world.

The system of the red flag bearers is based on atheism but the allegedly religious Indian example is an eyeopener. When the genocide of Muslims begins in an area of India and the Hindus attack the lives and property of Muslims, they do not pause to ask whether the Muslims they are killing is a Sunni or a Shi'ite, a Deobandi or a Barelvi [minor sects among Indian Muslims]. It is also immaterial whether he lives in one province or another or whether he speaks a certain dialect. It seems sufficient that he is a Muslim and should be killed.

It is a source of regret that educated, perceptive, and enlightened people also have preferences on the basis of province, sect, language, clans, and lineage. The basic reason for this is that we do not have a higher national interest and are involved in petty, internecine bickerings. As a result, our aspirations and aims have also become rather low and narrow. The worst part is that even our political groups have been formed on sectarian considerations. Their dealings are lacking the goodwill and camaraderie which signifies that all Muslims are brothers. Even if they

pray together, they discuss the differences in rituals later. When these so-called religious parties join with the secular ones and say that religion is a private matter, then they seem to go overboard.

The common factor in all the tragedies from Andalusia to Mesopotamia through the ages to the fall of Dhaka is that whenever Muslims gave priority to sects, language, and lineage over religion, they became vulnerable to their enemies and were swallowed by them. Perceptive persons can see even today what the interests and aspirations of those who give precedence to considerations of province, class, or sect instead of the Islamic bond are, and with whom they have forged relations.

CSO: 4656/144

PAKISTAN

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWED, ANTI-PAKISTAN STANCE NOTED

GF251240 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] Mrs Gandhi should really be at peace with her son, Rajiv, reserving the full venom of his fury for Pakistan. Only the innocent might have expected any departure from Mrs Gandhi's policies. Had there been even a ghost of a chance that Rajiv would move away from Mrs Gandhi's "Pakistan policy," she will not have nurtured him for the office.

Mr Gandhi's Moscow visit seems to have gone a bit too well. He is talking tall and tough. Having unleashed his fury on our policies, he now wishes to thrust his "friendship" on us and on his own terms. Friendship we seek, with India and all others, for that matter, but on the basis of sovereignty. It is the attitude and not the size of our neighbours which determines our or deters our quest for friendship. This is amply demonstrated by our classic friendship with China on the one side and our smaller neighbours on the other. China is bigger than India in every respect. But it is China's non-hegemonistic approach that has endeared that country to Pakistan in particular and to quite a few others in the Third World. India must learn to match its words with its deeds. India, with an arrogant, accident-prone relationship with every other of its neighbours should be the last to pontificate to us.

Rajiv's mute stand on Afghanistan, justifying intervention, could have been no different. After all India had played a similar sinister role in 1971. How could India take a moral position on Afghanistan? In fact, there are reasons to believe that the final date for Soviet intervention could possibly be linked to Mrs Gandhi's re-emergence on the Indian political scene. Being assured that the Janata was doomed to defeat and reassured that an Indira victory would guarantee the Soviets India's silence or muted protest on their intervention, the Soviet Union walked into a non-aligned Muslim country. Strangely enough, despite being chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement, neither Mrs Gandhi had, nor has Rajiv taken a moral position on Afghanistan or on the Iraq-Iran war issue. Is it because both countries transgressed are Muslim?

By justifying Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, Rajiv has morally impaired chairmanship of the NAM. Had the Soviets any reason to intervene they should have first knocked at the door of the

United Nations, NAM or the IOC before taking the law into their own hands.

After his "very good" visit to the Soviet Union, Rajiv hopes to reap rich rewards in Europe and the U.S. In constantly asking the U.S. to pressure us on our nuclear programme and on other issues sacred to the people and government of Pakistan, Rajiv is probably being guided by his own perception of a telling influence of the U.S. on this country's government. Hopefully, he will be proven wrong. But let him visit the U.S. clearly assured that U.S. influence on Pakistan and its people is far below that of Washington's influence on India and the teeming millions of that vast country.

Rajiv will perhaps do his best to delink Pakistan from the U.S. and "force" Pakistan to share an Indian perception. This country will not come to grief if it is "jilted" once again by the U.S. It is only then that we would draw upon our untapped reservoirs of strength within Pakistan and from our natural inalienable friends in the Muslim world. Our present day relationship with the U.S. gives us little security while making us suspect in the eyes of our neighbours with whom otherwise we have no quarrel. In a truly non-aligned India and Pakistan lies destiny of the peoples of both countries. But does Rajiv's India have the inner strength to disown Indira's India? Only a rational India is a friendship that flows from mutual goodwill and respect for one another, a friendship free from fury and force.

CSO: 4600/503

PAKISTAN

'WRETCHED CONDITION' OF EDUCATION LAMENTED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 15 May 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Lamentable Condition of Education in Pakistan"]

[Text] Federal Minister of Finance Dr Mahbudul Haq, expressing concern over the worsening condition of education in Pakistan, stated that if the UNESCO standard is to be taken into consideration the percentage of literacy in Pakistan diminishes from 26 percent to below 10 percent whereas the percentage of Pakistanis going in for higher education does not exceed 0.62 percent.

The impression of illiteracy given by the federal minister of finance is very disappointing. The intelligentsia, including the government, are not unaware of the prevailing conditions in the field of education. But what is most disappointing is the fact that every government that comes into power claims to have done away with illiteracy. Though commissions are established from time to time for bringing about revolution in the field of education and proposals of basic importance are worked out, unfortunately, they are not implemented. We have before us the results of such irresponsible and imprudent actions.

Facts and figures are a clear indication that the literacy rate which was 35 percent at the time of independence has now diminished to 25 percent or, according to Dr Mahbudul Haq, is now only 10 percent. The question that arises is how this problem can best be resolved. According to some circles the real reason behind our backwardness in the field of education is the fast rate of growth of our population. But the conditions prevailing in the third world countries expose the flimsiness of this point. The rate of growth of the population in Sri Lanka and India is by no means slow, nor are the conditions in those countries in any way better than ours, but the literacy rate is far better than in Pakistan. South Korea, which has been the victim of conditions far worse than ours, has achieved an enviable 100 percent rate of literacy. Similarly, conditions were much the same in Japan and West Germany, which were the worst targets of war destruction but as a result of an increased rate of literacy and their unquenchable desire and determination, they once again attained a prominent place in the comity of developed and industrialized nations.

In Pakistan, on the contrary, we are still engaged in debating primary issues like the system and medium of education and keeping in view the conditions currently prevailing in the country, one fears that for some time yet to come this issued appears to be far from resolved. The importance given to education by Islam demands that we should develop this important sector of life on a preferential basis right from the beginning and, keeping in view our temperament and tradition, we should have made Urdu the medium of education at every level without any pretence or excuse. The "maktab" scheme too was beneficial from this view, but owing to defective planning and lack of interest shown by the education department, satisfactory results could not be obtained from this scheme as well.

One of the reasons put forth for our disappointing performance in the education sector is the lack of funds allocated to it. It is an undeniable fact that we have been spending only 1.7 percent of our gross national income on education. The irony of fate is that on top of this, even out of this meager amount, funds are withdrawn for spending in other sectors. The conditions of our schools as well as that of our teachers can best be described as non-enviable. Intelligent people, first of all, do not take up the teaching profession and, if they do, they are very soon disheartened because of the conditions prevailing in that sector and join other professions. As against this, president Ziaul Haq, while talking about the situation prevailing in the field of education in (South) Korea, acknowledged the fact that the salaries of the teaching staff are much higher than that of people in other sectors. Special attention is given to education not only in (South) Korea but in many other countries of the third world, and in this lies the secret of their speedy economic and industrial progress.

The purpose underlying this discussion is that we must change our attitude of apathy towards education without any further delay and must put a stop once and for all to the process of starting impossible projects and spending tens of millions of rupees on publicizing them. We must also stop imitating costly ways of education and teaching followed by others and adopt ways compatible with our conditions, traditions and values, so that by following these we are able to achieve greater benefits with comparatively smaller resources. Keeping in mind our historical traditions, we would also like to state that besides taking other measures for improving education we must adopt the policy of reducing the influence of administration on educational matters. Alongside governmental educational institutions, we must set up an independent educational organization capable of planning and financing long term projects. Such an organization should also be capable of implementing official projects for which the administration should provide abundant funds annually, because expenditure on education must not be considered a financial burden and, without achieving reasonable progress in the field of education, it will not be possible to reach the level (of progress) attained by countries like (South) Korea, Japan and (West) Germany.

9315

CSO: 4656/136

PAKISTAN

EXPORT CRISIS TERMED 'ENDEMIC', CONCERN EXPRESSED

GF261910 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 19 Jun 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Endemic Export Crisis"]

[Text] The news on Pakistan's foreign exchange front continues to swing between the bad and the worse. Export earnings of 223.7 million dollars for April compare badly with the preceding month's 329.7 million dollars (and 225.4 million dollars for April last year). For the tenth month of the current financial year ending in April, the total exports were only 1,951.9 million dollars compared to 2,315 million dollars in the same period last year. And adding to difficulties is the fall in remittances of Pakistanis overseas, down to 2.4 billion dollars from 2.7 billion last year. If all this will produce a deficit in the balance of payments in the current account of 1,662 million dollars, or Rs. 25 billion, that is to be expected, however demoralizing. Capital inflow will reduce that record deficit by Rs. 13 billion, says Dr Mahbubul Haq, and yet the net deficit of Rs. 12 billion is indeed very large.

The painful fact is that despite all the steps taken, including devaluation of the rupee, which made Pakistan's export cheaper by 60 percent, the increasing export rebates, and other concessions, Pakistan's exports have slipped from the peak of 2,958 million dollars in 1980-81. Last year, however, the exports recovered to an extent to reach 2,768 million dollars. But on the basis of the latest figures it appears doubtful whether the exports for the whole year would touch the estimate of 2,633 million by June 30.

The situation would not have become critical and left the country with foreign exchange reserve equal to six weeks of imports if the home remittance had not been falling at one end and imports had not been rising at the other. The situation next year, after the balance of payments deficit of 562 million dollars recorded in 1982-83, 1,000 million dollars last year, and the current year's estimated deficit of 1,662 million dollars can be far worse because of the import of nearly a million tons of wheat which has to be arranged for.

Undoubtedly there will be a fall in the phoney exports by those who had vailed of the 2.5 percent interest rate on export re-finance and traded on loans instead of on exports, as Dr Mahbubul Haq rightly said. It is certainly proper to raise the interest rate to 6 percent and assist only bonafide exporters. But the fact remains that despite devaluation, increasing export rebates, cheap export finance and a variety of tax refunds and relief, the exports have been slipping while India's exports last year went up by 24 percent. And now exporters maintain that the increase in energy cost for manufacturers and higher transportation costs following the budget would raise the exports cost further. Undoubted inflation and higher wages which go with it have pushed up the export costs, while enough attention is not paid to the quality of the export products always. Hence the export sector calls for a detailed analytical new study and effective remedies. Conventional cures have not worked. Far more imaginative steps are called for and must be forthcoming.

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PAKISTAN

OPTIMISTIC VIEW ON AFGHAN TALKS DISCUSSED, COUNTRY'S CONCERNS

GF241810 Rawalpindi THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 19 Jun 85 p 6

[Editorial: "Optimism on Afghanistan"]

[Text] Hopes raised about a possible solution of the Afghanistan issue have too often been frustrated in the past now to cause any euphoria among the students of Pakistan-Afghan relations. But it would also not be correct to dismiss Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's latest statement on the prospects of Geneva IV merely as an exercise in diplomatic artfulness. There are, specifically speaking three fairly clear points in his statement which need to be noted.

First, that Mr Diego Cordovez, U.N. secretary-general's special envoy, had done preparatory work and there was progress in "clarification of some issues." Our foreign minister was understandably reticent about the nature of the issues since clarified, but one would not be far wrong in the speculating that these related to the crucial matters of a timetable for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the nature of the guarantees that the Soviet Union expects as a precondition to its withdrawal. It is on account of the conflicting perceptions of these two matters by the parties to the negotiations that previous attempts at a compromise foundered.

Presumably it is because of the progress achieved this time that Sahabzada Yaqub Khan revealed that "some preliminary work has already been done on the drafts of instruments that form the comprehensive settlement." The second point in his statement is that "he looked forward with cautious optimism and would approach these talks with a positive spirit and a constructive frame of mind." This is not entirely a new stance. Pakistan's approach in the previous rounds of talks too has been positive and constructive but the new element in it now is of "cautious optimism."

To dampen this optimism in the past has been a less than flexible stand of the Soviet Union about the legitimacy of the Karmal region combined of course with its own reluctance to come forward as a party to the dispute.

Pakistan, on its part, has consistently held that governmental legitimacy can spring only from a free and fair expression of the will of the Afghan people, clearly implying thereby that Pakistan's objection is neither to the form of government in Kabul nor to the man who heads it, but that the present Kabul Government has to demonstrate not only to Pakistan but also to the rest of the world that it is there because the people of Afghanistan wish it to be there and not because the Soviet Union wants it to be there.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly claimed that the so-called socialist "revolution" in Afghanistan is irreversible and the attempts to put the clock back have to be resisted. Pakistan's view, based on norms of international morality on the other hand, is that the continuation of this "revolution" or otherwise is a matter that can be decided only by an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. These two stances, each with a logic of its own, may not be as irreconcilable as they seem at first glance.

For, taking the point to its logical conclusion, it is basically the protection of Soviet interests in Afghanistan that is being sought by the one and the protection of the legitimate rights of three million refugees that is being sought by the other. Hopefully, common ground can be found to accommodate both.

The third point to which Sahabzada Yaqub referred was the expected meeting in the near future of the representatives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It is well known now that an important item on the agenda of this meeting is Afghanistan. It is no secret now that the Soviet Union is not likely to budge unless it is given a guarantee by the United States that the Mujahidin, who are being supported by will receive no such support. In return the Afghan refugee repatriation with honour to their homes will be ensured. For if peace has to come and to last in the troubled land of Afghanistan, it can only be brought about by the two superpowers. The fact that the U.S.-USSR talks will be taking place at the same time as Geneva IV would therefore be a major positive element in the eventual solution of the Afghanistan problem. Our foreign minister warned against "dramatic results" but at the same time he said that there were prospects of "some progress" both in regard to substance and form for an eventual settlement of the Afghanistan issue. In any case, Geneva IV takes place in circumstances but appear to be more favourable than before.

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

OIL RESERVES IN SANGHAR--Karachi, June 15 -- It has been assessed that there are huge reserves of oil and petrol in Sanghar district. The experts have started a search of these items in the area. The engineers of the surveying team told PPI here the other day that they had started a survey on an experimental basis in Chak No 11 on Nawab Shah Road about 40 miles from here. Reserves of oil have also been expected in Hathungo, about six miles from here. [Text] [Karachi DAWN (Economic and Business Review) in English 16 Jun 85 p 1 GF]

IRON ORE DISCOVERED--Quetta, June 14 -- A team of Chinese experts has confirmed the availability of 50 million tonnes of iron ore reserves in Nokkundi area of Chagai district of Baluchistan, an official source said here today that the good quality iron ore reserves had average ferrous content of 50 percent. [sentence as published] Further investigation indicates that another 50 million tonnes of reserves might be available in the same area. Analytic study of the iron ore reserves carried out in Sweden and Japan also indicates that the reserves could be utilised by the Pakistan Steels. Pak Steels blast furnaces, if run on the Nokkundi iron ore deposits, could save annually about Rs. 250 million in foreign exchange. [Excerpt] [Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 14 Jun 85 p 12 GF]

SIKH PILGRIMS ARRIVE--A group of 435 Sikh pilgrims has arrived in Lahore on a 10-day visit to Pakistan in connection with the death anniversary of Maharaja Ranjit Singh [Sikh leader]. [Text] [Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT 27 Jun 85]

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